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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines Modernist literature as an aesthetic reaction to the 
endemic sense of loss in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Western culture. 
Focusing on the aesthetic, political, and ethical aspects of literary Modernism as it 
evolved from decadence in the 1890’s through to the “high Modernism” of the early 
1920’s, I read the formal and stylistic innovations that define Modernist literature as 
attempts to narrate the complicated and paradoxical experience of Modernism—the hope 
and optimism for a liberal cosmopolitan social order and a profound sense of loss for the 
stable, idyllic past.  The vacillation between these two positions becomes the “process” 
of Modernism; Modernist narrative literature can, therefore, be simultaneously read as 
both progressive and melancholic, defined as a persistent, unresolvable attitude of loss 
towards an object that may not have been in the subjects’ possession.  
 While the Modernists eagerly ascribed to such values as egalitarianism, the 
rejection of authority, and the transformative power of art, they began to question the 
virtues of scientific advance, democracy, mass culture, and the possibility of absolute 
truth and individual freedom.  I will argue that this perceived sense of loss, a pervasive 
feeling that the nature of individual existence has irrevocably changed, is the defining 
characteristic of literary Modernism.  Melancholia, however, problematizes the process 
of memorialization and history-making, and what modernism presents as an historic loss, 
might also be understood as a creative absence. Any artistic attempt to make visible the 
greatness that we can conceive is insufficient—therefore, the affectation of the 
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melancholic mode is painful, dejected, inconsolable. The object of loss in these cases 
typically inhabits some sort of “cultural archive”—that is, it is typically a lost ideal or 
abstraction, a value promoted by a cultural “metanarrative” that is perceived as having 
passed.  Therefore, the ideal (and its metanarrative) may not be actually lost, but simply 
absent.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Every age reaccentuates in its own way the works of its most immediate past. 
--Mikhail Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel”  
 
This dissertation will describe a means of reading Modernist literature as an 
aesthetic reaction to the endemic sense of loss in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century Western culture. A fundamental assertion will be that the formal and stylistic 
innovations that define Modernist literature are not merely an aesthetic exercise, but 
rather a reflection of the conflicts and upheavals occurring at or near the turn of the 
twentieth century—a politics of loss.  These literary innovations narrate the complicated 
and paradoxical experience of Modernism—the hope and optimism for a liberal 
cosmopolitan social order and a profound sense of loss for the stable, idyllic past.1  The 
vacillation between these two positions becomes the “process” of Modernism; Modernist 
narrative literature can, therefore, be simultaneously read as both melancholic and 
progressive. 
The paradoxical “backwards/forwards” stance of Modernist literature seems out 
of step with its avant-gardism. As Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane suggest, in 
the introduction to their landmark collection Modernism: 1890-1930, “the great works of 
Modernism live amidst the tools of modern relativism, skepticism, and hope for secular 
change; but they balance on the sensibility of transition, often holding in suspension the 
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forces that persist from the past and those that grow from the novel present” (49). To 
explore this paradox, my method will be to examine the process of Modernism (that is, 
an examination of the movement as it developed from decadence in the 1890’s through 
to the “high Modernism” of the early 1920’s) in regard to aesthetics, politics, and ethics, 
and how the highly recognizable characteristics of Modernist literature are indicative of 
the widespread sense of loss that pervades this cultural period.  The “process” of 
Modernism would be a disentangling from the value systems of the Enlightenment and 
Romanticism—that is, the primacy of rationality and freedom, in the former, and beauty 
and truth, in the latter. While the Modernists eagerly ascribed to such values as 
egalitarianism, the rejection of authority, and the transformative power of art, they began 
to question the virtues of scientific advance, democracy, mass culture, and the possibility 
of absolute truth and individual freedom.  I will argue that this perceived sense of loss, a 
pervasive feeling that the nature of individual existence has irrevocably changed, is the 
defining characteristic of literary Modernism.   
In utilitarian terms, “Modernism” is a retrospectively applied term describing the 
breadth of experimental and avant-garde literature produced in the early decades of the 
twentieth century.  Typical of literary periodizing, however, this definition reinforces the 
tendency for scholars to construct sensible narratives out of seemingly unrelated events 
and to make sensible divisions between categories. Taxonomy as a penchant for order 
and sequence can obscure more fluid and productive modes of inquiry. For instance, a 
dark line is customarily drawn to separate the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; this 
conceptually impermeable borderline is reinforced by library subject headings and 
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academic job descriptions.  Western culture did not suddenly become “modernist” on a 
specific date; the radical advances that occurred in culture, technology, politics, the arts, 
and science that were later categorized as “modernist,” although fast-moving, did not 
happen in the span of a decade, much less in a single year.  Thus, the tendency to focus 
our conception of Modernist literature on the years immediately preceding and in 
between the first and second world wars provides limits our understanding of late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century history, culture, and art.  As Raymond Williams 
asserts, by excluding the “great realists” (e.g. Gogol, Dickens, Flaubert) from the 
Modernist canon (as is often done), “this version of modernism refuses to see how they 
devised and organized a whole vocabulary and its structure of figures of speech with 
which to grasp the unprecedented social forms of the industrial city” (“When Was” 49). 
In supporting the larger argument, this dissertation seeks to shift the focus of Modernist 
studies slightly to “the left,” so to speak, and consider less the “moment” of Modernism 
and more the process of Modernism—that evolution from romantic, realist, and 
naturalist literature through decadent and avant-garde literature to the highly 
recognizable style of canonical “high Modernist” authors such as James Joyce, Virginia 
Woolf, or T.S. Eliot.  Reading the early Modernist works retrospectively, with 
knowledge of how Modernist literature would develop, provides us a new perspective 
that improves our understanding of the very challenging, even inscrutable, works that we 
now describe as “high” Modernist texts. 
For these (and many other) reasons, as the field of Modernist studies continues to 
evolve and expand, defining “Modernism” continues to present a challenge.2 
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Researchers who may very well be reading the same authors and studying the same 
historical events may use, in reference to the literature and movements of this period, the 
terms Victorian, late romantic, avant-garde, or decadent.  As well, Modernism can be 
quickly subdivided into its constituent –isms: Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, 
Symbolism, Aestheticism, Expressionism, Cubism, Futurism, Vorticism, Dadaism.  The 
use of these terms breeds confusion and, therefore, productive dialogue, so I do not 
advocate for their replacement, since consensus often becomes totalizing (as Jean-
François Lyotard suggests, “…invention is always born of dissension” (xxv)).  In her 
influential 2011 essay “Definitional Excursions: The Meanings of 
Modern/Modernity/Modernism,” Susan Friedman offers a number of critical “parataxes” 
to illustrate the perplexing, yet productive, contradictions in Modernist studies, leading 
to a simultaneous description of the terms modern, modernity, and modernism both as a 
“critical Tower of Babel, a cacophony of categories that become increasingly useless the 
more inconsistently they are used” and as “fertile terrain for interrogation, providing 
ever more sites for examination with each new meaning spawned” (497).  I am in 
agreement with the latter perspective, and attempts to define series of categories can 
easily derail any critical discussion. I would instead borrow Bradbury and McFarlane’s 
image of Modernism as “the bow-wave of a ship” and consider Modernism as a process 
or continuum, one that cannot understood only by studying a single example or moment 
(22).  Determining the points of origin and termination for this continuum are also 
difficult.  For that matter, it can be just as difficult to determine the direction of travel—
does Modernism face “forward” or “backward?”  Perhaps it is an ontological block to 
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adopt the binary model at all and assume that to be looking in one direction means the 
exclusion of the other. As Richard Lehan suggests in Literary Modernism and Beyond, 
“the modernists were not yet willing to write off mythic and symbolic reality. They 
could not reconcile theories of cyclical time and history with a belief in linear evolution 
and mechanical progress” (9). As Jean-Michel Rabaté observes, however, most 
historians of philosophy use the term “modernity” to refer to “a direct route from 
Descartes to the Enlightenment in a movement of thought that rejected religious 
authority and ended up stressing the political freedom allied with scientific knowledge” 
(1913 9). The Modernists were not quite ready to relinquish the past (although the 
concept of what was “the past” was problematic, as I shall explore in the first chapter of 
this dissertation). Adding to the terminological confusion is the fact that anything that 
critiques or rejects Enlightenment views is considered “anti-modern,” while the familiar 
term “modernist” is reserved for “aesthetic trends and describing how the apostles of the 
new attacked modernity while keeping an experimental edge in literary or artistic 
practices” (1913 10).  By applying Rabaté’s definition, we can then read Modernism as a 
critique of the process of modernity that is distinguished by a distinct break in its stance 
towards aesthetics, politics, and ethics. With regard to aesthetics, Modernism was avant-
garde, promoting stylistic and formal innovation and rejecting preceding literary 
techniques. Politically, Modernism ranged from socialism to fascism, but in all cases 
demonstrated a commitment to individual freedom and to communities formed upon 
ideals as opposed to nationalities or religious traditions. In terms of ethics, Modernism 
concerned itself chiefly with problems of alterity—that is, the ethics of relating to and 
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behaving as a stranger.3  Thus, to assign a literary work the designation “Modernist” is to 
say that the work is in the complicated position of both upholding and rejecting 
Enlightenment and Romantic values, to tear down the very ramparts upon which it stood, 
even as it stood atop them.  
Another typical means of defining a literary movement is by its canon—to know 
what Modernism was, we must only point to a list of its most prominent authors. This 
path is problematic, as well. As Friedman writes, the “heuristic tendency” when 
generating “definitional generalizations” is to “characterize the whole in terms of what 
the historian retrospectively believes to be its most influential of significant 
components” (509).  In other words, we do not present Joyce, Woolf, and Eliot as 
exemplars of literary Modernism not because they demonstrate specific, agreed-upon 
qualities of the literary movement; instead, they are selected as the standard-bearers a 
priori and the borderlines of literary Modernism are drawn around them.  To avoid this 
conceptual trap, we determine what the identifying characteristics of literary Modernism 
are and then consider texts that demonstrate all or some of these features.  The 
increasingly dominant trend in Modernist studies is, as Jessica Berman writes, to 
approach literary Modernism as, “a dynamic set of relationships, practices, problematics, 
and cultural engagements with modernity, rather than a static canon of works, a given set 
of formal devices, or a specific range of beliefs” (Commitments 7).  By approaching 
texts composed and published at or near the turn of the twentieth century in this way, we 
can begin to reconsider the Modernist canon.   
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New approaches to reading Modernist literature require an expansion of both 
time and space. In a 2008 PMLA essay, Rebecca Walkowitz and Douglas Mao describe 
the various expansions that define what they term the “new” Modernist studies, 
including not only temporal expansion, but also spatial, what they describe as the 
“transnational turn” of Modernist studies. Walkowitz and Mao identify three common 
manifestations of this transnational trend: scholarship that a) argues for the “inclusion of 
a variety of alternative traditions;” b) explores “transnational circulation and translation 
in the production of modernist art;” or c) examines how Modernists “responded to 
imperialism, engaged in projects of anti-colonialism, and designed new models of 
transnational community” (739).  This dissertation in particular takes a cue from the 
latter two modes as it considers how Modernist literature reconciles the old world to the 
new.  Geographically speaking, the typical division of “English literature” versus 
“American literature” can be problematic when approaching expatriate authors like T.S. 
Eliot or Henry James, who were essentially British, despite being born in America; 
peripheral Europeans like Joseph Conrad, Henrik Ibsen, or August Strindberg, who 
despite being non-native speakers are typically (or, in the case of Conrad, always) 
encountered in English; or “colonial” writers like Oscar Wilde or James Joyce, who 
frequently receive the polite nod of “& Irish” in the titles of literary anthologies, despite 
being Irish only by birth and entirely cosmopolitan in practice.  Assigning a single 
country of origin to such thoroughly “English” writers as Virginia Woolf and E.M. 
Forster can even be problematic, considering that their literary projects largely sought to 
undermine the nationalist and imperialist attitudes that so shaped their native country. 
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A seemingly more productive approach, then, would be to plasticate the temporal 
and geographical boundaries of literary Modernism and instead focus on formal or 
stylistic features.  Seeking to catalog the formal and stylistic features of such a protean 
body of narrative works, however, is also problematic.  As Berman argues, “even where 
modernism seems to exhibit certain formal preoccupations, such as textual 
defamiliarization, refusal of strict verisimilitude, or play with the vagaries of space and 
time,” these formal characteristics are “neither necessary nor ubiquitous conditions” but 
instead symptoms of a “particular attitude toward a specific literary horizon of 
expectations” (Commitments 7).  In other words, the structural features of the works are 
not what defines them as “Modernist,” but are instead markers of the innate attitude that 
distinguishes literary works of this period.4 Instead, Berman posits that Modernist 
narrative be approached as “a constellation of rhetorical actions, attitudes, or aesthetic 
occasions, motivated by the particular and varied situations of economic, social, and 
cultural modernity worldwide and shaped by the ethical and political demands of those 
situations” (ibid. 7).  In other words, we can read the progressive, experimental, and 
even challenging features of Modernist narratives as representative of the difficult 
process of becoming modern. 
Therefore, a goal of this dissertation is to explore how Modernist narratives can 
be read in terms of their symptomatic features; furthermore, I hope to elevate the 
discussion above the local, specific, or national, considering instead the more abstract 
aesthetic, political, and ethical struggles of Modernism.  In doing so, I proceed with four 
basic characteristics that distinguish Modernist works of literature: Self-awareness, 
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appropriation, formalism, and social commitment; with the first, conspicuous self-
awareness as a work of art or cultural practice, driving the latter three characteristics. 
The dramatic social, technological, philosophical, and political changes from the mid-
nineteenth century onward forced a total reconceptualization of subjectivity and the 
place of the individual within the modern global community. In seeking an 
understanding of this redefined position, Modernist authors often looked outside of their 
own local (both temporally and geographically) traditions and cultural practices for 
“new” modes of expression.  Hence, the self-aware modernist narrative might, for 
example, juxtapose Byzantine, British, and Oriental traditions.  Consequently, this self-
aware bricolage increases the emphasis on the formal structures of the work—at times 
seeming to elevate the form above the content.  This intense self-consciousness, often 
phrased as the “inward turn” of Modernism has led to the axiom that Modernist narrative 
is by definition “introspective.”5 As Jesse Matz argues, however, this intense aesthetic 
self-consciousness is actually a product of the Modernist preoccupation with social 
problems, particularly those that related to the “metropolitan perception.”  The new style 
of urban living, “wholly changed the writer’s job, by making life a matter of 
overwhelming crowds, lonely isolation, and cosmopolitan connections to the larger 
world of commerce and culture. Therefore, while Modern narratives may seem 
“autotelic—focused inward on itself, concerned only with its own styles and structures” 
Matz argues that they are formed in response to “public problems and responsibilities” 
(Modern Novel 79).  If we examine a range of Modernist narratives, we will discover at 
their core some sort of social problem, be it the problem of the “New Woman,” the 
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horrors of imperialism, classism, economic inequality, racism, religious bigotry, and 
nationalism, or even the dehumanizing effects of mass media, technology, and global 
commerce. 
 Although my discussion will be arranged chronologically—beginning with the 
“proto-Modernism” of the 1890’s and moving through to the “high Modernism” of the 
interwar years—that arrangement is more a matter of convenience than an attempt to 
fashion a chronology of Modernist literature. Instead, my discussion is thematically 
organized, focusing on the three major divisions of modern critical inquiry – aesthetics, 
politics, and ethics.6  In considering these thematic areas, I will examine texts that 
address crises in each of these three areas. 
Chapter II will provide the general theoretical and historical background that 
undergirds the textual analyses to follow in the later chapters.  The premise from which 
this dissertation proceeds is that the thematic, formal, and stylistic characteristics that 
today define Modernist narratives are a result of the self-perception that the modern age 
was becoming a period of “crisis,” an age of seismic shifts in the realms of science, 
politics, and cultural production that threatened the stability of meaning once enjoyed by 
citizens of earlier eras.  Whether or not this perception is true and accurate is up for 
debate; drawing on the fundamental theories of Sigmund Freud, I will present this 
generalized sense of loss as melancholia, defined as a persistent, unresolvable attitude of 
loss towards an object that may not have been in the subjects’ possession.  
Chapter III will begin in the 1890’s, commonly given the mournful descriptor fin 
de siècle, and focus on the Modernist attempt to reconcile conflicting aesthetic 
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paradigms.  To describe the larger paradigm, I present as one profound example of the 
melancholia inherent in Modernist literature the late-nineteenth century obsession with 
the biblical figure of Salome, the “dancing daughter” of Herodias.  Salome is present in 
three fin de siècle dramatic works: August Strindberg’s Miss Julie (1888), Henrik 
Ibsen’s Hedda Gabbler (1890), and Oscar Wilde’s Salome (1891).7  These treatments of 
the Salome plot are characteristic of decadent literature and the wider artistic culture of 
late nineteenth-century Europe.  Extending the dominant thread of scholarship in this 
area, which focuses on anxiety over gender performance, I will demonstrate that the 
anxiety that these works express is produced by the competition between aesthetic 
paradigms near the turn of the twentieth century.  Considering the disorienting aesthetic 
timeline of this period—wherein idealist romanticism evolves into realist naturalism and 
then anti-idealist decadence and Modernism—the avant-garde artists of the day would 
seek, by deploying old stories, to discover new meanings. This melancholic attachment, 
although a reaction to perceived loss, is in fact productive in that it lays the path for what 
will become known as Modernism. 
We may find in the Salome narratives of the late nineteenth century not only a 
desperate grasping for historical reference point, but, with the apex of European 
imperialism, a fascination with primitive and exotic cultures. The dawn of the new 
century saw the European empires at their most expansive; in particular, the British 
empire controlled one-third of the world’s population and one-quarter of the world’s 
landmass, including much of the “near east” and Africa.8  Imperialism heightened 
awareness of and exposure to other cultures had a profound influence on Modernist art, 
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in particular “primitivist” movements in visual art, music, and lyric poetry.  European 
imperialism created new possibilities for “Modernist” cosmopolitanism, both economic 
and intellectual.  Taken together, these works display a corresponding melancholic 
position that is suggestive of a particularly Modernist strain of cosmopolitanism—that 
valorizes stability of historical meaning—or “rootedness”—while simultaneously 
aspiring to create supranational communities. We can find this characteristic in 
Modernist novels that examine the conflict between the provincial and the global, the 
familiar and the strange, the self and the Other.9 
Authors who presage “mainstream” Modernism in English all hail from the 
periphery, so to speak.  Wilde, an Irishman, Ibsen, a Norwegian, and Strindberg, a 
Swede, found large audiences outside of their native lands and, for the most part, outside 
of their native tongues.  In Chapter IV, I will be examining how the interface between 
the desire for this cosmopolitan existence and the longing for the “pre-modern” 
functions to sustain “melancholic Modernism,” particularly within the context of “the 
metropolis,” or the densely-populated urban centers of the various Western empires, 
where the majority of Modernist writers and artists lived and worked. The interaction 
between the metropolis and the periphery demonstrates not only the obvious dangers of 
overzealous economic cosmopolitanism, but also the unforeseen dangers of intellectual 
cosmopolitanism—by opening oneself up to the exotic Other, the “historical” self the 
comfort of a cohesive, comfortable subjectivity is jeopardized.  Imperialism—the 
economic face of cosmopolitanism during this period—relaxes the literal borders of the 
nation and invites the periphery into the metropolis and in doing so threatens the stability 
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of formerly stable conceptions of place, nation, and self.  As its case study, this chapter 
will analyze E.M. Forster’s Howards End (1910) to consider how Modernism works to 
resolve the unavoidable interaction between the provincial and the global, the threat it 
poses to the cohesive self, and what is to be gained and lost in the transaction of 
intellectual cosmopolitanism.   
The fifth and final chapter focuses on hospitality in “high” Modernism.  
Hospitality, both in theory and practice, is the (often ritualized) practice of welcoming an 
outsider, the means by which one hosts a guest.  It is the consideration of borders, 
thresholds, and limits—what we should do with individuals (or even texts and ideas) that 
seek to cross from their place of origin and to be situated in close proximity with another 
individual in his or her home. In terms of textual analysis, this chapter will turn towards 
the consensus exemplar of high Modernism, James Joyce. In particular, I will read his 
most-read short story, “The Dead” (1914) against the “Ithaca” episode of his magnum 
opus, Ulysses (1922).  These texts are profoundly challenging in terms of style, structure, 
and theme.  Yet, despite the aggressive progressiveness of the technical aspects of these 
works, their chief thematic concerns are to situate the timeless practice of ritual 
hospitality within the context of modernity. By approaching the most challenging of the 
canonical Modernist texts in this way, I hope to also raise theoretical issues stemming 
from reception theory: In what ways might the interaction between text and reader, the 
site of exchange, be interpreted as hospitality?  In what way can, does, or should the 
text—especially the challenging, experimental text—function as the “host?”  What 
courtesy or sustenance does it offer the reader-as-guest?  What are the limits of this 
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relationship?  Where does it end?  What if hospitality is dead, and Modernism is its 
elegy?  The last question is particularly relevant to the overall argument of this 
dissertation, since it would require accepting Modernism as simultaneously melancholic 
and progressive, a paradoxical position that I argue is its fundamental quality. 
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 Notes
1 As Vicki Mahaffey writes, “The temporary apprehension of a precious, unattainable wholeness is what 
much modernist literature aims to recapture, through Joyce’s epiphanies—those moments of textual 
revelation in which the trivial and the significant exist in perfect equipoise, Woolf’s moments of being, or 
the ‘image’ of Imagist poetry: the presentation of an ‘intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of 
time’” (16). 
 
2 As Bradbury and McFarlane argue, “…few ages have been more multiple, more promiscuous in artistic 
style; to distil from the multiplicity an overall style or mannerism is a difficult, perhaps even an impossible 
task” (23) . 
 
3 As Vicki Mahaffey opines, “Modernist literature…often goes unread—dismissed because of its arcane 
allusions, experimental procedures, and perceived difficulty. In the popular view, modernist writing is 
characterized by a willful obscurity and shot through with nostalgia for a rapidly waning elite culture—a 
nostalgia mired in the ugly politics of the time (4). 
 
4 In her book Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism Beyond the Nation, Rebecca Walkowitz applies this 
“symptomatic” approach to consider how Modernist narratives work to create a sort of “critical 
cosmopolitanism.” In Walkowitz’s view, many of the hallmarks of Modernist style indicate a strong 
interest in “…conditions of limited or suspended agency” and ask the reader to consider how “conceptions 
of belonging are bound up in the new production, classification and reception of literary narratives” (4).  I 
will return to Walkowitz’s work in greater detail in Chapter II. 
 
5 See Fletcher and Bradbury, “The Introverted Novel.”  
 
6 David Eng and David Kazanjian deploy a similar structure in their anthology Loss, dividing their 
collected essays into three parts: “Bodily Remains,” “Spatial Remains,” and “Ideal Remains.”  This 
tripartite structure maps quite well onto my own organizational structure. 
 
7 The dissertation as a whole will be focused on narrative literature, which is generally taken to indicate 
the novel. At this particular stage of Modernism, however, the most innovative narrative literature was to 
be found on the stage—the novel lagged somewhat behind with regard to literary experimentation. 
 
8 For an expanded discussion on the effects of British imperialism on the modern world, see Niall 
Ferguson’s Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power. 
 
9 A broadening area of Modernist studies is “transnational” Modernism, which considers non-peripheral 
texts, largely written by non-European authors and especially authors from colonial states.  My method 
will be to apply much of the “transnationalist” approach to Eurocentric authors.  For excellent discussion 
on transnational and cosmopolitan Modernism, see works by Jessica Berman, Rebecca Walkowitz, Jahan 
Ramazani, and Susan Stanford Friedman. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL CONTEXTS 
 
Melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge.  But in its tenacious self-
absorption it embraces dead objects in its contemplation, in order to rescue them. 
--Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama 
 
Mourning vs. Melancholia; Absence vs. Loss 
In “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Walter Benjamin outlines the practice 
of “historical materialism,” a means of studying the past in a way that establishes an 
active and open relationship with it, engages in a creative practice that connects the past 
with the present, and makes the past available to the future. In Benjamin’s view, those 
who engage in “historicism,” on the other hand, prefer to “blot out everything they know 
about the later course of history” and seek an “‘eternal’ image of the past,” whereas 
“historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past” (262).  To engage in 
historicism is to fixate the past, to subjugate it in service to “the victor,” as opposed to 
historical materialism, which seeks a range of “alternate empathies” in service of the 
future.1 In his view, to engage in historical materialism is to seek an ethical engagement 
with the past. 
As David L. Eng and David Kazanjian suggest in the introduction to the 
anthology Loss: The Politics of Mourning, Benjamin’s essay “might be described as a 
treatise on the political and ethical stakes of mourning remains—mourning what remains 
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of lost histories and well as histories of loss” (1).  By not simply establishing casual 
connections between past events, for to do so is to buttress the claims to power of “the 
victor,” one is obligated to seek creative means of representation that will allow the dead 
to speak to the living and create a productive tension between the past, present, and 
future—that is, to grieve ethically. The study of the remains of the past is essentially a 
study of loss, and “the politics of mourning might be described as that creative process 
mediating a hopeful or hopeless relationship between loss and history (Eng and 
Kazanjian 2).  As Benjamin suggests, historicism is “a process of empathy whose origin 
is the indolence of the heart, acedia, which despairs of grasping and holding the genuine 
historical image as it flares up briefly” (256). As he suggests, this attempt to reconcile 
the past, to create a “universal history” is the origin of sadness, for it concedes the past 
as lost.  Comparatively, historical materialism, in its effort to re-animate history, to keep 
the past alive in the present, could be said to be a melancholic practice, in that it refuses 
to completely relinquish the past or accept consolation. In other words, while both 
mourning and melancholia are acts of grief, mourning seeks to move beyond the grief by 
affixing a static meaning to the loss, whereas melancholia refuses resolution, thereby 
keeping the loss interminably alive.   
The core argument of this dissertation is that the recognized features of 
Modernist narratives are a reflection of this melancholic politics of loss. Modernist 
literature is recognized for challenging its readers through its evasiveness, disregard for 
convention, and experimentalism.2 The “challenging fictions” of Modernism (to borrow 
Mahaffey’s term) represent an internal struggle between hopefulness and hopelessness, 
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between redemption and consolation, in the face of the rapid and overwhelming social, 
political, technological, philosophical, and scientific advances of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. These advances rendered the existing means of understanding 
and representing the world essentially useless.  General notions borne by the 
Enlightenment and by Romanticism failed to accommodate the new ways of being, and 
the narrative conventions that preceded this era could not adequately express this sense 
of loss. As Tammy Clewell notes in Mourning, Modernism, Postmodernism, Modernist 
authors “recognized the need to mourn a range of cataclysmic social events, including 
the slaughter of war, modernization of culture, and the disappearance of God and 
tradition” (1).  Despite its fecundity, Modernism was a practice of grief. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is important to distinguish between the 
two modes of grief. In common use, there are two distinct psychological responses to 
loss: mourning and melancholia. Although the two terms are closely related, both 
describing the abject grief and dejection experienced by an individual following the loss 
of an important person, thing, or ideal, Although the concept of melancholia as a mental 
and physical condition has existed since ancient times, contemporary discourse proceeds 
from the psychological model initially laid out by Sigmund Freud in is 1917 essay, 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” in which he bifurcates the two as independent, contrasting 
states of being. As a grief practice, mourning is identified by a disengagement from 
one’s normal behavior, coupled with an exhibition of dejection and loss of interest in the 
outside world, and, in extreme cases, a complete refusal of new objects of love or 
participation in any action that does not relate directly to the lost object.  As Freud 
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writes, to mourn (in the pathological sense) is to “lose interest in the outside world—
except as it recalls the deceased” and to lose the “ability to choose any new love-
object—which would mean replacing the mourned one—turning away from any task 
that is not related to the memory of the deceased.”  Within this framework, mourning is 
considered a normal, healthy reaction to loss, one that persists for a certain period of 
time and that is “pointless, or even damaging” to interrupt (204).  We are allowed to—in 
fact, encouraged to—excuse ourselves from socially normative behavior to mourn our 
losses.  The eventual goal, or “work,” of mourning (what Freud terms Trauerarbeit, 
translated as either “mourning work” or “sorrow work”) is to bring the subject back to 
equilibrium; through a process of “reality-testing” the mourning subject will come to 
comprehend that the “beloved object no longer exists,” and will then sever the bonds of 
the libido with that object. The subject’s libidinal attachment is then focused on a new 
object and the ego is “left free and uninhibited again” (204-205).  As Alessia Ricciardi 
observes, “mourning is not simply an emotion for Freud, but the performance of a work 
that, like interpretation, is a psychically transformative activity” (21). This process is 
understood to be painful, difficult, and long; however, it is important to note that it does 
have a terminus, ending when the libidinal cathexes are reassigned to a new object. 
In Freud’s original model, melancholia operates much the same as mourning, 
except with two important differences.  Most seriously, for the melancholic, grief is 
accompanied by self-recrimination and an expectation of punishment (204).  
Melancholia can produce intense anger or hatred, which, although primarily self-
directed, can also be directed outward.  Secondly, melancholia differs from mourning in 
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its duration.  Whereas mourning, although a tedious process, does have a terminus, 
melancholia is of indeterminate duration, frequently ending only with the death of the 
sufferer (typically by suicide).3  Melancholia is an ongoing state of being with no fixed 
endpoint; it is considered “unsuccessful” mourning. In other words, Freud’s framework 
distinguishes melancholia as characteristic of an arrested process in which the subject is 
locked in compulsive repetition, consumed by the past, and narcissistically identified 
with the lost object, whereas mourning brings the possibility of a reinvestment in life 
that would allow the subject to proceed.  Conceived as such, melancholia is the refusal to 
complete the work of mourning. 
Although grief is understood as the range of reactions to the loss of a loved one, 
Freud explains that grief can also occur with the loss of “an abstraction taking the place 
of the person, such as fatherland, freedom, an ideal and so on” (203). Indeed, one may 
grieve a wide range of abstractions, including but not limited to one’s self-identity with 
regard to nation, class, ethnicity, or gender; a commitment to a political belief or a moral 
code; familial or geographic affinities; or even the disappearance of coveted ideals, such 
as “truth,” “beauty,” or “freedom.”  
But why does mourning sometimes not succeed?  What blocks the typical 
progress of grief that we see in mourning?  Why cannot the subject sever the libidinal 
ties to the lost object and reassign them to a new object? Freud suggests several possible 
causes.  First, he implies that melancholia may emerge as a response to “ideal,” rather 
than “real” forms of loss—for example, one’s lover may not have died, but instead 
suddenly cease to be a love-object (as in Freud’s example of a the jilted bride).  In this 
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case, the loss may be considered traumatic, in that it occurred so suddenly that it could 
not be accommodated by the psyche; mourning is not successfully completed because 
the object still exists, but in a radically different relation to the subject, thereby 
obstructing the subject’s attempts to reassign his or her desire to a new object.  
Alternately, melancholia may occur if the subject has an important aspect of his or her 
identity altered (e.g. nation, title, station). The subject may not be able to conclude the 
process of mourning because it may seem that it is outside of an individual’s ability to 
either recover the lost object or to identify a new object of desire.  (Or, as I shall discuss, 
they may resist “working through” the grief out of fidelity to the lost object.)  Secondly, 
the subject may not consciously comprehend what has been lost; even if the loss is 
known, the subject may not fully comprehend what that loss actually means (205).4  
Because some change is evident, but the object of loss is obscured or unknown, the 
subject will find it impossible to conclude the work of mourning.  Thirdly, the process of 
mourning may be obstructed because of the subject’s ambivalent feelings towards the 
lost object—whereas he may consciously believe that he loved, he may instead actually 
be harboring subconscious hostility. Paradoxically, then, the melancholic may harbor 
ambivalence, and yet steadfastly refuse to relinquish connection.  This refusal to mourn, 
to “let it go,” is what distinguishes melancholia from mourning. To be melancholic is to 
be resolutely inconsolable. As Judith Butler comments, “the melancholic refuses the loss 
of the object, and internalization becomes a strategy of magically resuscitating the lost 
object, not only because the loss is painful, but because the ambivalence felt toward the 
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object requires that the object be retained until the differences are settled” (61-62). In 
this conception, resolution is never achieved, thus the indeterminacy of melancholia. 
One major problem with attempting to apply Freud’s models to cultural studies 
and literary analysis is that deploying it as a pre-established critical method is severely 
limiting.  As Seth Moglen observes in Modernism and Loss, Freud’s model was intended 
to analyze “private experiences of bereavement” and may therefore not “adequately 
capture the complex challenges of mourning collective injuries produced by historically 
particular social phenomena” (11).  Although he frequently dabbled in literary analysis 
himself, his primary work was with individuals in therapeutic consultation and not with 
creative works of art. Yet his discourse as a whole is widely appropriated by cultural 
critics with little regard for the variants in focus that produced particular concepts or 
methods.   In keeping with the conventions of psychoanalytic cultural criticism this 
dissertation moves from the model of individual loss to broader cultural phenomena 
patterning such loss on a communal scale.  My method is not to apply the psychoanalytic 
method to a particular author or character, for example.  Instead, my objective is to 
examine how Modernism, as a period of literary practice, addresses loss on a broad, 
socio-cultural and historical scale.  My claim is that individual works in the transitional 
years at the beginning of the modernist period shared a pattern of response to social 
change that meshes with the individual patterns of response to loss. Therefore, Freud’s 
concepts provide a framework for the analyses, but one that is broadened to account for 
collective action and for aesthetic practice. 
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First, however, it is important to acknowledge the variants in Freud’s own 
writing; notoriously self-reflective, he frequently revised his ideas years after initially 
publishing them (which, ironically, could be considered a melancholic practice).  For 
instance, in his 1923 work The Ego and the Id, Freud revisited the idea that melancholia 
was merely an “unsuccessful” attempt to mourn, and asserted that melancholia, rather 
than being a “pathological” condition was a necessary stage of ego formation and a 
precondition for successful mourning.  In completing the “work” of loss, the loss object 
is recreated by the subject’s ego—a process Freud terms “introjection.” This action 
maintains fidelity to the lost other by sustaining it through acts of imitation. As 
previously mentioned, however, the process of grieving may be problematized by a 
previously unacknowledged ambivalence towards the lost object; in Freud’s revised 
model, the act of internalizing this ambivalence is what produces the self-reproach or 
hostility he identifies in “Mourning and Melancholia.”  As he had initially proposed, 
pathological melancholia may be successfully explained by supposing that, for the 
melancholic, object-cathexis is replaced by identification—the hostility or ambivalence 
felt towards the lost object is subsumed by the subject.  Freud extends this notion, 
however, by claiming that this substitution has “a great share in determining the form 
taken by the ego” and makes an “essential contribution” to what is commonly termed as 
“character” (18).  Rather than opposing mourning, melancholia may well be the only 
means by which the ego can endure the emotional pain of loss.  Therefore, in his later 
framework, Freud casts melancholia not merely as a pathological state, but a necessary 
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phase of mourning, one through which the character of the ego is constructed (19). In 
other words, we become our losses.5 
Applying Freud’s paradigm—as articulated in “Mourning and Melancholia”—
wholesale to literary analysis can be problematic, however, because it invites over-
simplified categorization of complicated processes.6 I am in strong agreement with Jahan 
Ramazani when he cautions against devolvement into simple binary oppositions, such as 
modern vs. traditional or normative vs. melancholic.  To do so risks flattening out the 
historical and literary complexities that influence the texts to be analyzed (9). In Poetry 
of Mourning: The Modern Elegy from Hardy to Heaney (considered the foundation of 
the contemporary discourse on melancholia, mourning, and Modernism), Ramazani 
avoids this polarization by offering the hybrid phrase “melancholic mourning” to 
describe the posture of Modernist elegists, who self-consciously pursue the work of 
mourning but who resemble Freud’s melancholic in their “fierce resistance to solace” 
and their “intense criticism and self-criticism.”  Unlike their predecessors, the Modernist 
mourners “attack the dead and themselves, their own work and tradition; and they refuse 
such orthodox consolations as the rebirth of the dead in nature, in God, or in poetry 
itself” (4).  Ramazani’s offering of the operational term “melancholic mourning” is a 
rejection of Freud’s (initial) rigid distinction between the two modes of mourning and an 
acknowledgement of the high degree of overlap between mourning and melancholia.  
The loss of clarity provided by clear demarcations is compensated for by a far more 
nimble, adaptable paradigm, one that better represents the complex, and often 
contradictory, experience of grief. As Nouri Gana argues in Signifying Loss: Towards a 
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Poetics of Narrative Mourning, the purpose of sustaining the discourse on Freud’s 
seminal work, vis-à-vis Modernist literature, is “neither to accentuate nor to attenuate the 
differences or similarities between mourning and melancholia,” but rather to “to study 
the implications of the narrative confluence between mourning and literary tropes, or 
figures, by discerning both the potencies and limits of such a confluence for an ethically 
and politically responsible practice of mourning” (179, 10). By seeking resolution and 
comprehension through concrete definition of “terms,” we do violence to the practice of 
grief, by narrowing it, confining, and disallowing simultaneous meanings. To paraphrase 
Jacque Derrida, success fails and failure succeeds (Mémoires 35).  
Similarly, Dominick LaCapra has interrogated the common tendency to conflate 
loss with absence, pointing out that “the temptation is indeed great to conflate one with 
the other, particularly in post-traumatic situations or periods experienced in terms of 
crisis” (179).  Although LaCapra also discourages rigid binary oppositions, we can in a 
broad sense distinguish absence and loss in that, in the case of the latter, the loss is 
actual, historical, corporeal, or tangible; whereas, in the case of the former, the loss is 
only perceived, never having existed at all.  As for reasons why the conflation of absence 
and loss is so tempting, LaCapra suggests that “the conversion of absence into loss gives 
anxiety an identifiable object…and generates the hope that anxiety may be eliminated or 
overcome.”  Whether consciously or not, the anxiety related to absence is less preferable 
to the anxiety of loss, as it has little possibility of being overcome or resolved (and this 
impossibility is a likely source of the blame and hostility that the melancholic directs at 
others).  In contrast, by converting absence into loss, “one assumes that there was (or at 
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least could be) some original unity, wholeness, security, or identity that others have 
ruined, polluted, or contaminated and thus made ‘us’ lose” (183).  This process of 
converting absence to loss is often termed “nostalgia,” indicating a sentimental longing 
for an idealized past.  
This conversion of absence into loss can have serious political implications. 
Mourning could be seen not only as “individual or quasi-transcendental grieving” but as 
a “homeopathic socialization or ritualization of the repetition-compulsion that attempts 
to turn it against the ‘death drive’ and counteract compulsiveness by re-petitioning in 
ways that allow for a measure of critical distance, change, resumption of social life, 
ethical responsibility, and renewal.”  In contrast, melancholy produces an “impossibly 
mournful response to the closure of metaphysics, a generalized ‘hauntology,’” that 
problematizes our interpretation and critical evaluation of historical trauma (LaCapra 
189-190). This attachment to an idealized past can be problematic, as melancholia has 
the capacity to obscure the difficult truth that the object of desire was never really lost, 
but was lacking from the very beginning.  As Giorgio Agamben observes, in such 
instances of melancholia—where absence is indefinitely mourned as loss—the libido 
stages a “simulation,” creating a “phantasmal” object, a fabrication of what the subject 
wishes the object to be, an object that often bears little resemblance to the “real” object 
(20). Slavoj Žižek clarifies this notion, claiming that “what melancholy obfuscates is that 
the object is lacking from the very beginning, that its emergence coincides with its lack, 
that this object is nothing but the positivization of a void or lack, a purely anamorphic 
entity that does not exist in itself (660).7  In other words, by transforming absence into 
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loss, before we are able to possess the desired object, we are first obliged to create it. 
This process of “anamorphosis,” although a creative act, “undermines the distinction 
between objective reality and its distorted subjective perception” (659).  As LaCapra 
warns, when absence and loss are conflated, “melancholic paralysis or manic agitation 
may set in, and the significance or force of particular losses…may be obfuscated or 
rashly generalized,” or, worse, allowing those who did not suffer the loss to appropriate 
it, allowing “identity formation that makes invidious and ideological use of traumatic 
series of events in foundational ways or as symbolic capital (186). Formulating an 
identity on an untrue past, to inject the phantasmal object into one’s narrative of self-
identity, not only lays false claim to a non-existent loss, but distorts subjectivity, thereby 
creating an impossibility that problematizes the process of mourning.8  I shall return to 
this notion of the “impossibility” of mourning, vis-à-vis Modernism, at the end of this 
introduction. 
 
The Great Divide 
This dissertation argues that the recognized thematic, formal, and stylistic 
advances of Modernist narratives are symptomatic of the creative process of 
melancholia, a process that also engendered the common perception that the modern age 
was a period of “crisis.”9  Therefore, if the fundamental assertion of this dissertation is 
that the stance of Modernist literature is fundamentally melancholic, my argument 
cannot progress any distance without proposing some possible causes of this 
melancholia. My end-goal is that, in examining what was believed to be lost, we may 
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come to some satisfying conclusions as to what was gained through the process of 
Modernism.  As Eng and Kazanjian suggest, “…loss is inseparable from what remains, 
for what is lost is known only by what remains of it, by how these remains are produced, 
read, and sustained” (2). Ellipsis and omission work well enough in Modernist literature, 
but they function well in literary criticism; therefore, the question is worth asking—what 
did Modernism mourn? 
Modernism grieved the perceived chasm that separated it from tradition, from the 
entire breadth of human intellectual, artistic, and technological history.  For instance, in 
his inaugural lecture as the first Chair of Mediaeval and Renaissance Literature at 
Cambridge University in 1954, C.S. Lewis offers an eloquent justification for the 
combining of the two historical eras under one chair, a decision which at that time was 
considered either impressively progressive or a serious injustice.  In Lewis’s view, the 
combination is entirely appropriate, as he goes on to argue that the “Great Divide” of 
Western history is most sensibly established not between the Mediaeval or Renaissance 
periods (or, for that matter, between Antiquity and the Dark Ages or between the Dark 
Ages and the Middle Ages), but rather between all of history and the “present” age—
what we now describe as “Modernity.”  Lewis relates that his chief attraction to the 
newly created post was that it encouraged his own lingering belief that the “barrier 
between those two ages has been greatly exaggerated” (1).  He goes on to refute all other 
possible historiographic divisions, supporting instead the claim that “…the greatest of all  
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divisions in the history of the West [is] that which divides the present from, say, the age 
of Jane Austen and Scott” (7).  In support of this assertion, Lewis colorfully illustrates,  
When Watt makes his engine, when Darwin starts monkeying with the ancestry 
of Man, and Freud with his soul, and the economists with all that is his, then 
indeed the lion will have got out of its cage.  Its liberated presence in our midst 
will become one of the most important factors in everyone’s daily life. 
(7) 
The argument, then, is that a contemporary of Shakespeare or even Virgil would find the 
culture and literature of Lord Byron’s age more familiar than would Byron find the age 
Wilde, Conrad, or Woolf.  In the classic text of Modernist criticism, Modernism, 1890-
1930, Bradbury and McFarlane offer a similarly hyperbolic description of the Great 
Divide between Modernism and its preceding ages.  In describing the work of cultural 
historians as “cultural seismology,” wherein scholars attempt to “record shifts and 
displacements of sensibility that regularly occur in the history of art and literature and 
thought,” they distinguish between three orders of magnitude, with the third being the 
category reserved for “overwhelming dislocations, those cataclysmic upheavals of 
culture, those fundamental convulsions of the creative human spirit that seem to topple 
even the most solid and substantial of our beliefs and assumptions, […] question an 
entire civilization or culture, and stimulate frenzied rebuilding” (19). Their sense, then, 
is that the decades leading up to and immediately after the turn of the twentieth century 
are somehow different than other historical thresholds, mainly because of the rapidity, 
magnitude, and breadth of the changes that occurred.10  
 30 
 
Paradoxically, despite its breakneck progressiveness, Modernism is affixed to the 
past. Unlike many other artistic periods or historical eras, this duality was not identified 
post hoc, and it did not go unnoticed by those who experienced it.  The Modernists knew 
that they were in the midst of change, because they themselves manufactured a discourse 
of historical schism, and this fact undergirds many of the critical assumptions that 
scholars make about Modernist literature.  For example, in the introduction to The 
Cambridge Companion to Modernism, Michael Levenson writes that “crisis is inevitably 
the central term of art in discussions of this turbulent cultural moment,” going on to 
suggest that those attendant to the turning of the twentieth century quickly realized that it 
would be “the epoch of crisis, real and manufactured, physical and metaphysical, 
material and symbolic” (4).11  
A Latin loan, the word crisis originates from the Greek (κρίνειν) “to decide.”  To 
say, then, that the word is overused in our own time is not unfair; if we are to consider 
Modernism as a “crisis,” we benefit from disregarding present connotations of strife and 
instead focus on the denotation as “a deciding point.” In The Legitimation Crisis, Jürgen 
Habermas observes that, “Prior to its employment as a social-scientific term, the concept 
of crisis was familiar to us from its medical usage. In that context it refers to the phase of 
an illness in which it is decided whether or not the organism’s self-healing powers are 
sufficient for recovery” (1).  The implication is that “a crisis” is the point at which a 
conflict ceases to be an objective, external process and becomes a subjective, 
internalized process. In other words, the issue in question only becomes visible as a 
problem when it reaches the point of crisis, when it becomes clear that, beyond a simple 
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matter of fate or chance, the solution to the problem at hand requires the participation of 
those who suffer from it. We will approach Modernism as a point in the cultural history 
of the West in which it was broadly acknowledged that all that was known about art, 
science, and politics was either in the process of or on the verge of complete and utter 
change.12  As Steve Giles adds, Modernism can be understood as a “radical aesthetic 
response” to a profound sense of cultural crisis following from “the disintegration of the 
Providential world picture, the depredations of imperialist capitalism, the collapse of 
traditional notions of self and character in the work of Nietzsche and Freud, and the 
undermining of long-standing assumptions about language and reality” (175-176).  In 
short, the radical advances in, to use Immanuel Kant’s categories, science, morality, and 
art created a sense of crisis to which Modernism became the reaction—one could offer 
the paradox that modernity necessitated Modernism to explain itself. 
 As Richard Sheppard observes in his essay “The Problematics of European 
Modernism,” a common tendency in Modernist studies is to bring the recognized “traits” 
of Modernist literature into focus by “setting them in a one-dimensional historical, 
literary-historical, or sociological context” (3). It is this approach that has provided so 
many iterations of the Modernist “crisis.” For instance, in his 2011 survey of 
Modernism, Levenson describes a “crisis of ideology.” In depicting Modernism as an 
“oppositional culture,” he argues that the artists of the “precursor” phase of Modernism 
shared “an adversarial temper” that caused them to resist “the complacency of official 
culture that dominated the publishing industry, the venues of performance, and the pages 
of the mass circulation journals and newspapers” and create an aesthetic discourse that 
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was “fundamentally discursive, the challenge of propositions, ideas, and theories.”  As 
Levenson writes, “from the 1880’s on, the sheer proliferation of forms, movements, 
manifestos, and experimental works indicated an openness to novelty that was itself a 
form of social insurgency” (Cambridge 18, 17).   Novelty, by definition, however, 
cannot be maintained.  As Levenson suggests, “The 1890s, once the decade of novelty, 
became in hindsight the decade of exhaustion.  Acts of repudiation were grandly 
performed; recent novelty was reinterpreted as obsolescence” (ibid. 48).13   
The proliferation of novelty relates directly to another commonly identified crisis 
of Modernism—a crisis of representation. In his oft-cited foreword to Lyotard’s The 
Postmodern Condition, Fredric Jameson defines this crisis as Modernism’s rejection of 
“an essentially realistic epistemology, which conceives of representation as the 
reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it [and] projects a mirror 
theory of knowledge and art, whose fundamental evaluative categories are those of 
adequacy, accuracy, and Truth itself” (vii).  The rise of such movements as Symbolism, 
Surrealism, and Dada are radical examples of the rejection of realism and the limitations 
of mimesis and the desire for increased autonomy for artistic practice.  As Habermas 
notes, “the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere could then become a deliberate project: the 
talented artist could lend authentic expression to those experiences he had in 
encountering his own de-centered subjectivity, detached from the constraints of 
routinized cognition and everyday action” (“Modernism” 9). In Habermas’ view, by 
separating art from any sort of social or cultural function, to make it responsible only to 
itself, art seeks a reconciliation with society.  Unfortunately, this reconciliation was 
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doomed, for “art had become a critical mirror, showing the irreconcilable nature of the 
aesthetic and social world,” and, the “Modernist transformation” was painfully realized 
(“Modernism” 10).  Walter Benjamin describes this attitude as a “negative theology” 
that not only denied “any social function of art but also any categorizing by subject 
matter.” As Benjamin argues, the salvation of art comes in the form of mechanical 
reproduction, which “emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on 
ritual.”  When art—be it the photograph or novel—is produced specifically for 
reproduction and distribution, “the total function of art is reversed” and becomes not 
based on ritual, but on the practice of politics (224).  In other words, the mystical “aura” 
or immediate presence of a work diminishes in importance as it instead becomes a 
practice of documentation—the work itself develops an “exhibition value” that is greater 
than its “ritual value” (226). 
In taking up this role, Modernist narrative opens itself to further problems of 
memory, perception, authenticity—all of which directly relate to the work of mourning.  
To mourn the loss of an object is to arrive at some conclusion of what the loss 
represents, to offer testimony to it, to explain its history. In Literary Modernism and 
Beyond, Richard Lehan approaches Modernism as a “crisis if history,” describing it as a 
“state of mind” that involved a search for “an idealized reality—a quest for some kind of 
presence connected to the unfolding of time” (5). In Lehan’s view, “The idea of the 
beautiful was reinforced by theories of myth and symbol, leading to the idea of spatial 
form, the universalizing of modernism, the cyclicality of history, and the inevitability of 
historical decline” (x). Lehan also describes the general approach of Modernists artists—
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visual and literary alike—as a “layering” of spatial and narrative meaning, a method 
conceptually analogous to the archaeological layering popularized by Heinrich 
Schliemann, who had, in the late 19th century, discovered the historical city of Troy. In 
Lehan’s words, “if Modernists turned to the past…it was to the historical past made 
mythic, to the layering of past and present events to suggest the simultaneity of historical 
event, the universality or mythic oneness of time (16).  This notion of the “layering” of 
meaning and the grief for a singular temporality is echoed by Ronald Schleifer, who 
suggests in Modernism and Time that the various sorts of “abundance” created by the 
radical advances of the early twentieth century led to a departure from the 
Enlightenment-era concept of time—i.e. Isaac Newton’s “absolute, true, and 
mathematical” time, which is singular, universal, and constant in its forward progress 
(37).  In its stead, Modernists had to contend with the idea that there could be different 
“types” of time; beyond the absolute truth of mechanically standardized time, 
temporality could be individual, subjective, and multi-layered (79).14  Certainly, a 
complete radicalization of such a fundamental concept as the function of time could be 
considered a significant loss, and we can find evidence of mourning work in the 
challenging narrative forms of many Modernists. Consider, for example, the temporal 
disparities of Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, which advances a decade in a matter of pages, 
Joyce’s Ulysses, which advances only a dozen hours in hundreds of pages, and 
Hemingway’s In Our Time, which steps in and out of the past and present with little to 
no indication of how the individual episodes interconnect.  Yet, each of these texts 
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embraces temporal variance as the crisis that justifies particular aesthetic experiments 
and adaptations 
Each of these crises relates in some way to a radical rupture in the concept of 
time that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. To be in 
modernity is to be self-conscious of one’s existence in an historical moment that is 
fundamentally defined as having moved beyond those moments that preceded it.15  As 
Jonathan Flately writes, we must only look at the etymology of ‘modernity’ – from 
modernus, meaning “now” or “of today” to understand that it is essentially separated 
from “before.” Yet modernity names a period that begins centuries before the modernist 
recognition of crisis, of a break with the past. While the forward focus of Modernism 
demands the exhilaration of the avant-garde, as Habermas argues, this new time 
consciousness, “does more than express the experience of mobility in society, 
acceleration in history, or discontinuity in everyday life. The new value placed on the 
transitory, the elusive, and the ephemeral, the very celebration of dynamism, discloses 
the longing for an undefiled, an immaculate and stable present” (5). By moving from the 
traditional conception of time as cyclical, ever-repeating, the modern culture thus 
achieves progress, looking forward to the promise of the future; however, this acute 
sense of temporality engenders a profound sense of loss, an acknowledgement of being 
separated from an idyllic state of being wherein time did not pass in measured units, 
marching inexorably towards a terminus.  This idyll and our attempts to access it have 
been given many names—thanatos, the death drive, the Real, Eden, the Archive, Once 
Upon a Time.16      
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Modernist art and literature create a productive tension between this urge to 
retain the solidity of the past while articulating the experience of living in a world re-
shaped by speed, communication, and technology. T.S. Eliot famously referred to 
“contemporary history” as an “immense panorama of futility and anarchy” while 
praising the success of Joyce’s Ulysses integrating myth as a means of “manipulating a 
continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity” (175). A resulting tension is 
thus created between the urge to look forward in anticipation of an idealized future while 
being compelled to preserve the past against the advancement of historical decline; As 
Levenson writes, “set against a society organized around comfort and respectability, 
appetite and nostalgia, a true art will violently recover something ancient that has been 
forgotten, even as it creates something new that has never been anticipated. It will 
necessarily be out of harmony with its own time” (3).  This discordance is the fundament 
of Modernist narrative and explains such characteristic features as unstable narrative 
points of view, ellipses, recursiveness, parataxis, allusiveness, and pastiche, collage, and 
bricolage.   
Lewis’ “great divide” and Bradbury and McFarlane’s “cataclysmic upheaval” are 
not merely matters of technological breakthroughs, political revolutions, or philosophical 
schisms, but a total reconfiguration of the individual’s relationship to history and 
geography, or, more simply put, the very fabric of time and space.17 The drastic revision 
of these basic dimensions of human existence change not only one’s individual 
experience-as-lived, but also upend the means by which one conceives and articulates 
it.18   
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The radical reconfiguration of time and space was an unavoidable byproduct of 
the Industrial Revolution and the ascension of global capitalism, shifts that occur well 
before the twentieth century artist recognized them as critical crises. The development of 
reliable steam power and, later, the internal combustion engine dramatically 
reconfigured concepts of “society.” Prior to the widespread use of the locomotive and 
the automobile, the extent of one’s community was bounded by the distance one could 
comfortably travel on the back of a horse. Large cities—Paris, London, New York, 
Munich—certainly existed, of course, but it was not until the advent of steam power that 
that urban centers swelled to become the teeming metropolises of the modern age. Prior 
to the late nineteenth century, the common existence in the West was agrarian and rural, 
with the individual experience of time being completely local, dictated by the seasons, 
the rhythms of plants and animals, and the cyclical movements of astrological bodies. 
Although time had for centuries been divided into arbitrary units such as hour, day, 
month, week, these measures were by no means universal, and times and dates often 
differed from region to region, country to country, or even city to city. The expansion of 
railways throughout Europe and America created an altogether new problem—there was 
no reliable way of knowing when a locomotive would arrive or depart.  The first 
standardized time system was employed by British railways in 1847, when local times 
were replaced with “railway time,” which was synchronized to Greenwich Mean Time; 
in the United States, the nationwide standardization of railway times was not established 
until 1883.19  But, as Lewis Mumford famously argued in his 1934 text Technics and 
Civilization, it is “the clock, not the steam-engine, [that is] the key-machine of the 
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modern industrial age,” not only because it, in its complexity and craftsmanship, marks a 
“perfection toward which other machines aspire,” but because in its essential nature 
“dissociated time from human events and helped create the belief in an independent 
world of mathematically measurable sequences” (14-15). The standardization of time, 
coupled with the “industrial geography” of the modern city and the omnipresent force of 
the free market, completely upended the conventional notion of individual time by 
dividing one’s individual experience with time into “public” and “private” segments.  
Anthony Giddens terms this segmentation as the “commodification” of time and 
space, arguing that the differentiation of commodified time and space is “integrally 
related to the coordination of activity involved in labor discipline in the workplace; to 
the severance of work from ‘free time’ as sequential segments of a life governed by 
routine rather than by tradition; and to the severance of human beings from nature 
through the transformation of urban space through the prevalence of the ‘created 
environment’ of contemporary urbanism” (16).  Furthermore, as Steve Giles explains, 
“the monetization of the relations in social life transforms time-space experience by, for 
example imposing ever stricter temporal regimes on the working day, while capitalist 
commodity exchange requires increasingly efficient spatial organization as well as more 
rapid turnover time of capital” (179). In contemporary culture, the differentiation 
between public and private time and space is not often examined—we take for granted a 
division between the two (it would be inconceivable, for instance, to any person living in 
a developed country in the present day to not be continuously aware of the “correct” 
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time). Furthermore, it is incomprehensible to us that anyone would reject the authority of 
standard time.  
The establishment of standard time, however, can be read as a form of 
oppression, a means of homogenizing society, an attack on free, unrestricted, 
idiosyncratic time. Despite personal, philosophical opposition to the standardization of 
time, to the contemporary reader, the reordering of time might seem a relatively trivial 
matter, a simple adjustment to one’s daily patterns (interpellated as we are in modern, 
industrial society).  The standardization of time had, however, a profound effect on 
artistic output.20 One of Kern’s most interesting premises is that the strong reaction to 
the establishment of a World Standard Time in the artistic and philosophical 
communities can help to explain the avant-gardism of Modernist narrative and spatial 
arts: 
The assault on a universal, unchanging, and irreversible public time was the 
metaphysical foundation of a broad cultural challenge to traditional notions about 
the nature of the world and man’s place in it.  The affirmation of private time 
radically interiorized the locus of experience.  It eroded conventional views about 
the stability and objectivity of the material world and of the mind’s ability to 
comprehend it.  Man cannot know the world “as it really is” if he cannot know 
what time it really is.  If there are as many private times as there are individuals, 
then every person is responsible for creating his own world from one moment to 
the next, and creating it alone. 
(314) 
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The standardization of time is therefore a political action, a means of establishing 
hegemony—to control time is to control history. It is worth noting that the Prime 
Meridian Conference of 1884, which effectively located the “center” of world time in 
Britain, occurred in the same year of the Berlin Conference, which essentially divided up 
the continent of African between the European imperial powers.  That the entire planet 
should also be divided up into time “zones,” each of which is relative to England 
precipitated also a new sense of geography, of center and periphery.  As Adam Barrows 
notes, the Observatory “set the cosmopolitan standard for measuring historical 
progression and provided the infrastructure for modernity’s project of uniformity and 
homogeneity” (263). Thus, the Greenwich Royal Observatory becomes the physical 
embodiment of not only the British Empire’s dominance of global geography, but also of 
global time, and, therefore, the physical representation of the imperial metropolis.     
These latter two qualities—the “imperial” and the “metropolis” provide another 
means understanding the Modernist aesthetic, which is in many ways a product of the 
discovery and absorption of non-Western colonial cultures’ own aesthetic practices.21 
Given that the most notable characteristic of Modernist literature is its aesthetic 
experimentation, particularly such deeply personal techniques as interior monologue and 
stream of consciousness, colonialism and imperialism—both large-scale, external 
problems—may not seem one of the core areas of interest for Modernist studies; 
however, as Raymond Williams asserts, the development of Modernism “had much to 
do with imperialism: with the magnetic concentration of wealth and power in imperial 
capitals and the simultaneous cosmopolitan access to a wide variety of subordinate 
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cultures” (“Metropolis” 20).  The vast and sufficiently advanced culture of the 
metropolis allows both for the existence of academies and museums that hold the 
authority of the cultural archive and the dissident cultures who reject the orthodoxy of 
these cultural institutions. Simultaneously, their position as the centers of imperialism 
provide these dissidents exposure to exotic, less-advanced, “authentic” cultures and 
aesthetic practices.   
This new binary—the metropole vs. the colony—contributes to Modernist 
melancholia. One of the first scholars to explore the relationship between Modernism 
and imperialism at great length was Frederic Jameson, whose his basic premise is that 
the “structure of imperialism” makes its mark on the “inner forms and structures of that 
new mutation in literary and artistic language to which the term modernism is largely 
applied” (44).22  As a Marxist critic, Jameson frames his discussion of imperialism in 
terms of economics, emphasizing the relationship between the imperial center and the 
colony, a relationship of economic subjugation, as opposed to violence (48). The older 
conception of imperialism—which emphasizes the political strife between competing 
imperial powers—completely disregards the position of the colonial other, while the 
modern conception of imperialism shifts from a “horizontal” to a “vertical” perspective 
that demands a consideration of the intellectual, aesthetic, and philosophical hierarchies 
between the imperial metropolis and the colonial other.  In other words, read from this 
perspective, modernist literature invites consideration of the situation of the individual 
subject—whether the “metropolitan” subject, the “colonial” subject, or the 
“cosmopolitan” subject—in regard to their relationship to and attitude towards the 
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central source of imperial power.  This awareness of the spatial separation between the 
imperial center and the colony creates an awareness that every individual is now to 
varying degrees “outside” the locus of the imperial center.    
Furthermore, the force of imperialism also means that even if the subject 
physically inhabits the “center,” the very existence of the periphery creates an awareness 
of the spatially vast system of which one is unavoidably a part. Although the majority of 
canonical Modernists inhabited an imperial metropolis—e.g. Forster, Woolf, and Conrad 
in London, Hemingway and Wilde in Paris, Strindberg in Berlin, Ibsen in Munich, 
Wharton in New York—their own experiences as-lived located them still outside the 
center of power.  As Jameson suggests, the structure of imperialism dictates that “a 
significant structural segment of the economic system as a whole is now located 
elsewhere, beyond the metropolis, outside the daily life and existential experience of the 
home country” in places unfathomably far away inhabited by other individuals whose 
“own life experience and life world” remain unknown and ultimately unknowable.  
Jameson suggests that this “special disjunction,” results in an inability to conceive of the 
system as a whole, and the metropolitan experience, which in Jameson’s conception is 
the “the very content of the national literature itself,” no longer possesses immanent 
meaning (50-51).  As result, no Modernist narrative can truly be a completely “national” 
narrative.  There is no longer any such thing as a completely local, pastoral, or personal 
narrative that is not in some way touched by globalization, be it economically, 
aesthetically, or politically.   
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Impossible Mourning, Impossible Modernism 
Modernists decided that they had much to grieve, and what we now consider to 
be the categorical “traits” of Modernist narrative document the struggle to accommodate 
their sense of dramatic shifts in Western art, politics, and ethics. What Benjamin terms 
the “crisis of artistic reproduction” that manifests itself at the close of the nineteenth 
century could also be read as a “crisis in perception itself,” in that Modernist 
melancholia creates itself in its creation of a crisis as well as a refusal to relinquish the 
past.  As Benjamin suggests, “what prevents our delight in the beautiful from ever being 
satisfied is the image of the past, which Baudelaire regards as veiled by the tears of 
nostalgia” (187).  Benjamin’s oft-quoted statement suggests that the unresolved 
attachment to the past—to what has been lost—is both what motivates Modernism and 
frustrates it. Modernist mourning is “impossible mourning,” for it can never be resolved 
or completed; thus, Modernism is essentially melancholic. 
A similar reference to the limiting effects of nostalgia is voiced by Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, who, in his highly influential study The Postmodern Condition, suggests two 
alternate modes of “sublimity” in art.23 One approach, which he labels “melancholia,” 
emphasizes “the powerlessness of the faculty of presentation, on the nostalgia for 
presence felt by the human subject, on the obscure and futile will which inhabits him in 
spite of everything” (79).24  In the melancholic mode, the Romantic quest for 
communion with Nature falls short but nevertheless persists; that is, Modernism seeks to 
“make visible that there is something which can be conceived and which can neither be 
seen nor made visible” (78). What modernism presents as an historic loss, might also be 
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understood as a creative absence. Any artistic attempt to make visible the greatness that 
we can conceive is insufficient—therefore, the affectation of the melancholic mode is 
painful, dejected, inconsolable. The object of loss in these cases typically inhabits some 
sort of “cultural archive”—that is, it is typically a lost ideal or abstraction, a value 
promoted by a cultural “metanarrative” that is perceived as having passed.  Whether or 
not the ideal (and its metanarrative) is actually lost or is simply absent is one of the 
primary questions of this dissertation.  
In Archive Fever, Jacque Derrida plays with this notion of repetition and return 
to a point of stability, describing the primacy of the “archive,” or a repository of cultural 
information, establishing a metaphor of the literal archive (for example, libraries and 
museums) for the individual archive, considered as the Freudian subconscious.  If the 
archive, as a repository of authoritative documents, is the source of power for nations 
and governments (and therefore the source of power for the “metanarratives” that inform 
them), then the individual subconscious is the repository of experiences from which a 
subject’s identity/agency is drawn. To fixate on unidentifiable loss and obsession with 
ancient motifs, this melancholic urge for return, is, in Derrida’s view, to be in the grips 
of the archive.  As he writes, to be en mal d ’archive, is to  “have a compulsive, 
repetitive, and nostalgic desire for the archive, an irrepressible desire to return to the 
origin, a homesickness, a nostalgia for the return to the most archaic place of absolute 
commencement” (cite).  Along these lines, Jean-Michel Rabaté has examined how 
Modernism, in its unending cycles of repetition and in its refusal to relinquish what has 
been lost becomes “haunted’ by the past. In Rabaté’s view, these spectral voices are, “in 
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a classically Freudian fashion, what has not been processed, accommodated, 
incorporated into the self by mourning; the shadow of the lost object is still being 
projected onto the subject.  Modernism postulates both the necessity and the 
impossibility of mourning…” (xvi). This vexing position calls to mind Benjamin’s 
musings on Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus, which resembles what Benjamin terms “the 
angel of history:”   
His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees 
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it 
in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make 
whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got 
caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. 
The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, 
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call 
progress.  
(257) 
Benjamin’s angel is a metaphor for the melancholic stance of Modernism—forced 
forward, yet facing backwards, consumed by losses that it refuses to mourn, for to do so 
would be to relinquish the essential character of Modernist practice.  Yet Benjamin’s 
interpretation is itself a creative misreading, there is nothing in the Klee painting to 
indicate his Angelus Novus was an emblem of history, nor can the viewer see a pile of 
wreckage as the figure’s feet.  Benjamin’s projection is representative of the Modernist 
tendency to impose a sense of loss on an absence, thereby legitimizing a melancholic 
 46 
 
“return” that is actually an original invention of a past that must be maintained and 
grieved in equal parts. 
This notion that Modernism demonstrates either the “impossibility” of mourning 
or a steadfast “refusal” of mourning has become a popular notion in recent years.  Jahan 
Ramazani to a great degree initiated the discussion on the modernist refusal to mourn by 
arguing in his influential study Poetry of Mourning that the general resistance to the 
“work of mourning” is the defining characteristic of modern elegiac poetry.  In 
Ramazani’s view, modern elegists resemble Freud’s melancholic in their “fierce 
resistance to solace, their intense criticism and self-criticism,” yet unlike their literary 
forbears cannot successfully complete the work of mourning and instead “attack the 
dead and themselves, their own work and tradition; and they refuse such orthodox 
consolations as the rebirth of the dead in nature, in God, or in poetry itself” (4).  
Furthermore, in addition to refusing consolation, modern elegists seek to expand the 
scope of their grief, according to Ramazani:   
As poets mourn not only dead individuals but mourning itself, elegize not only 
the dead but elegy itself, the genre develops by feeding off a multitude of new 
deaths, including the body of its own traditions. Intruding into modern laments 
for war victims, public figures, relatives, and friends are many extraneous 
deaths—the death of mourning ritual, of God, of traditional consolation, of 
recuperative elegy, of the sanctity of the dead, of ‘healthy’ mourning, and even  
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perhaps—in the age of visual media and psychology—the death of the poet.  
Once a more quiet tomb, the elegy becomes a noisy columbarium, crammed with 
corpses ontological, aesthetic, and physical. 
(8) 
From this perspective, we can conceive of Modernism as entirely dependent on 
mourning and loss, consuming it as fuel for its fires. If the notion of “the modern” itself 
becomes constitutive of its perceived losses, then the reasons for its refusal of 
consolation become clearer. 
Until Ramazani, most critics shared the basic expectations set out by Freud in 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” that melancholia is but a pathological form of mourning.  
More recent scholarship, however, frequently contests Freud’s basic propositions with 
regard to successful vs. unsuccessful mourning and instead focuses on Modernism’s 
resistance to mourning and refusal of consolation. Patricia Rae describes this resistance 
as, “a deliberate decision about how not to respond to loss,” going to characterize this 
“resistance to reconciliation” as a “refusal to accept the acceptance of loss, whether 
through the severing and transference of libidinal ties or through the successful 
expansion of identity through introjection, or through any other kind of compensatory 
process” (16-17). The interesting questions—in terms of literary analysis—then become 
why one refuses to mourn, how a literary text attempts to present this ethical and political 
position, and what effect these experiments with representation have on literary 
narratives as a whole.  As indicated in the preface to this dissertation, the following 
chapters will seek to answer these questions.  These chapters are organized both 
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“horizontally” and “vertically”—that is, they are ordered chronologically, beginning in 
the 1890’s and ending in the 1920’s, as well as topically, with chapters focused on 
Modernist melancholia vis-à-vis aesthetics, politics, and ethics. 
As previously suggested, the paradox of Modernist melancholia is that it is 
simultaneously a regressive and progressive stance; that is, although it remains 
inconsolably fixed upon the past, it must engage in creation to do so. It moves forward to 
look backwards. As Žižek insists, the resolution of grief requires not only one to 
successfully mourn the lost object, but to also “kill it a second time through symbolizing 
its loss.”  The melancholic, by contrast, “is not simply the one who is unable to renounce 
the object but rather the one who kills the object a second time (treats it as lost) before 
the object is actually lost” (662).25  In other words, the melancholic not only resuscitates 
the lost object by symbolically recreating it, but also creatively translates absence into 
loss. 
We can read this fixation on imagined loss and the creative recovery of the past 
as the primary influence of the shifting aesthetics of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century literature and art, which promote a progressive “politics of mourning” that 
resists traditional forms of consolation. In the introduction to Faces of Modernity, Matei 
Calinescu describes Modernism as an “increasingly sharp sense of historical relativism” 
through which the artist, cut off from “the normative past with its fixed criteria” was 
obligated to invent a “private and essentially modifiable past” (3).  Read from this 
perspective, we can begin to comprehend the melancholic stance of Modernism, in that it 
paradoxically creates the lost object in order to preserve it, produces a break with the 
 49 
 
past in order to claim its own crisis.  In terms of artistic production, Calinescu 
summarizes this cultural moment as a marked shift from an “aesthetics of permanence” 
based on a belief in an unchanging, transcendent ideal of beauty to a transitory aesthetics 
that valued novelty.  This transition was, naturally, anxiety-provoking, necessitating as it 
did a sort of bidirectional view of history. We find this paradox manifested in the 
allusiveness and neoclassicism prevalent in late nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
literature; a key characteristic of both decadent and Modernist literature was an inherent 
urge for repetition and return, for the resurrection of older stories reshaped into new 
forms.     
Since Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, it has been common to regard 
Modernism as an aestheticization of loss, what Tammy Clewell has described as “a 
literary practice whose nostalgia tethers it to the very discourses, traditions, and beliefs 
that it describes as lost” (4). In Lyotard’s view, modern art is that which seeks to express 
the fact that the “unpresentable” exists, meaning that it makes “visible that there is 
something which can be conceived and which can neither be seen nor can be made 
visible” (78). Modern art, then, is distinguished from such forms as “realism” that seek 
to create art that conforms to established aesthetic notions of “the beautiful.”  Both 
postmodernism and Modernism would therefore fit within this circumscription,  
As previously suggested, in Modernism, we detect a “nostalgia for presence felt 
by a human subject;” that is, Modernism melancholically mourns the loss of unity 
between conception and presentation—the experience of viewing a work of art that 
accurately presents the sublime (79).  If we fail to recall LaCapra’s admonition to not 
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conflate loss with absence, we fail to successfully complete the work of mourning in an 
aesthetic sense because we mourn that which never was, so to speak.  We resist the 
understanding that what we can conceive will never match what we can present. 
Melancholic aesthetics, “allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing 
contents; but the form, because of its recognizable consistency, continues to offer the 
reader or viewer matter for solace and pleasure” (81).  In other words, while Modernism 
mourns the (perceived) loss of the sublime, it sustains a melancholic attachment to the 
traditional forms from which it seeks to separate itself.26  It simpler terms, despite is 
fixation on loss, Modernism resists the completion of mourning.  
New considerations of the political stakes of mourning have led to a 
reconsideration of melancholia. Instead of viewing the refusal of consolation as a 
pathological attachment to a lost object, it can instead be seen as a key entry point to 
understanding the relationship between mourning, politics, and aesthetic practice; as Eng 
and Kazanjian offer, “the politics of mourning might be described as that creative 
process mediating a hopeful or hopeless relationship between loss and history” (2). The 
problematization of “successful mourning” has led to a general trend to a 
“depathologizing” of melancholia that invites theorists to extend discourses on mourning 
and melancholia to include abstract losses, including items, places, ideals, and even 
concepts, such as “history.”  Our notion of history is shaped entirely by our 
contemporaneous context, which itself is defined largely by our ethics and political 
engagements.27  
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  Freud’s original framework assumed grief is “successful” when the attachment 
to the lost object is completely severed and placed elsewhere; however, we can easily 
imagine instances where to move past a loss in this way would be to abdicate our 
responsibility to the lost object, perhaps even asking us to ignore or forget a great wrong 
or injustice.  Instead, a refusal to “let it go” can be seen as the refusal to assimilate to 
hegemonic norms, to support the power imbalances that created the loss.  Remaining in a 
state of resistant melancholia keeps particular arguments usefully unsettled. As Patricia 
Rae notes, the successful “work” of mourning, “amounts to a forgetting of, or an 
abdication of responsibility for, what has been lost, and … this amnesia has been too 
often demanded and paid in the interests of preserving the status quo” (18).  In this way, 
the refusal to mourn indicates a desire for justice. As Rae points out, the sort of public 
mourning endorsed or promoted by nations or national identities encourages working 
through the loss of some peoples or identities but not others (20).  In other words, to 
mourn the loss of an individual, that individual must first be considered “grievable,” 
particularly in the context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century geopolitical 
stage, where the crushing reach of European imperialism creates new classes of “the 
subaltern,” both abroad and “at home.” (One might ponder, for instance, why late 
nineteenth-century authors would grieve the loss of the pastoral, but cheer the elevation 
of “the primitive.”) Jameson’s aforementioned emphasis on the relationship between 
Modernism and imperialism asks us to consider the relationships between Modernism, 
mourning, and the “imperialist dynamic of capitalism proper” (45-46).  Whether 
couched as global capitalism or outright imperialism, the problematic political context of 
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the Modernist era invites a serious reevaluation on the effects of “progress.” As Rae 
suggests, Modernist narratives reflect this concern by leaving mourning “unresolved 
without endorsing evasion or repression,” encouraging “remembering where memory 
has been repressed,” and exposing “the social determinants for troublesome amnesia.” In 
this way, we can examine how Modernism’s resistance to “narratives and tropes that 
would bring grief through to catharsis…raise questions about the social forces that have 
prevented the work of mourning from being accomplished [and] offer alternatives to the 
consolatory strategies that have been widely deployed and that threaten to introduce a 
whole new round of loss and grieving” (22-23).  Melancholia—conventionally 
considered a regressive, static condition—becomes not only a creative process, but a 
progressive political action. While mourning abandons lost objects, melancholia 
maintains an open relation to the past that promotes new discussions and new 
understandings of the past, rather than simply abandoning our losses to “history.”  As 
Eng and Kazanjian argue, “This attention to remains generates a politics of mourning 
that might be active rather than reactive, prescient rather than nostalgic, abundant rather 
than lacking, social rather than solipsistic, militant rather than reactionary” (2).  
Melancholia becomes not only an aesthetic creative practice, but a force for positive 
social change. 
A common characterization of Modernism is that it is elitist, demonstrating 
hostility towards commodification and popular culture.  If we consider the refusal to 
mourn as a progressive political action, however, we could instead interpret this 
resistance to commodification and mass culture as a component of “ethical” mourning.  
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As discussed previously, Lyotard’s theory of the “post-modern” holds that a “modern” 
discourse or practice is one that legitimizes itself “with reference to a metadiscourse” 
and by “making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative.” He distinguishes the post-
modern as any modern project that rejects or demonstrates “incredulity” toward 
metanarratives (xxiii-xxiv).  In the absence of metanarratives, we then encounter a crisis 
of legitimation; that is, we have no reliable means of determining what is true or just, for 
there are no legitimate antecedents.  This absence thus threatens the ultimate project of 
humanity, which is to constitute “sociocultural unity within which all the elements of 
daily life and of thought” take their places within an organic whole (72).  As such, as we 
trace the progression from early Modernism through to late Modernism in anticipation 
what today is classified as “postmodernism,” we begin to perceive the serious threat to 
practicable ethics engendered by the absence of legitimate metanarratives. By resisting 
attempts to normalize reactions to loss—particularly in service to metanarratives of 
capitalism or nationalism—Modernism offers its ethical and political resistance to 
hegemonic discourses.  With regard to aesthetics, Modernism’s disruption of narrative 
conventions or clear, concrete language is an act of rebellion, a refusal of “good forms.”  
The refusal to complete the work of mourning informs the Modernist embrace of 
ambiguity and interpretive open-endedness, qualities that correlate with a refusal to “let 
go” of the past. The best hope of resolving the paradoxical progressiveness and nostalgia 
of this stance is to revise our conception of melancholia in such a way that casts it not as 
a conservative, degenerative, or regressive state of being, but rather a progressive one.  
In this way, we can develop a practicable “ethics of alterity” that allows for a 
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disengagement from restrictive metanarratives while also creating a space where we may 
host the Other (be it an idea, a belief, or an individual). As Lyotard suggests, to do so is 
to develop new knowledge of the world that is not merely “a tool of the authorities” but 
that refines “our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the 
incommensurable” (xv).   
 The most influential recent work on the ethics of mourning has been offered by 
Jacques Derrida, who broadly considers reconciliation to loss as “unethical,” as the 
successful completion of mourning betrays the lost one and fails to adequately 
comprehend the meaning of that death.  The only way to truly honor the dead, in 
Derrida’s view, is to sustain a relationship with them that somehow combines an 
intimacy with the lost one with the certain finality of their passing—what he frequently 
dubs a species of “aporia,” or the rhetoric of unresolvable contradiction.   Per Freud’s 
original conception of grief, Derrida suggests that when confronted with the death of the 
other “we are given to memory, and thus to interiorization, since the other, outside us, is 
now nothing” (Memoires 34).  In the practice of mourning, we keep the other alive “in 
memory,” which re-creates the other within ourselves.  We bring the lost object into 
ourselves through the practice of memory. This “faithful interiorization bears the other 
and constitutes him in me (in us), at once living and dead. It makes the other a part of us, 
between us—and then the other no longer quite seems to be the other, because we grieve 
for him and bear him in us…” (Memoires 35).  Ultimately, just as Freud came to argue in 
Ego and the Id, Derrida posits that we are who we are only as a product of our 
interiorized losses. 
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 This attempt to successfully interiorize loss always fails, however; in Derrida’s 
view, mourning is ultimately impossible because “we can only live this experience in the 
form of an aporia: the aporia of mourning and of prosopopeia, where the possible 
remains impossible” (35). In other words, when confronted with loss, we are forced to 
choose between two infidelities—do we neglect to memorialize what is lost, or do we 
internalize the loss, thus maintaining a conversation with the dead through a sort of 
ventriloquism? The work of mourning remains simultaneously compulsory and 
impossible, for the dead are outside of ourselves, separate, alone, yet close.  We maintain 
them inside of ourselves through memory, we speak of them and to them, but the dead 
remain apart in their ultimate alterity, gazing back upon us. As Derrida offers, “when we 
say ‘in us,’ when we speak so easily and so painfully of inside and outside, we are 
naming space, we are speaking of a visibility of the body, a geometry of gazes, and 
orientation of perspectives. We are speaking of images” (Work 159). The dead are gone, 
but we reassemble their remainders within us.  Again, in this way, we discover the 
essentially creative character of melancholia.28 In the final chapter of this dissertation, I 
will seek a clearer understanding of Derrida’s conception of ethical mourning by 
viewing it through the lens of the similar discourse regarding hospitality, as  his 
conceptualization of “ethical mourning” depends on the action of welcoming this lost 
other inside oneself—the exact actions regulated by the demands of hospitality.  
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Notes
1 As Edward Said writes in the first paragraph of Culture and Imperialism,  
Appeals to the past are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations of the present. What 
animates such appeals is not only disagreement about what happened in the past and what the 
past was, but uncertainty about whether the past really is past, over and concluded, or whether it 
continues, albeit in different forms, perhaps. This problem animates all sorts of discussions—
about influence, about blame and judgement, about present actualities and future priorities. 
(3) 
 
2 As Mahaffey notes, “One of the main challenges of modernist writing in the twentieth century was to re-
awaken in its audience a willingness to relinquish the self-satisfaction of easy accomplishment in favor of 
immersion in the flux, the seeming desolation, of what is left to know” (14). 
 
3 In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud does invite continued development of his framework, suggest 
that mourning does not seem pathological simply because we understand it well and can account for its 
behaviors.  Melancholia, by contrast, is considered pathological because of its inscrutability, resistance to 
resolution, and potential for harm.   
 
4 Resulting in “an extraordinary reduction in self-esteem, a great impoverishment of the ego” (205).  
Paradoxically, the lost object may actually be the subject’s ego (207). 
 
5 Judith Butler famously extends this framework to articulate a theory of gender formation: “This process 
of internalizing lost loves becomes pertinent to gender formation when we realize that the incest taboo, 
among other functions, initiates a loss of love-object for the ego and that this ego recuperates from this 
loss through the internalization of the tabooed object of desire” (58).  
 
6 Contemporary discourse on mourning and melancholia has expanded and, at times, challenged, Freud’s 
paradigms. For instance, some scholars, most notably Maria Torok, have interrogated Freud’s use of the 
term introjection, insisting on a distinction between introjection and incorporation.  The former term—
introduced by Sandor Ferenczi in 1909—is defined as “an extension to the external world of the original 
autoerotic interests, by including its objects in the ego” (316-317).  Torok argues, however, that Freud 
(along with Nicholas Abraham and Melanie Klein), flatten Ferenczi’s original concept to signify only the 
act of object possession, disregarding the extension of autoerotic interests and the expansion of the ego. In 
distinguishing between introjection and incorporation, Torok emphasizes Ferenczi’s implication that 
introjection is not caused by the actual loss of an object of love and that it does not “tend toward 
compensation, but growth.” Introjection broadens and enriches the ego, introducing into it “the 
unconscious, nameless, or repressed libido” (113).  Torok observes that, in contrast, while introjection of 
these desires thus ends dependence on the object, incorporation of the object creates or reinforces 
“imaginal times and hence dependency…. Like a commemorative monument, the incorporated object 
betokens the place, the date, and the circumstances in which desires were banished from introjection: they 
stand like tombs in the life of the ego” (114). The instinct of many readers would be to map Abraham and 
Torok’s introjection/incorporation dyad onto the melancholia/mourning dyad.  While there are many 
logical interfaces between them, the concepts are not a direct 1:1 correlation.  Instead, if, as Abraham and 
Torok specify, incorporation results from “those losses that for some reason cannot be acknowledged as 
such,” I would suggest that the more accurate distinction would be between pathological grieving versus 
successful mourning (130). In this way, we can begin to understand mourning and melancholia not as 
oppositional states of being, but as stages along the continuum towards the successful resolution of grief. 
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7 Žižek begins his essay by establishing that he intends to challenge the hegemonic trend in critical 
literature that holds that “Freud opposed normal mourning (the successful acceptance of a loss) to 
pathological melancholy (the subject persists in his or her narcissistic identification with the lost object),” 
as it is only through the refusal to relinquish the remainder of the object do we maintain fidelity (658). 
 
8 Žižek also explains that, “the mourner mourns the lost object and kills it a second time through 
symbolizing its loss, while the melancholic is not simply the one who is unable to renounce the object but 
rather the one who kills the object a second time (treats it as lost) before the object is actually lost” (662). 
 
9 I prefer to describe the posture of Modernist literature as melancholic, as opposed to mournful.  In other 
words, my analysis will demonstrate that Modernist narrative deploys the markers of melancholia—grief 
for an ideal, as opposed to real, loss; lack of comprehension of the meaning of the loss; and unresolved 
ambivalence towards the lost object. 
 
10 Steve Giles argues that while the experience of “crisis” is not unique to the modernist time period, but 
the Modernist crisis is unique because it is generated by the dynamics of capitalism: “The monetization of 
the relations in social life transforms time-space experience by, for example imposing ever stricter 
temporal regimes on the working day, while capitalist commodity exchange requires increasingly efficient 
spatial organization as well as more rapid turnover time of capital” (179). 
 
11 As Alessia Ricciardi suggests, Freudian psychoanalysis is by nature a “modernist discipline,” not only 
because it historically coincides with the emergence of the culture of high modernism, but because “the 
operations of psychoanalysis insist on such crucial modernist principles as the hermeneutics of 
fragmentation and the interiority or encoded ‘depth’ of the psyche” (17).  By approaching Modernism 
from this perspective, we can interpret the widely accepted and highly recognizable characteristics of 
Modernist literature—non-linear emplotment, stylistic fragmentation, shifting narration, unconventional 
language, politicized themes—as representative of a resistance to grief, a refusal to mourn. 
 
12 In contextualizing Modernism within Louis Althusser’s thinking, Richard Sheppard offers that, “At the 
heart of the ‘problematique’ perceived by a large number of major modernist artists and intellectuals lay 
the sense, more or less explicitly formulated and explained in any given case, that contemporary European 
culture was experiencing the subversion of the most fundamental assumptions and conceptual models on 
which the liberal humanist epoch had been based” (13). 
 
13 As Habermas writes, “a modern work becomes a classic because it has once been authentically modern” 
(4). 
 
14 As Habermas suggests, “Aesthetic modernity is characterized by attitudes which find a common focus 
in a changed consciousness of time” ("Modernism" 4). 
 
15 As Benjamin writes, “Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various 
moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It became historical 
posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years” (263). 
 
16 As LaCapra suggests, “Paradise absent is different from paradise lost: it may not be seen as annihilated 
only to be regained in some hoped-for, apocalyptic future or sublimely blank utopia that, through a kind of 
creation ex nihilo, brings total renewal, salvation, or redemption (182). 
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17 The most influential text on the relationship between time, space, and modernity is Stephen Kern’s The 
Culture of Time and Space: 1880 – 1918, which surveys how the sweeping technological and cultural 
changes during these years fundamentally transformed the way Europeans and Americans came to 
“conceive of and experience time and space” (2). Kern does offer that the two most important 
developments in the broad categories of “space” and “time” during this era were the leveling of traditional 
spatial hierarchies” and “the affirmation of the reality of private time” (8). 
 
18 As Kern suggests, “…that very generation which had grown up amid the triumphant achievements of 
increasingly confident nineteenth-century science, technology, and economics, now felt that these systems 
were becoming dysfunctional and potentially totalitarian” (9). 
 
19 The development of the railroad coincides with the development of the telegraph, which makes 
synchronized time possible at all.  The first commercial electric telegraph was patented in Britain in 1837, 
with the first public telegraph company in the world, the Electric Telegraph Company, was formed in 
1845.  In the United States, Samuel Morse independently developed and patented his own electric 
telegraph system in 1837, and by 1861, the US was connected coast-to-coast. 
 
20 As Adam Barrows observes, the period during which Greenwich Mean Time became accepted, nation 
by nation, as the “universal time,” spans the period of literary history commonly ascribed to Modernism 
(263). 
 
21 The move away from late 19th century realism frequently takes shape as Orientalism, as in the case of 
the Salome trope and the poetry of Ezra Pound, or as primitivism, as in the case of cubism or the poetry of 
T.S. Eliot. For an interesting discussion of Modernism’s “cleansing” of African sources of inspiration, see 
Simon Gikandi’s “Picasso, Africa, and the Schemata of Difference.” 
 
22 For his part, Jameson defines “Modernism” as the combined effects of historical phenomena that 
include not only technological advances, but also “commodity reification,” “monetary abstraction and its 
effects on the sign system,” changes in the conception of the consumption of literature and art, and the rise 
of mass culture (44). 
 
23 For Lyotard, the aesthetic “sublime” is the sensibility that recognizes the demand of the un-presentable 
to be put into sensible form but overwhelming all attempts to do so (as contrasted with Kant’s notion of 
the sublime, which occurs when our senses are presented with images of overwhelming magnitude – even 
to the point of terror).  
 
24 Lyotard labels the second mode “novatio,” which seeks “the increase of being and the jubilation which 
result from the invention of new rules of the game, be it pictorial, artistic, or any other” (80). 
 
25 Derrida offers a similar perspective in his discussion of friendship, noting that mourning is but another 
word for anticipation – as in the anticipation of the other’s death.  In Memoires, he notes that, “everything 
that we inscribe in the living present of our relation to others already carries, always, the signature of 
memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave.”  He goes on to explain that this sense of finitude, “can only take that 
form through the trace of the other in us, the other’s irreducible precedence; in other words, simply the 
trace, which is always the trace of the other, the finitude of memory, and thus the approach or 
remembrance of the future” (29). 
 
26 In Lyotard’s thinking, then, post-modernism “denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a 
taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable” (81).   
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27 I use the term “politics” to describe large-scale engagement between groups of people (which includes 
not only governments and nation-states, but also classes or types or people), as opposed to interactions 
between individuals, which I assign to “ethics.” 
 
28 As Derrida offers, the “mimetic interiorization is not fictive; it is the origin of fiction, of apocryphal 
figuration” (Mémoires 34). 
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CHAPTER III 
MELANCHOLY AESTHETICS AND THE MAKING OF MODERNISM IN 
SALOME REVISIONS BY STRINDBERG, WILDE, AND IBSEN 
 
And when the daughter of the said Herodias came in, and danced, and pleased Herod 
and them that sat with him, the king said unto the damsel, Ask of me whatsoever thou 
wilt, and I will give it thee. 
                                                                                                                           --Mark 6:22  
 
Introduction 
Throughout the nineteenth century, a profound interest in the story of the death 
of John the Baptist inspired a remarkable number of novels, paintings, operas, and 
poems presenting variations on the Gospels’ accounts of the martyr’s demise. In 
particular, artists and writers were enraptured with the “dancing daughter” of Herodias, 
Salome. Most notable (and influential) were treatments by Gustav Flaubert in his quasi-
historical 1877 novel Hérodias (which subsequently inspired an 1881 opera of the same 
title); an elaborate play/poem conceived by Stéphane Mallarmé in 1864 and published in 
parts until his death in 1898; a major section of Joris-Karil Huysmans’ 1884 prototypical 
decadent novel A Rebours; not to mention famous visual renderings by Henri Regnault 
in 1870, Gustav Moreau in 1876, and Gustav Klimt in 1901, among many others.1 
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 On the dramatic stage, the best-known production (or perhaps most enduring) 
treatment was Oscar Wilde’s 1891 play Salome, and I argue that this figure is found in 
the works of other well-known playwrights of this era. While Wilde’s place in the 
“Salomania” of the late nineteenth century has been thoroughly explored, this work has 
not read alongside the “dancing daughter” plays of Wilde’s main contemporary 
dramatists, August Strindberg, in Miss Julie (1888), and Henrik Ibsen, in Hedda Gabler 
(1890).2  Similarities between the works were marked, however, by those involved in 
their composition and production.3 Strindberg is reported to have observed that “Hedda 
Gabler seems more gossiped together than observed, and its relation to [my own plays] 
seems indisputable.”4 Wilde sought comparison with the more famous Norwegian 
playwright. As Kerry Powel comments, despite the fact that the popular critics rarely 
compared the two, Wilde viewed himself as Ibsen’s equal, “working with the Norwegian 
on a level high above the swarming popular dramatists who gave London one adaptation 
from the French after another” (224). However, if the critics mentioned Ibsen in the 
same breath as Wilde at all, it was to draw sharp contrast between the two.  
Wilde must certainly have been pleased, then, when, in William Archer (who 
was also Ibsen’s translator), in his 1893 review of the English-language publication of 
Salome, commented that “Salomé is an oriental Hedda Gabler” (qtd. in Beckson 142).5  
Archer’s comment was embedded within his response to the recent decision to censor 
the play’s production in England, an occurrence that he felt was, “perfectly ridiculous, 
and absolutely inevitable” (qtd. in Beckson 142). As Powell writes, there was few 
precedents in English drama for Wilde’s “morbid, sexually frustrated” protagonist 
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“whose only satisfaction comes from causing the death of the man she vainly craves” 
(229), save Ibsen, who had been shocking European audiences with a succession of 
difficult and threatening women for several years. The ire of the theater-going public in 
London had long been raised against the “Ibscenity” of the Norwegian playwright’s 
work, and the implication of Archer’s comparison was that Wilde was paying the price 
for the critical outrange against Ibsen. Salome was to be the example.6 As well, for many 
years, Strindberg was unable to find an English-language theatre that would perform 
Miss Julie. So, in 1888, Strindberg leased the Dagmar Theatre in Copenhagen and 
prepared for his first season, which was to begin on March 2, 1889, with a production of 
Miss Julie. As with Wilde’s Salome, the state censors arrived to block the opening 
performance.7 The play was produced intermittently (and for very short runs) before its 
famous debut at André Antoine’s Théâtre Libre on January 16, 1893. The play was an 
immediate scandal, and it rocketed Strindberg to fame as an “enemy of women.” Miss 
Julie was not performed again for another ten years. Ibsen was not, of course, unfamiliar 
with censorship and outrage. Writing in such a way as to dismantle the superficial 
spectacle of “well-made plays” being produced in Paris and bowdlerized in London, 
Ibsen frequently suffered at the hands of the censors and critics alike. Ghosts was banned 
for over 20 years in England, and the Examiner of Plays did not look fondly upon any of 
Ibsen’s other works.8 While fairly tame by contemporary standards, at the time of their 
composition, these three plays were incendiary works that directly challenged common 
notions of decency, good taste, and decorum. 
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Therefore, although these treatments of the Salome plot melancholically lingered 
over well-worn narratives, they were thoroughly “modern” in that they were addressing 
issues of their time. In this way, they present an entry point for an examination of 
“proto-Modernism,” the Janus-faced art and literature of late nineteenth-century Europe, 
which was both challenging and progressive with regard to subject and form while being 
nostalgic in its themes and motifs, a time period that Strindberg himself described as an 
“age of transition more urgently hysterical at any rate than the one that preceded it” 
(59).9 As Strindberg’s use of the term “hysterical” suggests, a significant portion of the 
criticism on the Salome trope in fin de siècle literature is focused upon the cultural 
anxiety over the manufactured crises of gender performance and the “New Woman;” 
both of which are apparent concerns of these works (although I will suggest later that it 
is not the major concern of these works, as is commonly thought). I argue that these 
subversive works also function as commentary on the destabilized aesthetic of the last 
years of the nineteenth century. As authors attendant at the evolution from the 
retrospective idealism of romanticism to realist naturalism and, finally, through to anti-
idealist decadence, aestheticism, and forward-looking Modernism, all three authors 
demonstrate a melancholic attachment to an aesthetic ideal—defined as a perfect unity 
of form and meaning—both by integrating biblical plots and fairy tale motifs into their 
works while simultaneously recreating the “lost” plots and motifs through avant-garde 
literary technique.  
While discussion of the interplay between decadent (and decadent-influenced) fin 
de siècle writers and the New Woman “problem” is both compelling and fecund, I argue 
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that most of the perceived commentary on gender politics exists for sensationalist, rather 
than ideological, reason. While anxiety over gender roles is obviously present in these 
plays, I argue that the larger concern of these authors is to exploit the swirling discourse 
around gender to further their subversive projects, which are to express the intense, 
melancholic anxieties prevalent in fin de siècle culture and present larger arguments on 
the ongoing aesthetic conflict between aesthetic idealism and realism. These authors’ 
characterizations are not as concerned with subverting popular conceptions of gender 
roles as much as they attempt to problematize discourse on the function of art. By 
approaching these competing Salome dramas from this perspective, the ambivalence to 
the accurate categorization of these plays (for example, as naturalistic, avant-garde, 
aesthetic) thus underscores the critical value in juxtaposing them, as they represent a site 
of problematic transition from the preceding movements of romanticism, aesthetic 
idealism, and naturalism to the Modernism to come. 
Although the compositions of their “Salome” dramas were nearly simultaneous, 
separated by only three years, they took radically different approaches to the raw 
material. Although I consider them examples of early or “low” Modernism, both Miss 
Julie and Hedda Gabler are often treated as naturalist works, given their penchant for 
realism in their staging and dialogue and focusing on the social problems of women’s 
emancipation and class struggle as central themes. In the preface to Miss Julie, 
Strindberg details his intentions, noting specifically his characters—“conglomerates of 
past and present stages of culture;” scenery—“I have borrowed the asymmetry and 
cropped framing of impressionist painting;” and dialogue—“I have avoided the 
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symmetrical, mathematical artificiality of French dialogue and allowed my characters’ 
brains to work irregularly as they do in real life…” (60, 65, 63). In comparison, Ibsen’s 
critics often attacked the jerky and disjointed dialogue of Hedda Gabler, which was 
Ibsen’s similar attempt to more closely emulate natural speech.10 The lack of 
monologues and asides made it difficult for the contemporary audience to comprehend 
Hedda’s complex character, and, as critic Henrik Jæger commented, “No concession is 
made to the general public to help it understand. No explanations by other characters, no 
self-characterization to excuse or defend itself, even a minimum of information about 
events that have gone before” (qtd. in Meyer 645-646). In contrast, though his preceding 
dramatic works were actually far more conventional than either Strindberg or Ibsen’s, 
Wilde’s Salome is an ornate, dream-like work often held up as a primary example of 
decadent or aesthetic literature.11 It was originally composed in French and with a 
hypnotic, almost incantatory cadence, exactly the sort of stilted dialogue that Strindberg 
rejected.12  
Despite these differences, however, each play can be easily seen as reacting 
critically to the intellectually light and unchallenging popular drama of the day.13 These 
three plays present a particularly interesting case study in that they represent both a 
culmination/summary of nineteenth-century literature and art and presage the modernist 
literature yet to come. In fact, neatly categorizing any one of these plays (or authors) into 
a single literary movement is quite difficult.14 In general, terminological ambiguity is 
one identifying characteristic of fin de siècle literature. John Stokes describes the theatre 
of the fin de siècle as a series of interlocking modes or genres: “realism, modulating into 
 66 
 
naturalism, the symbolist reaction that will lead, eventually, to modernism” (209). These 
three authors—and these three works in particular—represent a literary “missing link” 
between the romanticism and symbolism of the nineteenth century and the Modernism 
of the early twentieth century. Taken together, we may read these artistic products as an 
attempt to respond to a prevalent sense of loss and to articulate an emerging 
metaphysical and aesthetic crisis categorized as the fin de siècle, a crisis to which 
“Modernism” became the response. 
 
Decadence, Loss, and Modernity 
The backward glance to cultural archives such as biblical legend and fairy tales 
can be read as a melancholic act; however, while melancholia is often understood as a 
failure to move beyond the past, to disentangle oneself from what has gone before, it 
differs from the work of mourning in that it is by necessity a creative process, for the 
melancholic is often grieving not a loss, but a lack or absence. In other words, in order to 
grieve a lost object of desire that was, in fact, never possessed, the melancholic must 
first create a spectral version of the object, in essence “re-creating” it. This 
fundamentally creative quality of melancholia correlates with the avant-gardism of 
aesthetic, decadent, and Modernist literature, as these movements are defined primarily 
by their radical separation from preceding artistic movements and epistemologies. 
Circuitously, this radical separation is the origin of the general sense of loss that 
pervades late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century narratives—as suggested in the 
introduction to this dissertation, Modernism created its own crisis. 
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This radical separation from previous ways of knowing and telling can be traced 
to the disorienting effects of, on one hand, the realization of widespread political and 
intellectual emancipation and, on the other, crushing imperialism, dehumanizing 
urbanization, and industrialization. These competing forces thus create a central tension 
between the urge to look forward in hopeful anticipation of an ideal future while being 
compelled to preserve our lost glories, to connect with the “golden age” of aesthetic 
idealism where beauty and meaning were one. Obvious and reliable touchstones are 
classical and biblical texts, legends, myths, and fairy tales. As Jean Pierrot writes, the 
decadent literary generation, in its rejection of contemporary reality and desperate for 
escape and dreams, “was naturally bound to make intensive use of the world of legends 
and myths” in its struggle to transmit “the metaphysical, moral, or esthetic ideas dear to 
their hearts” (206). The uniting characteristic of works from this period, then, is their 
aesthetic relationship to loss.15 The incessant repetition of and return to the Salome story 
is symptomatic of this pattern, this melancholic tendency to seek a sort of cultural 
“archive,” a space that houses the records of the past and preserves stable meanings, 
from which to draw artistic inspiration and find aesthetic authenticity. By reading the 
various iterations of the Salome story as emanating from a sort of cultural archive 
containing Biblical texts, historiography, visual art, and even folk traditions such as fairy 
tales, one begins to detect pervasive anxiety, a sense of loss expressed by fin de siècle 
writers.  
 The melancholia associated with this bidirectional view is an essential 
characteristic of what is now considered “decadent style.” The first and primary theorist 
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of decadent style was Paul Bourget, who, in his 1883 collection Essais de psychologie 
contemporaine, established an analogy between social evolution and manifestations of 
artistic language. In Bourget’s model, the “style” of Decadence is a sort of organic 
decomposition. If a society could be seen as an organism comprised by a descending 
series of lesser organisms (e.g. a country that consists of provinces, which are comprised 
of towns, which are populated by individual citizens, who themselves are comprised of 
millions of cells), we must assume that for the larger organism to survive and function, 
each lesser organism must subordinate itself to the good of the larger order(s). Should 
any level of this hierarchy fail, then the entire society descends into anarchy. In 
Bourget’s model, “decadent” literature is that which embraces this anarchy and rejects 
the hierarchy: 
A decadent style is one in which the unity of a book decomposes to leave room 
for the independence of the page, the page decomposes to leave room for the 
independence of the phrase, and the phrase to leave room for the independence of 
the word.  
(qtd. in Hutchinson 76) 16 
While this decomposition and decadence would be catastrophic to the stability of the 
state, Bourget argues that in regard to art, it may stimulate a new creativity of morbid, 
melancholy, refined, sensual kind (Bernheimer 10).  In the venerable articulation of 
Richard A. Long and Iva G. Jones, decadent literature represents a “change in 
concentration from the whole to the parts, as a disruption of unity, as a pursuit of the 
particular and the eccentric” (246). This movement, rather than being a means of 
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deconstruction, is instead a separation, an emphasis on the individual within society.17 
As we shall see, this concern over the individual is expressed by Strindberg, Ibsen, and 
Wilde through their Salome-esque heroines, who, as with typical fairy tale protagonists, 
struggle against normative society as strangers from outside its borders. 
Decadence, in this framework, is not so much an intentional movement but rather 
a descriptor that may be applied to fin de siècle works of literature that exhibit three 
primary characteristics. First, decadent literature exhibits an obsession with decay and a 
particularly powerful fixation on loss. Yet, this fixation on decay results in vibrant 
innovations in form and style. In this way, we discover once again the essential 
creativity of melancholia—the decay over which decadence ruminates is often created 
for its own sake, an absence in place of a loss. Secondly, I argue that decadence 
represents the conflict of Romanticism and Realism that, in aesthetic terms, overlays the 
larger, societal struggles between religion and science, between the ideal, imperfectable 
relationship with the sublime through a personal connection with truth, as found in 
nature and the beautiful, and the discovery of truth and meaning within the self. In 
spatial terms, the intellectual preoccupation becomes the relocation of meaning from 
“inside” to “outside.” Despite the pessimism of its name, however, decadence is 
optimistic; as Weir offers, “the negation of spirituality and the pessimistic acceptance of 
the reality that man is an animal and not an angel may be cause for despair, but, at the 
same time, outright acceptance of mortality as an end in itself can be liberating” (xiii). 
Thirdly, decadence upholds the superiority of Art to nature. As Wilde suggests in “The 
Decay of Lying,” “the only effects that [nature] can show us are effects that we have 
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already seen through poetry, or in paintings. This is the secret of nature’s charm, as well 
as the explanation of Nature’s weakness” (392). In this way, meaning is not found in a 
direct encounter with nature itself, but rather through the more stable, permanent truth 
offered by Art. The font of creation, then, is located in the hands of man. 
 
The Salome Plot and the Public Imagination 
Considering this melancholic attachment to the perceived stability of aesthetic 
idealism, the fact that Salome is a popular subject in late nineteenth-century art and 
literature, with its predominant interest in beauty and decay, seems logical. This intense 
interest in Salome, however, is not unique to symbolism, decadence, or other fin de 
siècle movements. Although a minor figure in the Biblical texts, Salome has captured 
artists’ imagination for centuries, and each new phase has added contours to the basic 
plot that, when examined, suggest that there are more complex forces at play in the fin 
de siècle treatments of Salome.  
The generally accepted ur-texts for the Salome plot are the Gospels of Mark 
(6:14-29) and Matthew (14:3-12), which relate similar stories: Jesus has been attracting 
increased attention, and when word of his deeds reaches Herod Antipas, the Tetrarch 
suspects that Jesus is actually John the Baptist, whom he had previously beheaded. John 
had been critical of the marriage between Herod Antipas and Herodias, for she had 
previously been married to his half-brother (whom Mark names as Philip).  Herodias 
wishes John dead but hesitates to act. The opportunity for revenge presents itself when 
her unnamed daughter dances at Herod’s birthday banquet, so pleasing him that he 
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promises her anything that she wishes, even half of his kingdom. The dancing daughter 
(Salome) goes to her mother to seek advice as to what she should request; she then 
returns to Herod and asks for the head of John the Baptist on a platter. To keep his oath 
and preserve his honor before his guests, Herod complies.  
The biblical account of John the Baptist’s death plays a subversive role in the 
New Testament, both thematically and narratively. From a narratological perspective, 
both accounts are of special interest because they are told in analepsis, or flashback, a 
rare and unusual device in the Bible. Its use suggests some authorial interjection into the 
“historical” plot, as the Bible is generally linear; the interruption of the story of Jesus 
suggests that ideological forces are at play, and the inconsistencies between the gospels 
are indicative of contemporary anxieties of the gospel authors. For instance, Ross S. 
Kraemer suggests that the competing ancient Salome narratives are indicative of early 
Christian anxieties about the relationship between Jesus and John the Baptist. The 
interjected anecdotes are intended to refute not only the notion that John had been 
resurrected but also the idea that Jesus is actually John raised from the dead (341). Thus, 
the beheading of John is essential, for it means that his body has been desecrated in such 
a way as to make resurrection impossible, thereby subverting any claims that Jesus and 
John are one in the same.   
Considering the crisis of belief experienced at the end of the nineteenth century, 
it is unsurprising to find a similar didactic objective in the Salome plays of Strindberg, 
Ibsen, and Wilde.  The Salome story has been retold and reworked countless times, and 
with each re-telling, the story has added or subtracted elements so as to better reflect or 
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comment upon the culture to which it was being told. (And, in fact, the essential 
elements of the story likely pre-date the Christian era entirely; I will discuss this further 
on in the chapter.) The account of the slaying of John the Baptist was recounted again in 
the first century by Roman historian Flavius Josephus (who is credited with giving 
Salome—otherwise known only as “the daughter of Herodias”—her name). Josephus’ 
account, like that of Mark and Matthew, is also told in analepsis; as well, in both the 
New Testament and the histories, the anecdote is brought up as a means of explaining 
Herod’s unreasonable fear that the tumultuous events of the present—that is, the 
miracles of Jesus in the former or the immanent defeat of Herod’s armies by Aretas, 
King of Arabia, in the latter—are caused by his unjust execution of his former prisoner, 
John the Baptist.18  
 The Salome story remained in the popular imagination for several centuries 
thereafter, and from the fourth century on, the previously benign, obedient (and minor) 
Salome began to acquire the immoral characteristics with which we are now familiar.19 
Around the year 1,000, Salome began appearing in painting and sculpture, most 
famously in the tympanum of the Porte St-Jean in the Cathedral of Rouen, where 
Salome is depicted in an acrobatic stance, bent backwards onto her hands, emphasizing 
an acrobatic physicality.20 Although Salome had begun to acquire immoral, erotic 
characteristics throughout the medieval period, during the Renaissance, these elements 
faded from popular depictions. Instead, she became an ideal subject for depicting the 
beauty of the human form and a convenient means of displaying artistic virtuosity, given 
the challenges of painting the severed head and the opulent, Oriental costumes.21 Salome 
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gradually disappeared from the artistic imagination until the early nineteenth century, 
when the trope resurfaced with several important thematic additions in Heinrich Heine’s 
long narrative poem, Atta Troll (1841). Heine admittedly embellished the Biblical story 
with elements found in popular the folk tales of Reimarus Secundus,22 and commentaries 
written by the Brothers Grimm.23 Atta Troll’s contribution to the Salome story was to 
introduce the taboo eroticism emphasized by Flaubert, Moreau, and Wilde, among 
others. Heine’s narrative conflates Salome and Herodias, casting the composite character 
as a melancholic figure who is motivated not by the political vindictiveness of the 
medieval Herodias/Salome, but by a fierce, unrequited love: 
 Still with her hands she bears  
    That deep charger with the head 
Of the Prophet, still she kisses— 
     Kisses it with fiery lips. 
 
For she loved the Prophet once, 
   Though the Bible naught reveals, 
Yet her blood-stained love lives on  
   Storied in her people’s hearts. 
(114) 
After its 1847 publication in French, Heine’s capricious revision of the basic Salome 
plot not only rescued it from relative obscurity, but also established Salome as the muse 
of the new type of “aristocratic” artist, artists that would later be categorized as leaders 
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of the symbolist, decadent, and aesthetic movements.24 Salome had become not only a 
symbol of idealized beauty, but a figure that is socially, politically, and sexually 
subversive.  
 
Salome as Fairy Tale 
As previously indicated, another aspect of the Salome trope that makes it such a 
popular subject of the avant-garde artists of the fin de siècle is that it comes to us from 
“the archive”—that is, the stable cultural repository of Biblical, historical, and fairy tale 
narrative traditions. As mentioned, Heine drew many of his more radical inspirations for 
his depiction of Herodias-Salome from German folk narratives, which had carried along 
the Salome trope from the Middle Ages on. In Teutonic Mythology, Jacob Grimm 
observes that the story of Herod’s dancing daughter, “must have produced a peculiarly 
deep impression in the early part of the Mid. Ages, and in more than one way got mixed 
up with fables” (283, abbreviation original). Grimm then goes on to explain the 
conflation of Herodias with Diana and the Teutonic deity Holda (or Frau Holle), who is 
the matron of childbirth, domestic animals, witches, and the “Wild Hunt” mytheme. 
Therefore, the Salome story re-entered the modern artistic imagination, in part, by way 
of the fairy tale.25 
It is reasonable to assume that Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde were not only 
familiar with the Salome narrative, but also the literary tradition of fairy tales as a whole; 
each author had done significant scholarly or creative work in the field.26 Given that 
these authors were familiar with the didactic potential of the fairy tale form, we can 
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understand why they would so quickly adapt it to their needs: the appropriation of fairy 
tale motifs serves both as an efficient means of situating the new work within the 
cultural canon and as a means of layering complex, perhaps even subversive, themes 
upon the story at hand.27 Attempts to subvert, however, are not without risk of 
generating in both English and Norwegian contexts what Henry James describes as the 
“cries of outraged purity which have so often and so pathetically resounded through the 
Anglo-Saxon world” (521). The difficulty of a subversive project, then, is to encode it so 
as to be both recognizable and effective, to be old and yet new.28  The technique of 
appropriating fairy tale forms is a means of putting new wine in old wineskins.  In this 
way, Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde can deliver the “metaphysical, moral, or esthetic ideas 
dear to their hearts” described by Pierrot in a form that is accessible by their audiences. 
In other words, the familiar narratives offered by fairy tales provide a comfortable, 
recognizable point of access—a means of allowing the audience to conserve their mental 
energy. Therefore, composing a revised fairy tale creates an entirely new product that 
both allows for the incorporation of the author’s cultural critique and corresponds to the 
expectations tastes of the audience.  
Furthermore, these acts of revision represent the melancholic process of creating 
the absent object in order to possess it. There are several obvious fairy tale motifs in 
these three plays, and I shall touch on the most important characteristics in regard to 
setting, plot, and character. One essential quality of the fairy tale is the presence of a 
supernatural or magical atmosphere. In Miss Julie, this magical quality is established by 
the setting, as the play is set on Midsummer’s Eve, a Swedish festival traditionally 
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celebrated on June 23 and 24, the Feast of St. John the Baptist.29 Considered one of the 
times of the year when the potential for magic is the strongest, numerous oracular 
traditions arose around the holiday. In particular, young people would pick bouquets of 
flowers and lay them beneath their pillows in order to dream of their future spouses; 
greenery was placed in and around the house and barn to bring good fortune and fertility 
to people and livestock alike. This theme of fertility is promoted in Wilde’s Salome 
through the repeated emphasis on the moon, which is a complicated metaphor in the 
play, simultaneously representing both life, as Salomé’s fertility and virginity, and death, 
gazing down in judgment upon Salomé at the end of the play. Of the three plays, Hedda 
Gabler is the most realistic in its mood and setting, although the fertility/death theme is 
continued in Ibsen’s work as well, given that Hedda begins the play pregnant, against 
expectations, given her distaste for her new groom. 
Another important fairy tale motif is the plot of transformation and integration. A 
fairy tale typically begins with some sort of extraordinary disturbance of their “home,” 
or point of equilibrium. The narrative then examines how the protagonist overcomes this 
extraordinary challenge in an attempt to achieve his or her strongest desire, which is 
typically a return to the originary point of equilibrium. Quite typically, however, the 
protagonist, through the course of his or her adventures, returns to their place of origin 
with their circumstances much improved (for example, riches, marriages, status). In Miss 
Julie, the point of disturbance is the recent dissolution of Julie’s engagement, coupled 
with the revelry of Midsummer. In Salome, the disturbance is fairly obvious—the 
presence of Iokanaan and Salomé’s sudden attraction to him. In Hedda Gabler, the 
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obstacle is Hedda’s pregnancy, her marriage, and the prospect of a mundane, bourgeois 
lifestyle. In each of these three cases, the protagonist does not achieve equilibrium—
there is no “happy ending.” I shall comment further on this deviation below. 
Additionally, the protagonist’s point of origin is often undesirable, as fairy tale 
protagonists typically begin the story outside of mainstream society, often because of an 
abnormal upbringing, thus constituting a third important element of the fairy tale trope. 
True to form, all three protagonists—Hedda, Julie, and Salomé, are either mistreated by 
step-parents or raised unconventionally by their own parents (or both). Julie is raised by 
her mother to be masculine, in Julie’s words, “a child of nature and, what’s more, I was 
to learn everything a boy has to learn...” (93). Hedda is an aggressive gynander. Her new 
aunt-in-law Miss Tesman remarks that Hedda is, “General Gabbler’s daughter” and 
comments to Berta the maid, “the way she lived in the general’s day! Do you remember 
how she would go out riding with her father?” (291). Salomé is raised by the 
opportunistic, vengeful Herodias and gazed upon by the lecherous Herod Antipas (who 
together are in a perverse marriage). Perverted by her step-father’s lust for her and 
goaded by her mother’s vengefulness, Salomé begins the play seemingly a demure, 
chaste virgin, and but by the end is revealed to be as vengeful and lascivious as both of 
her parents. At the climax of the play, as she speaks to Iokanaan’s severed head, she 
says, “I was a princess and thou didst scorn me. I was a virgin, and thou didst take my 
virginity from me. I was chaste, and thou didst fill my veins with fire….” (65). The 
characterization of Salome/Julie/Hedda as an eroticized predator is the problematic 
point, in terms of the dramatic re-interpretation of the original plot. 
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Sexual Salome and the New Woman 
The depiction of Salome as an aggressive, sexual predator, not only conforms to 
the outsider trope of the fairy tale mode, it is also the hallmark of the decadent vision of 
her, which itself is a product of her confusing and problematic artistic history. As 
previously indicated, Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde’s interest in Salome was neither 
unique nor timely—Salome had been the subject of countless poems, paintings, and 
narratives for decades before the fin de siècle.30 Prior to her re-appearance in Atta Troll, 
Salome had been depicted, from the fourth century onward, flatly, as a villain; during the 
Renaissance, she was simply depicted as an object of ideal physical beauty, void of 
eroticism or immorality. Upon her reappearance in the nineteenth century, however, 
Salome is depicted in remarkably divergent ways: at one end of the spectrum, she is 
childlike, pure (to the point of sterility), unpossessible; at the other, she is a highly 
(though coldly) sexual emasculating gynander, a vile seductress, a femme fatale. It is the 
latter trope that was favored by symbolist and decadent writers alike, and it was this 
version of Salome that influenced the characterization of Hedda, Julie, and Salomé.31 
The decadent Salome is ambiguous, both corrupt and innocent, a predator and a victim, 
androgynous yet sensual (Parker 473). Both Salomé and Hedda attempt to manipulate 
those who gaze upon them (Herod Antipas/Tesman and Judge Brack) and orchestrate the 
demise of the would-be lovers who spurn (or have spurned) their amorous advances 
(Iokanaan/Løvborg). Strindberg’s scandalous Miss Julie follows a similar trajectory of a 
high-born young woman seeking to assert ultimate control of her circumstances by 
asserting sexual emancipation. Like her counterparts, Julie attempts to seduce a 
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subordinate—her father’s valet, who, as it turns out, is not as inferior as the haughty 
Julie had first assumed.  
This theme of the femme fatale is particularly emphasized by the essential 
element of the Salome motif: her dance of seduction. Although many details of the 
Salome story have changed over the centuries, the centrality of her dance has remained 
consistent. In Wilde’s Salome, the dance is not described in great detail: “Salomé dances 
the dance of the seven veils” (54). In Miss Julie, the dance motif occupies a greater part 
of the dramatic space, given the importance of ritual dance to the Midsummer festival. 
As a fertility celebration, it was also a time strongly linked to sex and marriage. The first 
reference to Julie is to her dancing: 
JEAN.  Miss Julie’s quite crazy again tonight; absolutely crazy! 
KRISTIN. Oh, so you’re back then, are you? 
JEAN. I went with the Count to the station and on my way back past the barn I 
just stopped by for a dance. And who do I see but her ladyship with the 
gamekeeper, leading the dance? But as soon as she claps eyes on me, she comes 
rushing straight on over and invites me to join her in the ladies’ waltz. And how 
she waltzed!—I’ve never known the like. She’s crazy! 
(71)  
Furthermore, in place of an act division, Strindberg writes in a “ballet” that is 
reminiscent of the Herodian fête and alludes to off-stage events: 
The peasants enter, dressed in their best clothes, with flowers in their hats; a 
fiddler at their head; a cask of small beer and a small keg of acquavit, garlanded 
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with leaves, are placed on the table; glasses are produced. They drink. Then a 
circle is formed and they sing and dance the dancing game, ‘There came two 
women from out the wood’. When this is finished, they exit again, still singing. 
(86)  
In Hedda Gabler, the dance of seduction was performed before the commencement of 
the play’s narrative. When asked by Brack why she had married the “most acceptable” 
George Tesman, she replies, “I’d danced myself out, dear Judge. My time was up” (314). 
In the action of the play itself, the dance is revised: Hedda instead performs dance music 
on the piano. At the climax of the play, the point at which Hedda realizes that her 
attempts to orchestrate a heroic death for Løvborg have failed and that her manipulations 
of Brack have been reversed, the stage directions read as follows: 
Hedda goes into the rear room and draws the curtains after her. Short pause. 
Suddenly she is heard to play a wild dance melody on the piano. 
(355, emphasis mine)  
Shortly thereafter, a blast is heard, and Hedda is found to have shot herself with her 
father’s pistol—through the temple, in heroic fashion.32   
 The deaths of Julie, Hedda, and Salomé are not only narrative innovations to the 
Salome plot, but they are also obvious points of divergence from the typical fairy tale 
trope. Indeed, a common characteristic of a fairy tale is the happy ending in which the 
protagonist reaps the rewards of his or her transformation and lives “happily ever after.” 
The deaths of the protagonists are obvious commentary—but upon what do these deaths 
comment? 33 What critique are these authors attempting to make?  In the end, it is Julie 
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who has been seduced, and she does not escape the story alive – she slits her own throat 
with a straight razor. Similarly, Salome and Hedda’s triumphs are short-lived and end 
with their deaths—in the case of Salomé, execution by Herod Antipas’ soldiers. The 
heroine’s deaths forward a number of thematic arguments. Whether Julie, Hedda, and 
Salomé are murdered by an oppressive system, martyred for the cause of women’s 
emancipation, or sacrificed for idealized love is up for debate. Of the three, Strindberg is 
the least sympathetic towards his subject—Julie is disempowered and humiliated before 
her death, whereas Hedda and Salomé retain their agency. A more important question, 
however, is why they must die at all. If Strindberg exhibits underlying misogyny when 
he kills Julie to punish her for her abnormal behavior, then what motivates Ibsen and 
Wilde when Hedda and Salomé do not live? Why did these authors, who so often gave 
audiences not what they wanted but what they needed not make their ideological 
arguments clearer?34 
 I argue that the deaths of these Salome-esque protagonists are not so much 
commentary on specific political or social issues as they are representative of the 
heightened sense of impending crisis. Read this way, the deaths of our protagonists are 
but symptomatic of a trend in fin de siècle literature. While plays adapting the well-
known fairy tales of Perrault and the Grimms became increasingly popular from the late 
eighteenth century onward, particularly as a form of political and social commentary, 
beginning at the turn of the next century with the Modernist moment, dramatic 
adaptations of fairy tales began to take a darker turn. Given the generalized anxieties and 
feelings of doom at the fin de siècle, the fantastic utopias of fairy tales may have seemed 
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an inadequate means of discourse; therefore, avant-garde authors sought to “re-produce” 
them to better suit the contemporary mood. Playwrights like Maurice Maeterlinck, 
Strindberg, Ibsen, Wilde, and W.B. Yeats turned to fairy tales and other anti-realistic 
forms to bring poetry and spiritual meaning back into the theatre. In particular, 
Maeterlinck’s 1893 play Pelléas et Mélisande, considered to be the definitive example of 
symbolist drama, converted the typical plots of social integration and “happy endings” 
into decadent themes of doom, disillusionment, and despair.35 If fairy tales serve moral 
purposes, the revision of a fairy tale serves a moral revision appropriate to historic shifts 
in social arrangements.  
As mentioned, the plays’ emphases on sexuality, perhaps mundane by today’s 
standards, were the primary causes of public outcry against them. In the minds of many 
viewers, Julie, Hedda, and Salomé were “nervous, depraved women” whose deadly 
sexual games were a direct contradiction of the “pure and noble” attributes upon which 
the Victorian male had constructed his feminine ideal (Powell 230). As Tydeman and 
Price comment, adherents of the “cult of overt, self-conscious masculinity” that so 
dominated the late Victorian age strongly rejected aesthetic and decadent art, often 
criticizing it as morbid, unnatural, perverted and unwholesome (143). To be fair, 
decadent art was quite intentionally morbid and perverse; as Pierrot observes, decadent 
authors “took great delight” in depicting such erotically “perverse” subjects as, sadism, 
incest, and even bestiality with clear intentions of shocking the bourgeois audiences of 
the day.36 Against this context, that Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde would exploit the 
uncertainties felt by their audiences should not be surprising. As the manufactured crisis 
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of Modernism began to coalesce, they were happy to lend a hand in pushing what 
remained of convention over the edge of decency. Ever the provocateurs, these authors 
are practically expected to mount a full-frontal assault the convoluted sexual mores of 
the waning days of Victorianism, particularly because of the controversy such 
campaigns attract. It is not difficult, then, to read the Salome plays of Strindberg, Ibsen, 
and Wilde as commentary on the ascendency of the “New Woman” and the ebb of 
Victorian-era mores.37 What is more difficult, however, is interpreting precisely what 
that commentary seeks to achieve.  
Although the Decadents (and other avant-garde fin de siècle writers) did not 
overtly lend their voices to the cause of the New Woman, they did share an interest in 
upending mainstream middle-class values, which, in the public mind at least, coupled the 
two groups together. The popular press attacked both groups for their sexual candor and 
desire to challenge prevailing notions of gender, particularly in British society. 
Ironically, according to Sally Ledger, a significant portion of New Woman writers drew 
more allegiance to “social purity feminism” and were antagonistic towards “sexual 
avant-gardism” (“Wilde Women” 7). Likewise, two popular depictions of woman in 
decadent and symbolist art were either as nakedly helpless or as lethally seductive; 
women were either passive slaves to their emotions or predators that sought to drag man 
to her base—that is, biological—level. Ledger points to The Picture of Dorian Gray to 
illustrate the man/culture woman/nature dualism frequently promoted by decadent 
writers: “The art/nature dualism is clear in the distinction made between ‘femininity’ and 
‘woman’ in Wilde’s decadent novel, and this in turn can be inserted into the 
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Enlightenment culture/nature dichotomy which locked ‘man’ into culture and ‘woman’ 
into nature” (New Woman 108-109). Woman was generally devalued (or, more 
accurately, not valued in any special way), cast as either as helpless victims of biology or 
as dangerous parasites that would leech man’s vitality through the bourgeois 
conceptualization of the marriage contract. In particular, dandyism, an outgrowth of 
decadentism, was a particularly misogynistic cultural position. To point, in her extensive 
study of dandyism, gender, and performance in the fin de siècle, Rhonda K. Garelick 
argues that because dandyism values perpetual, artificial youth, it rejects the woman 
because “by virtue of their association with the human life cycle and reproduction, 
women threaten the dandy’s eternal present with temporality, and hence become objects 
of fear and disdain in decadent literature” (5).38 Whether or not Strindberg, Ibsen, and 
Wilde belong to this misogynistic cohort is debatable. Strindberg was openly hostile 
towards women, as described in his perplexing essay 1895 “On the Inferiority of 
Woman” in which he cites Darwin, among others, to support a quasi-scientific 
hypothesis that menstruation, the “anemia of necessity,” “seems to atrophy the brain,” so 
that the normal condition of a grown woman is that of a “sick child” (qtd. in Parker 473). 
This sort of misogyny, however, is significantly different than the typical decadent 
misogyny, which originates from a preference for the artificial over the natural and the 
social limitations implied by a woman’s role in middle-class culture. 
Wilde and Ibsen were, by comparison, ardent feminists. In Ibsen’s Women, Joan 
Templeton observes that Ibsen’s female characters are generally drawn in such a way as 
to subvert the paradigm of “dutiful feminine submission” (21-22). Hedda is among 
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Ibsen’s most extremely subversive female characters; in fact, the majority of the critical 
backlash against her as a character attempts to categorize her as a defective or 
degenerate woman, going as far as psychoanalyzing her as a study in sexual neurosis 
(Templeton 204-205). In Hedda Gabler (and most of his other plays), Ibsen displays a 
high degree of empathy for the social limitations placed upon women. Wilde, the 
nominal head of British decadence, was a champion, of sorts, for the New Woman. For 
instance, in negotiating his appointment as editor-in-chief of The Woman’s World (née 
The Lady’s World), Wilde argued for a reduction in the number of articles about dress 
and ornament and an increase in the publication’s attention to matters such as women’s 
education and women writers (Ellmann 291-292). Thus, one cannot simply point to the 
authors’ misogyny or fear of the New Woman as the cause of death in these plays. 
 
Death of the (Romantic) Dancer 
I read any apparent “decadent” misogyny (that is, anxiety over biology, or an 
allergy to the natural) as evidence of a melancholic attachment to an idealist paradigm, 
the Romantic Image of essential female beauty described by Kermode. Therefore, 
woman should not, in art, ever be treated realistically. As Toril Moi writes, the idealist 
view holds that, in avoidance of “the coarse and the vulgar,” that which is not beautiful, 
there is an urge to transcend the physical body in favor of “wildly idealized” 
representations of women, including the trope of a pure woman proving her purity by 
sacrificing her life for love, the highest ideal of (melancholic) beauty. Moi goes on to 
describe an “an increasingly impoverished, moralizing, didactic form of idealism” that 
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continued to function as a the master discourse about literature and art in the wake of 
romanticism proper (79, 82), and I would argue that Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde are 
participating in this discourse, thereby sacrificing their women not in punishment for 
their deviance or degeneration (as would be the case in the New Woman discourse), but 
to either preserve them as an aesthetic ideal or employ them as a metaphor. Salomé and 
Julie must die because their death is the only way to salvage their honor and elevate 
them above the base animalism of their unreasonable sexual needs. Hedda dies for a 
similar reason—because she is confronted by a system that gives her no other choice and 
because she aspires to a masculine ideal of heroism. Granted, these sacrifices are 
departures from the traditional trope of sacrifice for an idealized love, but in each case, 
the death of the Salome-esque protagonist signals an unwillingness to resolve the 
conflicts or disappointments of the present age and instead reach towards an idealized 
past. This melancholic turn is not a sort of unresolved attachment to the loss of the true 
“woman” in the socio-cultural sense, but rather in the aesthetic sense.  In other words, 
the melancholic attachments of Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde are to an idealized time 
when form and meaning were one, when Unity of Being was possible in art – the unity 
sought by Symbolists, but destroyed by the onset of Modernism, concerned as it was 
with the dichotomies of self and other, art and artifice, organism and machine. Salome 
dies not as a warning against the progress of the New Woman in the socio-political 
sense, but rather to mark the passing of beauty in the sense of Kermode’s “Romantic 
Image,” which prizes the unity of meaning achieved by the perfectly proportioned body 
of a beautiful woman. Kermode muses, in considering the work of William Butler Yeats, 
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“It is hardly too much to say that whenever Yeats refers back to the historical concept of 
unity of being, or to the aesthetic one of beauty as a perfectly proportioned human body, 
the image of Salome is likely to occur to him…” (76).  
This fixation on “beauty” is the point upon which we may easily segregate these 
three plays. As previously indicated, Strindberg was a well-known and fairly 
conspicuous misogynist, and his execution of his protagonist is likely a punishment for 
Julie having overstepped the bounds of both class and gender.39 If he leads Julie to her 
death, it is not to somehow preserve her ideal beauty or prevent her from further 
degeneration—instead, I read her death as an unavoidable outcome of the complex range 
of factors that prevent her, from her birth onwards, from ever achieving this idealized 
female beauty. Her death is not simply a castigation of only women’s emancipation, but 
a naturalistic interpretation of the entire range of “degenerative” outcomes of modernity. 
As Strindberg comments, “I flatter myself that this multiplicity of motives is in tune with 
the times” (59). In other words, Miss Julie’s death was inescapable, for she is the 
product of a flawed culture that had a priori negated the possibility of ideal beauty. 
Hedda’s suicide is in service to romantic ideals. Throughout the play, Hedda 
indicates her commitment to romantic ideals, particularly the notion that modern society 
is an artificial restriction of individual free will. As her own agency is diminished—by 
her pregnancy, her marriage, and the increasingly ominous sexual advances of Judge 
Brack—her eagerness for any sort of self-defining act of will increases. For instance, she 
praises Løvborg for having “more of life’s courage than the others,” even though his 
passions are entirely self-destructive (334). In the fourth act, when she learns that he had 
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fatally shot himself, she remarks that he “had the courage to live life his own way, and 
now—his last great act—bathed in beauty” (351). When the full truth is revealed—that 
Løvborg’s fatal wound was most likely an accidental shot to the stomach—Hedda 
realizes that her quest for a romantic ideal is futile. She takes her own action and 
dispatchers herself in “heroic” fashion, with a shot to the temple. Like the dancer, she 
represents action and meaning united as beauty.  
Wilde’s objectives are a bit more obscure. He considered, in early drafts, letting 
Salomé live out her days in exile, subsisting on locusts and wild honey, as had St. John 
the Baptist (Ellmann 344-345). But to allow her to escape the bounds of the tragedy 
would disavow Wilde’s core principle in that, “…all excess, as well as all renunciation, 
brings its punishment… (“The Artist” 246). Salomé, must perish as a result of not only 
her initial commitment to chastity, but also her later self-consuming desire for 
Iokannan’s physical beauty not to mention Herod’s all-consuming desire for hers. 
 
Conclusion 
We have identified in the works of Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde a subversive 
mien, inspired in part by their affinity for fairy tales; however, their urge to appropriate 
precedent plots also suggests the possibility of a desire to elevate and legitimize their 
self-consciously scandalous works, to infiltrate the grand narrative of Western culture, 
and to resuscitate the dramatic form. These attempts to dramatize the Salome story—to 
perform it—are an attempt to revive the oral tradition and reject the “industrial” plays 
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produced for the urban masses. This paradoxical urge to return to a fabled past is the 
marker of Modernist melancholia. 
If we follow this line of thinking, however, we realize that Strindberg, Ibsen, and 
Wilde not only insinuated an ancient story into their modern texts, they reinterpreted the 
story to better fit the needs of their contemporary culture, an subversion through 
duplication and revision common to the literary appropriation of fairy tales. Such a 
process of duplication and revision is to be expected, as the dramaturgical inheritance of 
Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde was essentially bankrupt. While the preceding century had 
borne an unprecedented wealth in European poetry and painting along with and the rise 
of the realist novel, bowdlerization and government censorship had crushed all 
adventure from popular drama, resulting in either heavily melodramatic popular works 
or well-made plays rife with thinly-disguised fashionable taboos, such as adultery—
works from a peculiar form of “literary industrialization.” For an artist compelled to 
make bold statements, the stage was an underused vehicle, vacant and ready. 
As the leaders of avant-garde theatre, Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde demonstrate 
conflicted attitudes towards the preceding traditions of aesthetic idealism. Numerous 
authors considered as “decadent” writers expressed their separation from romanticism by 
valorizing artificiality (either thematically or stylistically) while at the same time 
maintaining the romantic interest in “erotic sensibility” (Weir 14). Decadence was not so 
much an inspired literary movement as it was the site of a collision between opposing 
literary tendencies, and a decadent work may be discovered to be simultaneously 
innovative and imitative, overtaking, as it were, parallel literary movements such as 
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realism and naturalism to eventually become a means of writing circumscribed as 
Modernism. These complexities notwithstanding, the notions of “decadence” and “fin de 
siècle” both carry negative connotations, suggestions of decay, degeneration, and an 
unhappy end.  The artistic and formal innovations of decadence are perhaps eclipsed by 
its fixation on the past, which encourages one to read decadence as a reaction to 
romanticism and realism, an attempt to dismantle the faulty notion of truth, whether it be 
the rage of Caliban seeing himself in the mirror or not seeing himself in the mirror (to 
paraphrase Wilde’s preface to Dorian Gray).  But an ancillary argument posed by this 
chapter is to read decadence as a form of “proto-modernism,” not only for the “newness” 
of its style, but also because the backwards gaze of decadence is distinct from the 
nostalgia of romanticism and instead more accurately described as a particular form of 
melancholia that later evolves into the highly recognizable neo-classicism of 
Modernism.  In this way, we may understand this sort of unresolved longing for the lost 
object not as a process of decay or degeneration, but as a process of creation.   
Per Freud’s later conception of melancholia, which depicted it as an unavoidable 
and necessary stage of the mourning process, loss becomes an “introjection” into the 
psyche around which the ego is constructed. As Flately argues, the ego is thus “like an 
archive or archaeological site” that contains the record of our choices (49). We are our 
losses. While from a certain point of view, the melancholic attachment to “the archive” 
is a system of compulsive repetition under the sway of the death-drive and beholden to 
pleasure and desire, a more balanced view would recognize that melancholia is a process 
of subject formation.  Conceiving melancholic attachment to archival sources in this 
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way, we can then recognize the sort of morbid, refined, sensual kind creativity described 
by Bourget. Rather than a process of decomposition or deconstruction, this creative sort 
of melancholia is instead a separation, an emphasis on the individual within society, 
however discomforting or painful it may be. 
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Notes
1 For thorough surveys of the Salome/Herodias/Judith trope in fin de siècle art, see Bram Dijkstra’s Idols 
of Perversity, Helen Zagona, The Legend of Salome and the Principle of Art for Art’s Sake, Charles 
Bernheimer’s Decadent Subjects: The Idea of Decadence in Art, Literature, Philosophy, and Culture of 
the Fin de Siècle, and Robert C. Schweick, “Oscar Wilde’s Salome, the Salome Theme in Late European 
Art, and a Problem of Method in Cultural History.”  
 
2 Wilde composed Salome in 1891 while residing in France. Composed in 1890, Hedda Gabler premiered 
in Paris on 17 December 1891 at the Théâtre du Vaudeville (after an April, 1891 London premier); Miss 
Julie was composed in 1888 and premièred in Paris on 16 January 1893 at Théâtre Libre (Törnqvist 93). 
There is little doubt that these three writers were not only influenced by the major Salome-themed works 
of the late nineteenth century, they almost certainly influenced one another (with the greatest influence 
perhaps belonging to Ibsen on Strindberg as a rival and Wilde as an aspirant). For discussion of 
Strindberg’s exposure to the Salome trope, see Brian Parker’s “Miss Julie and the Legend of Salome.”  
 
3 For a thorough examination of the relationship between Ibsen and Strindberg, see F.L. Lucas, The Drama 
of Ibsen and Strindberg. 
 
4In his typically bombastic fashion, he goes on to ask his friend, “Now do you see that my seeds have 
fallen even in Ibsen’s brain-capsule—and grown? Now he carries my semen and is my uterus! This is the 
Will to Power and my pleasure in settling others’ brains in molecular motion” (qtd. in Lucas 465). 
According to Ibsen biographer Michael Meyer, Strindberg particularly hated Hedda Gabler because he felt 
that Ibsen had based the character of Eilert Løvborg on him. Ibsen, for his part, felt no fondness for 
Strindberg, either. From 1895 onward, he kept in his study a portrait of the Swede, about which Ibsen 
commented, “He is my mortal enemy; he shall hang there and watch what I write” (qtd. in Meyer 732). 
 
5 Wilde is known to have seen the London performance of Hedda Gabler, commenting “I felt pity and 
terror, as though the play had been Greek” (Holland and Hart-Davis, 293). 
 
6 Wilde’s play was to have been performed as part of a repertory season of French-language plays at the 
Royal English Opera House, starring Sarah Bernhardt. By July 1892, Salomé had been in rehearsals for 
over two weeks when its production was terminated by the Examiner of Plays, who refused to grant a 
license on the “entirely traditional grounds” that forbade the performance of biblical figures on the stage in 
Britain. Salomé was not staged in Britain until 1931.  Rumors abound that Wilde wrote Salomé with 
Bernhardt in mind. Meyers twice comments that Bernhardt disliked Ibsen’s works because his characters 
were too plain and reserved (517; 569-570). 
 
7 As a compromise, Strindberg instead offered the premier as a “private” performance, attended by 
students from Copenhagen University, close friends, and critics. It did not get good reviews. 
 
8 He was not directly censored again, however, as the Examiner felt that his plays were generally 
unintelligible and would therefore not cause a scandal. 
 
9 Frank Kermode suggests that this tendency for profound expressions of anxiety at saecula (arbitrary 
chronological divisions) is a means of means of projecting the in-temporal ‘weight of our anxieties and 
hopes’ onto a historical calendar, which appeases our human need for order and reason. Kermode cites the 
fin de siècle as a prime example of this tendency, describing it as a literary-historical moment where “all 
the elements of the apocalyptic paradigm clearly co-exist” (Sense 11).  
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10 For further discussion on the effects of Ibsen’s dialogue in Hedda Gabler, see Joan Templeton’s Ibsen’s 
Women. 
 
11 In the critical literature related to fin de siècle literature, the terms “decadent” and “aesthetic” are often 
used interchangeably. My general sense of the terms is that “decadent” refers to a movement in French 
literature, while “aesthetic” refers to the similar movement in British literature. Terminological clarity is 
problematic, however, when dealing with cosmopolitan authors such as Strindberg, Ibsen, and Wilde. The 
latter, for instance, was Irish, publishing mostly for a British audience, but who composed Salome in 
French. Strindberg and Ibsen, although Swedish and Norwegian, saw their plays performed primarily to 
German, French, and British audiences. 
 
12 Readers have disagreed as to whether the incantatory quality of Wilde’s dialogue is intentional or a 
result of his lack of fluency in French. William Tydeman and Steven Price note that during the time that 
Wilde was in Paris, working on Salomé, a series of stage experiments were underway at the Théâtre d’Art 
that dramatized the Song of Solomon, thereby alerting Wilde to the ‘dramatic relevance of this rich 
scriptural text with its sharply etched erotic imagery, lyric simplicity of expression, patterned repetitions 
and periphrastic elaboration” (6). I argue that Wilde’s incantatory dialogue is an attempt to emulate the 
cadences found in fantasy and fairy tale plays by Belgian playwright Maurice Maeterlinck, whom Wilde 
admired. See Zagona, Legend of Salome, p. 129 and Ellmann, Oscar Wilde, p. 373. 
 
13 In regard to the ‘comforting’ drama of the preceding decades, see Stokes, “Varieties of Performance at 
the Turn of the Century” in The Cambridge Companion to the Fin de Siècle, p. 207. 
 
14 As Brian Parker argues, Strindberg’s approach may also be closer to Wilde’s decadence than the 
naturalism than he professes, given his ‘comparatively slight concern for the social, as distinct from the 
psychological, aspects of environment’ that is a defining characteristic if mainstream naturalism. Parker 
also observes that Miss Julie also departs from typical naturalism for its ‘hallucinatory intensity of focus’ 
and Strindberg’s exploitation of ‘oneiric and romantic—even fairytale—elements that are literary and 
theatrical in origin, not social or autobiographical” (469-484). 
 
15 Stephen Arata describes this same characteristic in British literature, a widespread expression of anxiety 
over “the collapse of culture, the weakening of national might, the possibility of fatal decay—physical, 
moral, spiritual, creative—of the Anglo-Saxon ‘race’ as a whole” (1). 
 
16 No English translation of Bourget’s work has yet been published.  
 
17 As Calinescu suggests, the decadent style is simply a style “favorable to the unrestricted manifestation 
of aesthetic individualism,” one that rejects traditional authoritarian requirements such as unity, hierarchy, 
and objectivity (171). 
 
18 See F. Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book XVIII, Chapter 5. 
 
19 Zagona suggests that the change in attitude towards the character of Salome coincides the erection of a 
great church in honor of St. John the Baptist in Alexandria, which, in conjunction with the crusades, led to 
increased general interest in the Baptist. As she writes, ‘In legends, the purer the hero, the blacker the 
hero, and the Salome story followed the rule’ (20). 
 
20 Flaubert is known to have visited the cathedral, and it is supposed that he drew his inspiration for 
Hérodias in part from the tour. 
 
21 For further discussion, see Zagona, p. 21. 
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22 In Secundus’ version, the name of Herod’s daughter is Pharaildis (not related to St. Pharaildis of Ghent). 
We find elements of the Biblical plot intertwined with pagan narratives:  
 
Herod had a daughter, named Pharaildis, and he would have been happy about it, if she would not 
have been taken by a fatal passion. This maiden yearned only to embrace the Baptist and had 
vowed not to belong to anyone if she could not have him. When the father had discovered the 
love of his daughter, he was angry, and in his cruelty had the innocent saint beheaded. Stricken 
with grief, the virgin asked to have the head brought to her on a dish; when a courtier did so, she 
embraced it with her soft arms and moistened it with tears, but as she attempted to cover it with 
kisses, it drew back and blew so hard that she was blown through the roof opening by the 
whirlwind. Since that time, she still rides the all too implacable wrath of John through the air. 
Even in death he resents the unfortunates who he had in life not saved. But fate has at least saved 
them from total destruction by the honor she bestows. Her grief and reverence for her eases the 
penalty, thus a third of people follow her.  
(46-47. Translation mine.) 
 
23 Intended primarily as a satire, Atta Troll is primarily directed at the new forces of liberalism, which 
promoted equality for all at the expense of artistic integrity and exceptional genius. The Herodias episode 
in the poem is relatively brief, but thematically important, as she represents the influence of non-Christian 
(specifically Semitic) art, which Heine prizes above all for its ‘ardent spirit of life’ (Zagona 29, 34-35). 
See also Dijkstra (395). 
 
24 Between 1862 and 1877, dozens of prominent French artists, writers, and composers created works 
based on the Salome story, including Stéphane Mallarmé’s poem Hérodiade (1869), Gustav Flaubert’s 
story ‘Herodias’ in Tres Contes (1877), and major paintings by Puvis de Chavanne (1869), Henri Gegnault 
(1870), and Gustave Moreau (1876). This ‘second generation’ of Salome works influenced a flurry of 
artistic production from 1883 to 1893, including works by Symbolist poets Jules Lafourge, Jean Lorrain, 
Albert Samain, an opera by Jules Massenet and the bellwether decadent novel À rebours by Joris-Karl 
Huysmans. For a detailed discussion of many of these major works, see Zagona. 
 
25 The term ‘fairy tale’ is somewhat problematic, as it often laden with culturally-specific meanings and 
individual associations. Additionally, the terms ‘folk tale’ and ‘fairy tale’ are often used interchangeably. 
In folklore studies, the term ‘fairy tale’ is used to identify one type of folk tale (alongside ‘myth’ and 
‘legend’). Furthermore, the term ‘folk tale’ is generally used in reference to a tale deriving from or 
existing in oral tradition, whereas ‘fairy tale’ refers to a genre of prose literature See Stein, “Folklore and 
Fairy Tales” in The Oxford Companion to the Fairy Tale. The major (relevant) point of consensus on the 
definition of the genre is that fairy tales typically reflect historically specific visions of gender, class, and 
sexuality, and the interpretation of a fairy tale is a highly individualized experience. For further discussion, 
see Anne Martin, Red Riding Hood and The Wolf in Bed: Modernism’s Fairy Tales, p. 13.  
 
26 Wilde wrote two collections of children’s stories, The Happy Prince and Other Tales (1888) and A 
House of Pomegranates (1891), which are conventionally labeled as ‘fairy tales.’ A significant body of 
literature has commented on the influence of fairy tales on Strindberg’s works, and, as Edmund A. 
Napieralski writes, Strindberg’s ‘interest in legends and fairy tales…was not something casual, accidental, 
or temporary’ (282). Strindberg translated Hans Christian Anderson in the 1870’s, composed a fairy-tale 
drama, Lucky Peter’s Travels, in 1882, and wrote a collection of original fairy tales, Sabor, in 1903. 
Likewise, Ibsen was an avid folklorist, having received, as a young writer, a public grant to support the 
collection of popular folktales, producing an essay ‘On the Heroic Ballad and Its Significance for 
Literature’ (1857). He later spent two months in rural Norway, collecting folk ballads and tales, after 
which he composed Peer Gynt (1876).  
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27 As Martin writes, fairy tales in Modernist works often function as “…repositories of cultural knowledge, 
or as links to the childhood of the nation, or as representations of an original humanity” (7).  
 
28 As Strindberg continues in the Preface to Miss Julie, ‘…I have not tried to accomplish anything new, for 
that is impossible, but merely to modernize the form…’ (56). 
 
29 Note Cantos XVIII to XX of Heine’s Atta Troll, which depicts the ‘Wild Hunt,’ which according to 
legend, also occurs on this date. Notably, Julie’s dog is named Diana, a cross-reference the Herodias-
Diana conflation previously mentioned. Also note the role of the notorious (and implicitly lascivious) 
singer Miss Diana in Hedda Gabler. 
 
30 According to Brian Parker, it is estimated that by 1912, no fewer than 2,789 French poets had written of 
Salome. 
 
31 In A Rebours, Huysmans inscribes the centrality of this figure in the grand narrative of decadent 
modernity through Gustav Moreau’s Salome: 
 
No longer was she merely the dancing-girl who extorts a cry of lust and concupiscence from an 
old man by the lascivious contortions of her body; who breaks the will, masters the mind of a 
King by the spectacle of her quivering bosoms, heaving belly and tossing thighs; she was now 
revealed in a sense as the symbolic incarnation of world-old Vice, the goddess of immortal 
Hysteria, the Curse of Beauty supreme above all other beauties by the cataleptic spasm that stirs 
her flesh and steels her muscles, - a monstrous Beast of the Apocalypse, indifferent, irresponsible, 
insensible, poisoning. 
(95) 
 
32 Taking as it does such a prominent role, one must consider what the metaphoric meaning of “the dance” 
is in these works. Transgressing culture, and time, and artistic boundaries, the image of dance is a complex 
and fecund symbol. A particularly useful means of interpreting this symbol is presented by Frank 
Kermode in Romantic Image. Kermode proposes a notion of “the Image” as a point of access to higher 
truths and a means of reconciling opposites, such as action and contemplation (5). In Kermode’s way of 
thinking, the work of art itself is a symbol, a “means to a truth…more exalted than that of positivist 
science or any observation depending upon the discursive reason.” Specifically, Kermode is consumed 
with the idea of the woman’s body in motion as the “emblem of the work of art or Image.” Kermode refers 
to this recurring image as “the Dancer.” In outlining the role of the Dancer in romanticism, he spends 
significant time considering the importance of the Salome motif, asserting that, “throughout this tradition, 
the beauty of a work of art, in which there is no division of form and meaning […] is more or less 
explicitly compared with the mysterious inexpressive beauty of such women, and perhaps particularly with 
that of Salome” (44, 57, 60).  In other words, the dancer is the representation of a unification of form and 
meaning, the elusive and ultimate goal of the artist’s effort. In this, the Dancer eludes reduction to 
dichotomies and is the “lost object”—the ideal of aesthetic perfection.   
 
33 This sort of killing is expected in melancholia. As Zizek suggests,: “In short, the mourner mourns the 
lost object and “kills it the second time” through symbolizing its loss, while the melancholic is not simply 
the one who is unable to renounce the object; he rather kills the object the second time (treats it as lost) 
before the object is actually lost” (“Excursions” par 22). 
 
34 As Calinescu writes, the most striking paradox of literary modernity is that, ‘freed from the constraints 
of tradition, the writer should strive to give his contemporaries a pleasure that they seem unprepared to 
enjoy and perhaps do not even deserve’ (41). 
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35 For further discussion, see Shawn Jarvis, “Drama and Fairy Tales” (139). 
 
36 Tydeman and Price, Wilde: Salome, p I. 143 
 
37 As Linda Dowling writes, “late-Victorian critics of the avant-garde used the vocabulary of apocalypse to 
express the urgent sense of cultural crisis, their fear of imminent besiegement, betrayal, and collapse” 
(439). 
 
38 Garelick also identifies the same dyad that I describe here: “Taking into account the burgeoning 
women’s movement of the period, many critics have seen the fin-de-siecle Salome as either an emblematic 
feminist heroine, a strong woman who uses her seductive power to bring a rule to his knees, or as a 
misogynist portrayal of the New Woman, a grotesque, masculinized virago who threatens all around her, 
and whose appeal only leads to mutilation” (133). 
 
39 In his preface, Strindberg professes that he has ‘motivated Miss Julie’s tragic fate with an abundance of 
circumstances,’ including her upbringing, her ‘degenerate brain,’ the festive atmosphere, her 
preoccupation with animals, the ‘powerful aphrodisiac influence of the flowers,’ and even her menstrual 
period (58).   
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CHAPTER IV 
POLITICAL MELANCHOLIA: IMPERIALIST PASTORALISM AND THE 
RELUCTANT MODERNISM OF E.M. FORSTER’S HOWARDS END 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines how the contradictions between the desire for a 
cosmopolitan order and the longing for the “pre-modern” in the face of globalized 
modern society functions to produce the formal and stylistic innovations that we now 
recognize as Modernism.  The fin de siècle Salome narratives discussed in the previous 
chapter demonstrate a desperate grasp for aesthetic stability presumed to be threatened 
by various destabilizing crises of modernity—the crisis of meaning, of belief, of 
representation—read as cherished ideals lost or threatened by the radical transformations 
of technology, communication, philosophy, and politics that occurred at or near the turn 
of the twentieth century. The question remains, however, as to whether these ideals were 
ever actually possessed or if they were already absent; therefore, this process of grieving 
is performed as melancholia, for it not only engages in a creative act to recast the 
absence of these meanings as instead losses, but it also resuscitates fallow symbols of 
bygone eras to represent and communicate these losses. 
As a popular choice of precedent in the early decades the Modernist period, 
Salome illustrates the Modernist tendency to resurrect symbols or tropes from previous 
eras and cultures as a means of articulating the present. In melancholic fashion, however, 
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the Modernists resurrect these symbols and tropes only to grieve them a second time, 
thus providing a site for expression of grief that would otherwise be dislocated. The 
intense interest in the figure of Salome is also noteworthy in that she comes not from 
“within” Western cultural history, but from outside of it, from the exotic “Orient.”1  The 
trend towards exoticism in early twentieth-century art and literature presents an 
interesting means of re-considering the melancholic stance of Modernism.  This dialectic 
between these melancholia and exoticism, two seemingly unrelated processes is perhaps 
initially unexpected; however, the correlation between the two becomes clearer if we 
proceed from a conception of exoticism as a byproduct of progressive Western 
imperialism.2   This chapter will take a counter-intuitive approach to demonstrating the 
interplay between imperialism, exoticism, Modernism, and melancholia in that it will 
look not towards texts explicitly concerning themselves with exotic colonial adventures 
or primitive cultures, but instead focus its analysis on a narrative concerning urbane, 
highly localized cultures: E.M. Forster’s Howards End. My analysis shifts from the 
direct encounter between the modern and the exotic to the ancillary effects of the 
encounter between the colonial subject and the Empire, so to speak.   
 
Imperialism vs. Cosmopolitanism 
The spike in interest in exotic cultures coincides with the apex of Western 
imperialism.3 The dawn of the new century saw the European empires at their most 
expansive; in particular, the British empire controlled one-third of the world’s 
population and one-quarter of the world’s landmass, including much of the “near east” 
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and Africa.   Following the Berlin Conference of 1884, the European powers jostled for 
colonial control of Africa; Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands consumed Southeast 
Asia; and even the United States, under the guise of manifest destiny and the Monroe 
doctrine, entered the business of colonialism by staking claims in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific.4  
It was a common view in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century that 
imperialism (particularly European) was not merely an economic endeavor, but also a 
“civilizing” mission, one that would bring not only technological and economic 
development to the poor, backwards cultures of Africa, the Middle East, Oceana, and 
Southeast Asia, but also the fortifying effects of religion, education, and industry.5 As 
Patrick Brantlinger observes, in reference to the evolution of Britain’s imperialism, “by 
mid-century, the success of the antislavery movement, the impact of the great Victorian 
explorers, and the merger of racist and evolutionary doctrines in the social sciences had 
combined to give the British public a widely shared view of Africa that demanded 
imperialization on moral, religious, and scientific grounds” (168). In other words, 
drawing subordinate nations and cultures into the “global” community was a point of 
national pride for many imperial powers. Paradoxically, the Western Imperialist project 
could be said to have informed both the development of nationalism—in that it was a 
point of national pride and identity to be at the center of a global economic system—and 
cosmopolitanism, in that colonized and colonizers alike were drawn into a system that 
operated above the level of national boundaries.   
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The byproduct of imperialism was heightened awareness in the “metropole” of 
less technologically advanced foreign cultures; we can find this interest demonstrated as 
a range of themes, forms, and motifs appropriated from the “exotic” and “primitive” 
colonized cultures in avant-garde works of visual art, music, and lyric poetry.  For 
instance, posthumous exhibitions of Paul Gauguin’s Tahitian-themed paintings at the 
Salon d’Automne in 1903 and 1906 inspired a range of avant-garde visual artists to 
reject the highly academic realism that had dominated European art from the mid-
nineteenth century in favor of foreshortened perspective, garish, conflicting colors, and 
bold lines. When the controversial works of Henri Matisse and Andre Durain were 
exhibited in 1905 at the Salon d’Automme, the critics disparaged them as fauves—“wild 
beasts.”6  Drawing inspiration from these Fauvists and, to a greater degree Gaugin’s 
work, Pablo Picasso offered Les Demoiselles d’Avignon in 1907, establishing the Cubist 
movement.7  Primitivism also impacted popular music, most notably Igor Stravinsky’s 
The Right of Spring (1913), which spurned traditional Western harmony in favor of 
repetitive rhythms and short, violent musical phrases.  The accompanying ballet paid 
homage to pagan rituals, and, as in the Salome plays discussed in Chapter 1, ended with 
a violent dance leading to the death of the female protagonist.8   
With regard to narrative, the influence of exoticism is more complex and varied.  
One would like to believe that the intense interest in “the exotic” among Western 
audiences was based in sincere curiosity about unfamiliar cultures and a desire for 
communion. Sadly, this was commonly not the case.  For instance, “adventure novels” 
set in exotic locations became quite popular at the fin de siècle, with the most well-
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known examples being Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island (1883), H. Rider 
Haggard’s King Solomon’s Mine (1885) and She (1887), Rudyard Kipling’s The Jungle 
Book (1894), or Edgar Rice Burroughs’ Tarzan of the Apes (1914).  At the time 
generally referred to as “imperial romance,” these novels were primarily conceived for 
mass-market consumption and relied on straightforward plots—either brave men go to 
an exotic setting in search of treasure or a lost boy is raised by beasts to become a “noble 
savage”—and on simplified depictions of “primitives” as the primary complication. 
Beyond being commercially viable and easily consumable, these types of novels did 
much to promote and support the imperialist project. As Nicholas Daly suggests, this 
sub-genre of novels “constituted a more or less explicit part of the propaganda of empire, 
leading whole generations of schoolboys…to believe that Britain’s colonies promised 
exciting adventures for those who were bold enough” (21).  And, despite its supposedly 
more sophisticated worldview, exoticism in “higher” forms of literature and art was 
often no less problematic. As Judith Walkowitz posits, the increased interest in world 
culture at this time was “less associated with Kantian concerns of universal justice or 
disinterested humanitarianism than with transnational forms of commercialized culture 
and with transnational migrants” (338).  Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush add to this 
view, suggesting that, as an aesthetic movement, exoticism supplied the “necessary 
‘Other’ against whose specter embattled Victorian society reinforced itself” and served 
as a “defensive expression of a specific moment of crisis—the prehistory of a future 
whose unsettling shadow had just crossed the horizon” (2).9 Given the amorphous 
anxieties prevalent during the Modernist period, the Western imagination sought a 
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concrete receptacle for both its pride and longing. To paraphrase Voltaire, if primitive or 
exotic cultures did not exist, the Western mind would find it necessary to invent them.   
And, to a large degree, they did. Read as a “defensive reaction” to the crises of 
modernity, exoticism can be read as form of melancholia, in that its essential function is 
to seek a replacement for a lost object of grief.  In a rather pessimistic view of this 
process, Brantlinger suggests that the “racist view of Africans as a natural laboring class, 
suited only for performing the dirty work of civilization, expresses a nostalgia for lost 
authority and for a pliable, completely subordinate proletariat that is one of the central 
fantasies of imperialism” (181). In this way, Africans symbolically replace the wide 
swaths of the indigent working poor many of whom, near the turn of the twentieth 
century, began to form a new stratum of the middle class who performed jobs requiring 
moderate skill.10  Less dour is Bongie’s suggestion that, “the project of exoticism is to 
salvage values and a way of life that had vanished, without hope of restoration, from 
post-Revolutionary society…but that might, beyond the confines of modernity, still be 
figured as really possible” (270).  The most scathing articulation of this sort of 
“imperialist melancholia” is offered by Paul Gilroy, who argues that “Victorian 
melancholy”—that is, the “older melancholy of the poor, the expropriated, the 
empressed and the abjected”—began to evolve to a modernist melancholia “as soon as 
the natives and savages began to appear and make demands for recognition in the 
empire’s metropolitan core;” thus the process of determining where “…the boundaries of 
British culture would fall was contoured by a new arrangement in which immigration, 
war, and national identity began to challenge class hierarchy as the most significant 
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themes from which the national identity would be assembled” (91). In Gilroy’s 
conception, the lost object is Britain’s “historical responsibilities as well as its 
relationship to the classical world that had supplied the template for its global imperium” 
and its mission to “civilize and uplift the world” (90-91). Marianna Torgovnick view 
supports my own thinking about the melancholic posture of Modernism, suggesting that 
an intense interest in primitive and exotic cultures, “inhabits thinking about origins and 
pure states; it informs desires for known beginnings and, by extension, for predictable 
ends” and is emblematic of a “utopian desire to go back and recover irreducible features 
of the psyche, land, and community—to reinhabit core experiences” (5). This 
articulation of melancholic exoticism echoes the utopian sensibilities remarked by 
Brantlinger, Bongie, or Gilroy: each is a form of impossible mourning, a type of grief 
that can never be resolved, as this object of desire was never lost, but absent from the 
very beginning and can therefore never be adequately recovered.   
Furthermore, exoticism can be read as an attempt at consolation for the trauma of 
modernity. Torgovnick asserts that the West has “almost continuously” been engaged in 
defining itself in opposition to a series of primitive “Others,” and explains this urge for 
differentiation from the Other as “a response to the disruptive effects of identification 
with the Other…. Fascination with the primitive thus involves a dialectic between, on 
the one hand, a loathing and demonizing of certain rejected parts of the Western self and, 
on the other, the urge to reclaim them” (8).  Therefore, the “cultural imperialism” of 
Modernism suggests deeper anxieties about the effects of modernity on communities in 
the West. This sense of loss is performed as “melancholic cosmopolitanism”—a 
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simultaneous longing for both nationalism and true “world citizenship.” We can find this 
characteristic in Modernist novels that examine the conflict between the provincial and 
the global, the familiar and the strange, the self and the Other.  As Paul Stasi argues, 
cosmopolitan primitivism arises as a “response to the structural transformations of the 
Age of Empire, where imperial expansion was conditioned by the overproduction of 
commodities in the metropole, leading to the pursuit of ever-larger markets in the 
periphery.” This unending process of imperialist expansion occurs concurrently with the 
“emergence of that mass commodity culture which is one of neo-imperialism’s chief 
features and was also one of modernism’s most consistent objects of attack” (6).  
Modernism is identified by its rejection of mass media and consumer culture (alternately 
described as “elitism”).  Read from the perspective of mourning and melancholia, 
however, we can read in this conflict the self-loathing described by Freud.  Modernism 
despises the very conditions that make it possible. 
 
The Rise of the Metropolis and the Loss of the “Known Community” 
Any scholar who studies a specific historical or literary period is susceptible to 
the siren song of exceptionalism—and (with full awareness of irony) scholars of 
Modernism are perhaps the most frequent victims.  As David Adams observes, “…the 
history of modernity may be seen as a sequence of returns or revivals, with each period 
attempting to mitigate or escape the unsettling aspects of modern experience more 
successfully than its predecessors” (20). Every stage of modernity—if we casually 
define it as any era in the Western world after the Middle Ages—assumes that it is 
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simultaneously the apex of civilization and the beginning of its end. We recognize in this 
tendency a melancholic pattern—the resuscitation of what has passed solely for the sake 
of sustaining the process of grief.  
I would argue that one primary quality that differentiates the modernity 
experienced in the early twentieth century from previous “modern” eras, however, is the 
rise of the “metropolis,” the massive, technologically advanced, population-dense, 
heterogeneous urban capitals of the various Western empires—London, Paris, New 
York, and Berlin.  These cities—and the individual experience of living in them—are 
inseparable from the idea of Modernism. The experience of living in these global cities 
is frequently articulated as an existence as a stranger—either as a stranger come from 
afar to a new place, or as an individual who finds himself a stranger in his own home. In 
“The Metropolis and the Emergence of Modernism,” Raymond Williams argues that the 
“key cultural factor of the modernist shift is the character of the metropolis” considering 
that “the most important general element of the innovations in form is that the fact of 
immigration to the metropolis, and it cannot too often be emphasized how many of the 
major innovators were, in this precise sense, immigrants” (91). The status as a stranger 
or outsider in the metropolis is articulated in Modernist literature as themes of 
“strangeness and distance, indeed of alienation” and led “the artists and writers and 
thinkers of this phase” to the only community available to them: “a community of the 
medium; of their own practices” (92).  In other words, Modernists developed an 
allegiance to a sort of aesthetic cosmopolitanism—an allegiance to forms of expression 
and ways of seeing, as opposed to conventional patriotism. 
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In his influential lecture “When Was Modernism?”, Williams adds that new 
media such as photography, cinema, and radio not only provided possibilities for new 
outlets for expression, but also prompted the “internationally anti-bourgeois” artists of 
the era to form “defensive cultural groupings,” particularly in the “new metropolitan 
cities, the centers of the also new imperialism, which offered themselves as transnational 
capitals of an art without frontiers” (50).11  These enclaves of the cultural elite became 
havens for the cosmopolitan artist, the “restlessly mobile émigré or exile,” to find refuge 
as he or she sought to develop an aesthetic that both honored the great cultural traditions 
of the past while faithfully representing the disorienting experience of modernity. The 
Modernist aesthetic developed by a range of “cosmopolitan” authors, such as James 
Joyce, Ernest Hemingway, E.M. Forster, Joseph Conrad, and Edith Wharton, was the 
result of the increasingly difficult attempts to define new communities and reconcile 
oppositional concepts such as “the past” and “local” with “the present” and “global.” 
The world had become simultaneously large and small. These sorts of oppositional 
pairings are easily traced throughout Modernist literature, which is perhaps most easily 
understood as the varied aesthetic attempts to resolve the paradoxes presented by rapidly 
globalizing market economies. These paradoxes present opportunities for loss, as the 
assumption is that if one option is selected, the other is abdicated. With regard to these 
sorts of “binaries of loss,” Williams offer in contradistinction to “the metropolis” the 
concept of “the known community,” offering that,  
the growth of towns and especially cities and a metropolis; the increasing 
division and complexity of labour; the altered and critical relations between and 
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within social classes: in changes like these any assumption of a knowable 
community—a whole community, wholly knowable—became harder and harder 
to sustain. 
(Country 165) 
This fragmentation of community means that there is no such thing as shared experience, 
except as through the “community of speech” (ibid. 245). The loss to be grieved, then, is 
the ideal of the rural, intimate community in which every individual is known or at least 
knowable, where one’s individual place or purpose is understood, and where the forms 
of knowledge and meaning are stable and specific to the local community.12 
If we follow Freud’s basic framework of the process of mourning, we understand 
that, typically, once a loss is accepted, the grieving subject will seek a new object of 
desire to which he or she can attach. In the particular context of the loss of the “known 
community,” many Modernist artists sought to develop communities formed not upon 
geographical proximity or historical connection, but ideological affinity—a form of 
identification frequently described as cosmopolitanism.  Jessica Berman has explored 
this concept of cosmopolitan community, extending Williams’ argument to suggest that 
in the early twentieth century, the loss of “this realm of the knowable” becomes “a key 
experience of the narratives of modernism” (2).  Berman observes that the Modernist 
response to this loss is neither unified nor even, in that these writers “engage directly 
with early twentieth-century historical and political transformations of community, 
transformations that occasioned on the one hand an almost desperate effort to recoup 
community in the form of nationalism and fascism, and on the other hand an insistence 
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on deepening cosmopolitanism” (3). Berman’s model runs counter to the previously 
dominant view of Modernism as largely apolitical, as this process of community-
building is most definitely a political action, particularly because it rejects existing 
political affiliations and identifications. 
This process of community re-formation is not without its hazards.  Despite the 
best efforts to develop a cosmopolitan community sustained by affinity and ideals, 
Modernism frequently finds itself in a disconsolate position—one may not so easily 
discard one episteme in favor of another (nor may one actually wish to do so). For 
instance, we find traces of this melancholia in the idea of nationalism, specifically the 
concept of a “national literature.” To point, Jameson offers a Marxist perspective on the 
dissolution of the “known community,” arguing that the larger process of imperialism 
creates a “spatial disjunction” wherein a significant segment of the economic structure is 
located outside of the metropolis, “outside of the daily life and existential experience of 
the home country.”  The effect of this disjunction is not only an inability to integrate the 
radical alterity of the colonized Other, but also a complete inability to comprehend the 
overall system of the nation as a whole. When the separate pieces of the system’s 
“puzzle” can never been seen as a whole, no amount of personal experience, 
introspection, scientific investigation, nor statistical analysis can ever bring sufficient 
understanding. In Jameson’s view, then, the “daily life and existential experience in the 
metropolis,” the fundamental material of a national literature, can no longer be “grasped 
immanently; it no longer has meaning, its deeper reason for being, within itself” (51). 
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Jameson argues that the spatial disjunction created by imperialism thereby makes a 
satisfactory national literature impossible, 
As artistic content it will now henceforth always have something missing about 
it, but in the sense of a privation that can never be restored or made whole simply 
by adding back in the missing component: its lack is rather comparable to 
another dimension, an outside like the other face of a mirror, which it 
constitutively lacks, and which can never be made up or made good.  This new 
and historically original problem in what is itself a new kind of content now 
constitutes the situation and the problem and the dilemma, the formal 
contradiction, that modernism seeks to solve; or better still, it is only that new 
kind of art which reflexively perceives this problem and lives this formal 
dilemma that can be called modernism in the first place. 
(51) 
Modernist melancholia reflects the expanding tension between a Victorian 
cosmopolitanism, based upon a perception of the good work of the global distribution of 
“culture,” the rise of the middle class, and the realization of the Kantian world order; and 
early twentieth-century imperialism, as exhibited by the diminishment of the “old 
country” notion of nationalist identity at the hands of the ever-expanding globalized 
metropolis, the genocidal horrors of the colonial capitalist enterprise, and the impending 
doom of the Great War, the first techno-modern armed conflict of many. 
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On the Primacy of Place 
Much of the argument presented in Chapter II assumed great concern over the 
individual’s relationship with time in modernity, that is, one’s relationship with history 
as a source of authority in justifying an aesthetic position.  At this point in the 
dissertation, however, I wish to extend Jameson’s emphasis on spatial relations to 
examine the relationship between space and loss.  If we look towards the archive of 
history in search of meaning, in what way is this meaning “territorialized” insomuch as 
the perceptions that one derives of the individual’s place in the world are developed 
through an entirely “local” filter?13 In other words, understanding the nature of grief and 
loss depends on understanding how identity depends not only on conceptualizations of 
time—as in memory and history—but also on conceptualizations of space—that is, 
physical and geographical place.14 The reconfiguration of spatial relations has a 
profound effect on the ways in which we narrate the human experience. 
To this point, this chapter has been attempting to establish the point that, as a 
result of advances in technology and the far-reaching effects of Western Imperialism, the 
concepts of space, place, and distance were completely undone, and attempts to narrate 
the experience of this rapid transformation thus necessitated new formal and stylistic 
means of expression. In Moving Through Modernity: Space and Geography in 
Modernism, Andrew Thacker proceeds from Foucault’s suggestion that modernity is less 
a specific period or era and more an attitude towards the historical present, arguing that 
the Modernists’ attitude towards physical space and geography is as equally important as 
their attitude towards time.  Thacker suggests that “Modernist writing…is about living 
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and experiencing ‘new times,’ not in the abstracted location of literary history, but in 
specific spatial histories: rooms, cities, buildings, countries, and landscapes” (13).  The 
simultaneous expansion and contraction of the wider world engendered a heightened 
sensitivity and awareness of physical and geographical space. 
A fundamental assertion of this dissertation is that the experimental forms of 
Modernist narratives were an invention of necessity, in that the pre-existing means of 
narrating personal experience were no longer adequate. Moving from local, communal, 
face-to-face interactions between similar people to the global, metropolitan, indirect 
communication between people of diverse beliefs, backgrounds, and languages severely 
problematized the act of narration. For instance, in his 1936 essay “The Storyteller,” 
Walter Benjamin discusses the incommunicability of experiences in the modern world, 
suggesting that “Less and less frequently do we encounter people with the ability to tell a 
tale properly” (83).  Despite the numerous and varied narrative experiments of 
Modernism, however, Benjamin has no faith in the novel as means of conveying human 
experience, arguing that, “the earliest symptom of a process whose end is the decline of 
storytelling is the rise of the novel at the beginning of modern times.” He continues, 
suggesting that “to write a novel means to carry the incommensurable to extremes in the 
representation of human life” (87).  As Berman suggests, Benjamin identifies, “the way 
that we, removed yet again from the scene of face-to-face narration” tell the story of 
“community;” therefore, the concept of community becomes “something inherently 
linked to the experience of geographical distance, for it operates in translating the 
experience of the faraway into a story that can be told in the here and now.” The 
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difficulty presented by cosmopolitan modernity, however, is that the only way that the 
community “creates itself anew is to retell both its own stories and those of other places, 
and to recognize in them their common relationship to their own past and to the lives of 
others.” Therefore, in Berman’s view, “Modern narratives of community arise in the 
movement and translation of foreign experience (whether of the past or of a 
geographically distant place) into common experience and the concomitant and never-
ending movement back towards the foreign experience that this process entails” (Berman 
19).  This process of formulating affiliations thus “creates radically new forms of 
cosmopolitan communities” (Commitments 27). 
As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, the familiar inclination when 
examining moments of crisis or conflict is to identify oppositional relationships; habitual 
contrasts include mourning vs. melancholia, absence vs. loss, nationalism vs. 
cosmopolitanism, when in fact these notions are actually different phases of a particular 
process, stops along a continuum, or complimentary voices in the discourse. In 
Cosmopolitanism and Place, Emily Johansen reacts to this tendency, arguing in favor of 
a “consideration of the everyday experience of global connections in local places, and 
the cosmopolitical ethics that emerge from this recognition” in an effort to move away 
from “the critically reified opposition between the local and the global, the parochial and 
the cosmopolitan” (3). Johansen observes that preceding philosophical and political 
discourses generally approach cosmopolitanism at the “macroscopic” scale, with an 
emphasis on “large, shared categories of being,” with the unspoken goal of defining 
“something like a universal humanity” at the cost of becoming an “all or nothing” 
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proposition—that is, either cosmopolitanism will save us all or lead us to our doom (5).15  
In place of the “macro” discourse, Johansen proposes the concept of “territorialized 
cosmopolitanism” to invite consideration of how local, individual experience—that is, 
the day-to-day as-lived experience of individuals living in a specific geographical area—
is influenced by cosmopolitan sensibilities (8).  This notion is provocative, as the natural 
inclination is to contrast “the local”—sensed as parochial, inward-focused, and self-
interested—with “the global.”  Extending the work of scholars of cosmopolitanism 
Robin Cohen and K. Anthony Appiah, Johansen suggests, however, that “local” 
cosmopolitanism must neither be “rooted” in a specific place, nor must it be in direct 
opposition to nationalism.16  In simplest terms, approaching texts from the perspective of 
territorial cosmopolitanism invites consideration of how individual experience that is 
strongly connected to a specific geographical location can still be influenced by super-
national concerns.17  
 
Ideological Imperialism 
A common-sense assumption is that cosmopolitanism is a practice for those who 
abandon their geographical point of origin in favor of a “nation-less” existence in a 
foreign locale—a pattern sustained by the tendency to stereotype Modernist authors as 
outsiders or expatriates. But could one not practice cosmopolitanism at home? In 
Cosmopolitan Style, Rebecca Walkowitz attempts to re-direct the recent conversations 
about “international modernism” (and modernisms) away from thinking about context or 
physical space (i.e. the Irish writer in Trieste) towards a specific intellectual practice, 
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what she terms “critical cosmopolitanism,” the practice of interrogating how the 
dominant conceptions of identity and belonging are bound up in the “production, 
classification, and reception of literary narratives” (7, 4).  This practice, in Walkowitz’s 
view, explains many of the “salient features of modernist narrative, including wandering 
consciousness, paratactic syntax, recursive plotting, collage, and portmanteau language” 
(2).  Walkowitz’s argument is innovative in that it, first, focuses on style (which she 
defines as the “attitude, stance, posture, and consciousness” of the author as expressed in 
and by their writings), and, secondly, that it offers the concept of “critical” 
cosmopolitanism, an “intentional engagement” to be distinguished from “planetary 
humanism” for its aversion to “heroic tones of appropriation and progress” as well as 
epistemological privilege (2).  In other words, Modernist literature can be read as an 
attempt to measure what it means to think and act “super-nationally,” interrogate the 
responsibilities engendered by this political stance, and, more importantly, explore the 
interrelationship between narrative, political ideology, and ethics.  I would agree that 
Modernist authors, taken as a whole, do not necessarily promote a coherent political or 
ideological stance on nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism (ranging as they do from 
socialism to fascism), but rather promote the practice of metacognition, a practice that 
Walkowitz identifies as “the critique of the critique” that is the fundament of critical 
cosmopolitanism (3).   
I can think of no other author from this period who practices “critique of the 
critique” with greater dexterity and to greater effect than E.M. Forster, and the remainder 
of this chapter will examine his breakthrough novel, Howards End, to establish a 
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conception of cosmopolitanism not as a form of action—that is, as self-imposed exile or 
adventurous travel to exotic locations—but rather a critical position as a melancholic 
subject exceedingly aware of the losses produced by imperialism, not only for the 
colonial subject, but also at the imperial center. 
 
 
Forster, Qualified Modernist 
If Forster is to be classified as a Modernist, I will at least concede that he might 
rank as a sort of “qualified” Modernist. He has been described by critics as, “at best, a 
closet Modernist” (Jameson 54) or an “Edwardian Modernist” (Domestico), while others 
affirm that Forster was “never a modernist” (Tambling 2), “if not by choice then by 
native genius” a Victorian (Sarker 318), or even a “Georgian” novelist (Woolf 
“Character” 421).  In his introduction to The Cambridge Companion to E.M. Forster, 
David Bradshaw adds that Woolf “saw Forster as part of the post-Edwardian avant-
garde, and while shoehorning him into the canon of high modernism alongside Eliot and 
Joyce now seems more than a touch audacious, his various affinities with the writings of 
Lawrence, Strachey, and Woolf are obvious enough” (5).  For her part, Virginia Woolf, 
his Bloomsbury contemporary, considered his approach to the novel “baffling and 
evasive” (“Novels” 391). For what it’s worth, Forster classified himself as belonging to 
the “fag-end of Victorian liberalism” (Two Cheers 56), and in all fairness, one does not 
simply toss Forster in the same bag as Joyce, Eliot, Ezra Pound, Stein, or Woolf. 
Stylistically, Forster wrote not with the flamboyant virtuosity of Joyce, nor was he 
particularly ground-breaking in his form, as his novels more closely resembled Jane 
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Austen’s work than Woolf’s.18 His preferred subject matter related to “contrasts,” 
particularly contrasts between the English and other nationalities, and he could be said to 
have taken up the “condition of England” torch from such writers as Benjamin Disraeli 
or Elizabeth Gaskell.19 
I would argue, however, that Forster’s philosophical elusiveness—the critical 
dexterity to which I earlier referred—is a key marker of Modernist style, which exists in 
the space between the literal meaning of a thing and an apparent meaning, whether an 
object is a symbol, metaphor, or merely the object itself, presented as perceived in 
objective reality. As Jameson writes, “Modernism is itself the very hesitation; it emerges 
in this spatial gap within Forster’s figure…” arguing that his style, “is at one with the 
contradiction between the contingency of physical objects and the demand for an 
impossible meaning…” (55). For his evasiveness of style and philosophy, I would agree 
that Forster is worthy of reconsideration as a Modernist, if at least a “missing link” sort 
of Modernist.20 As Elizabeth Langland writes, although Forster refused to participate in 
a self-congratulatory Modernism that lacked both a “strong ethical grounding and a 
commitment to illuminating human life in society,” he was obviously drawn to “the 
beauty, the mystery, the meditative, mythic, and numinous quality of human life that 
inhabits the ordinary” (102). Although Forster was occupied by many of the same 
existential concerns as his High Modernist contemporaries, he was ultimately unable to 
fully commit to avant-gardism in the same way, preferring that his moral arguments be 
presented by plot and character, rather than through formal innovations.21 If he were a 
composer, he would be praised not for his virtuosity, but for his thoughtful and 
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understated arrangements; conversely, he might be criticized not for alarming or 
shocking the listener, but for apparently failing to meet expectations established in the 
first movement. 
Forster’s position at the adolescence of Modernism, so to speak, provides an 
excellent case study in the evolving relationship between Modernism and melancholia. 
In his extensive examination of Forster’s Modernism, David Medalie refers to Forster’s 
“reluctant” Modernism, characterizing it as an “interweaving of old and new, modern 
and traditional in a complex process of disintegration and recomposition.”  This sort of 
Modernism cannot, by necessity be “a triumphant or euphoric modernism, for it is 
permeated with elegies for past traditions, even as it admits, with a mixture of reluctance 
and suspicion, the new” (193). This bi-directional view is a melancholic posture, in that 
it remains affixed to the past while at the same time expressing animosity towards it, 
simultaneously refusing consolation for grief while also seeking to release what has been 
lost.  If only for his melancholic posture towards twentieth-century modernity, Forster is 
a Modernist. 
 
Howards End and the Condition of Empire 
The most nostalgic of Forster’s novels is Howards End. Published in 1910 and 
set in the years immediately preceding World War I, the novel explores a range of 
philosophical, socio-economic, and political issues of chief concern in England, which at 
that point was the heart of the largest Empire in human history and riding the tide of high 
industrialism and unprecedented wealth.  The Edwardian period was brief but intense, 
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and, immediately followed as it was by the horrors of the first global war, became the 
focus of much nostalgia—almost before it was over.  As Alistair M. Duckworth 
suggests, this nostalgia often leads to portrayals of Edwardian England as “a social Eden 
before the Fall, a time of order and harmony, the golden evening of Empire and the Pax 
Britannica,” that unfortunately also “exclude[s] from view the problems of Britain’s 
cities—poverty, ill health, substandard housing—and the growing tension of its relations 
with Germany” (3).  In fact, the years between 1901 and 1910 were quite dynamic, 
punctuated by the upheavals of the Irish home rule movement, the increasing militancy 
of the woman’s suffrage movement, the ascendency of organized labor and trade unions, 
divisive internal politics, and a looming trade war and arms race with post-Bismarck 
Germany.  So while Forster may be prone to nostalgia, he is also not blind, and as many 
critics have suggested, Howards End is a continuance of the “condition of England” 
novelistic tradition, although I much prefer Stuart Christie’s description of the novel as a 
“condition of Empire” novel (119). However it shall be classified, it is, as Duckworth 
suggests, a “subtle and complex response to the conflicts and contradictions of a swiftly 
changing, increasingly urban world” (7). It is precisely Forster’s subtlety and complexity 
that makes pinning upon him labels such as “liberal” or “nostalgic” so difficult.  In many 
ways, he works at cross-purposes to himself, resuscitating the very thing that he 
despises, sustaining it only to condemn it, in melancholic fashion. The proposition of 
this chapter is that Howards End seeks to analyze the reverberative effects of European 
imperialism on the as-lived experience of the metropolitan subject, and in doing so 
exhibits a particularly Modernist melancholia. 
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Ostensibly a novel chiefly concerned with the plight of the British middle-
classes, the chief question of Howards End is, as Lionel Trilling writes, “Who shall 
inherit England?” (118). The primary tension that structures the novel is the 
contradistinction between three families—the industrious Wilcoxes, the intellectual 
Schlegels, and the working-class Basts—who represent oppositional interpretations of 
British modernity and of three “levels” of middle-class British society.22   The Wilcoxes 
are energetic, purposeful entrepreneurs.  Father Henry, sons Charles and Paul, and 
daughter Evie belong to the world of “telegrams and anger,” and for them, all that exists 
in the world exists for a purpose, with the end being productivity and success.  They are 
critical of and condescending towards those they consider beneath them, for their 
laziness and incompetence; they are disdainful of progressiveness in all its forms, from 
women’s suffrage to socialism, for its lack of economic benefit; they are great lovers of 
sport, from shooting to cricket to calisthenics to golf, as opposed to music and art; and 
they admire technology and machinery, as emblematized by their enthusiasm for the 
motor car.  They are, for better or worse, Edwardian imperialist England—pragmatic, 
ambitious (perhaps even rapacious), capitalistic.  
The Wilcoxes—with their multiple properties, motor-car, and ardent imperialism, 
are set in contrast to the Schlegels, who represent the aristocratic and intellectual 
traditions of England.  Whereas the Wilcoxes are nouveau riche, the Schlegel clan, 
comprised of sisters Margaret and Helen and little brother Tibby, subsist not on the 
bounty of their labor but the interest of their inherited wealth, and, furthermore, they 
aspire not to accumulate greater wealth, but to rather pursue a contented life of cultured 
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leisure. Drawing on the cosmopolitan idealism of their German father—characterized as 
the “countryman of Kant and Hegel, as the idealist, included to be dreamy, whose 
Imperialism was the Imperialism of the air”—the Schlegel family is humane, urbane, 
progressive, and concerned chiefly with the arts and, perhaps too ardently for their own 
good, the welfare of the less fortunate (HE 22-23).  The late Mr. Schlegel, in his 
idealistic nationalism, patriotically fought for Germany in the Franco-Prussian war, yet 
immigrated to England in rejection of his native country’s aggressive colonial ambitions 
and materialism.  He married Eine Engländerin from a well-to-do family, thereby 
cementing a literal union between pre-imperialist Germany and England. 
The three families are introduced to one another through a series of chance 
encounters. The novel begins in media res, with the Schlegels rallying forces to 
intercede on an impromptu marriage between Helen, the younger Schlegel sister, and 
youngest Wilcox son Paul (Helen and Mrs. Wilcox had become acquainted during a 
Germany holiday, just prior). The initial interactions between the two families 
demonstrate that, although they are in most ways diametrically opposed to one another, 
the cosmopolitan Schlegels are drawn towards Wilcoxian imperialism. Although the 
episode between Helen and Paul ends in naught, the reader is introduced to the figure of 
Mrs. Wilcox, who, as foil to her husband and children, is the picture of peace, grace, and 
good will. The narrator imparts that, “She seemed to belong not to the young people and 
their motor, but to the house, and to the tree that overshadowed it. One knew she 
worshipped the past, and that the instinctive wisdom the past can alone bestow had 
descended upon her….” Trailing “noiselessly over the lawn” with an actual “wisp of 
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hay” in her hands, she seems almost a supernatural presence, Ceres reborn as a pastoral 
English ideal (HE 18). Mrs. Wilcox is indivisible from the house at Howards End, 
having been born there and its legal owner (the house had been her dowry).  If the 
Schlegels represent Britain’s intelligentsia and Henry Wilcox represents its 
entrepreneurs, Ruth Wilcox is Britain’s essentially pastoral character.   
In contrast to both the Schlegels and the Wilcoxes, Leonard and Jacky Bast are 
neither wealthy nor cultured, nor do they have much control over their own fates. 
Leonard Bast is not necessarily “poor,” but rather of the new sort of English middle-
class who perform skilled jobs in the cities (he is a clerk an insurance firm) as opposed 
to manual labor or agrarian work.  Later in the novel, at Leonard’s second appearance in 
the Schlegel’s home, the narrator observes that, “one guessed him as the third 
generation, grandson to the shepherd or ploughboy whom civilization had sucked into 
the town; as one of the thousands who have lost the life of the body and had failed to 
reach the life of the spirit” (HE 84).23  Leonard is neither robust, as a Wilcox, nor 
cultured, as a Schlegel. He and his wife Jacky exist “at the extreme verge of gentility” 
and although Leonard is not in “the abyss,” of London’s faceless poor, “he could see it, 
and at times people whom he knew had dropped in, and counted no more.” The narrator 
continues, imparting that Leonard “knew that he was poor, and would admit it: he would 
have died sooner than confess any inferiority to the rich” (HE 35).  The narrator, whose 
judgements and opinions loom large in the novel, does offer that, however, that Leonard 
was “inferior to most rich people,” as he was “not as courteous as the average rich man, 
nor as intelligent, nor as healthy, nor as lovable” (HE 35). Leonard would be a comic 
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character, were he not so tragic. In essence, he represents the unforeseen product of post-
industrial, modern England—physically weak, disillusioned, disgruntled, and filled with 
unrealistic hopes of societal advancement. He was neither born, as the Schlegels were, 
into a position of sufficient privilege to allow for deep rumination on art, philosophy, 
and literature, nor does he possess the influence and connections of the Wilcoxes to 
change his circumstances. 
The complication of Howards End relies on number of opposing principles 
representative of the English character, oppositions that, as Duckworth observes, persist 
in the present day:   
Memories of a communal and rural past versus the experience of a frenetic urban 
present; an awareness of society’s irreversible commitment to technology versus 
an awareness of technology’s destructive ecological effects; cosmopolitan 
concerns versus local attachments; the world of business versus the world of the 
intelligentsia; cultured versus popular tastes’ and enthusiasm for art versus an 
enthusiasm for sports; established male power versus emerging female 
aspirations; a laissez-faire economy versus a poverty-stricken and hopeless 
underclass. 
(10). 
The juxtaposition of the Wilcoxes and the Schlegels, in particular, invites comparison 
and contrast of seemingly oppositional views on British imperialism, with the Wilcoxes, 
being sort of social Darwinists, viewing it as their duty and right to wrest financial profit 
from the hands of lesser cultures who refuse to work, while the Schlegels would consider 
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imperial ambitions as crass, materialistic, and, perhaps, inhumane.  The third part of the 
troika, the Basts, do not offer an alternative to these binaries, as their social and 
economic station does not afford them agency of any kind, and they are therefore 
haplessly adrift in the wakes of the Schlegels and the Wilcoxes.  Leonard’s fate—as with 
the fate of millions of Britons and British colonial subjects—depends on the outcome 
reached between the two parties’ negotiations. 
With full knowledge of Forster’s characteristic liberalism, one would assume that 
he would, at worst, direct the narrative in favor of the Schlegels or, at worst, seek a 
synthesis between the two worldviews to present his solution for “problem” of 
modernity, represented in the hapless, disenfranchised Leonard Bast.  Forster, however, 
typically avoids tidy solutions to his narrative complications; as Trilling observes, 
Forster’s manner does not “tolerate absolutes” and frequently “confuses the issues, 
forcing upon us the difficulties and complications of the moral fact” (74). Rarely in a 
Forster novel does a proper denouement ever occur, although readers will typically find 
that if they have not discovered a solution to the problem, they at least have a better 
understanding of it. The “problem” of Howards End, so to speak, is Empire.  It is 
“foreign things,” or at least the wealth that they create, that make the Schlegels, 
Wilcoxes, and Basts who and what they are, and it is the modernizing effects of the 
imperial system that propel whatever changes occur to both characters and settings in the 
novel.  As Delany observes, the increasing popularity of foreign investments had a 
powerful effect on Britain’s economic development. From the mid-nineteenth century to 
the beginning of World War I, Britain “exported capital on a huge scale,” with a 
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correlating decline in domestic capital investment (288). It was easier (and more 
lucrative) for British investors—such as the Schlegels—to invest in overseas ventures—
as sought out and developed by the Wilcoxes—than to invest not only the financial 
capital, but the social capital, to upgrade Britain’s native industries to compete with their 
industrial rivals, Germany and the United States. The irony presented by Howards End is 
that the Schlegels and the Wilcoxes are not opponents—they are symbiotic.  The 
Schlegels have no industry or work ethic of their own, whereas the Wilcoxes depend on 
the inherited wealth of others to provide the capital for their imperialist ventures. 
The theme of foreign investment and its effects on British culture are implied 
from the outset of the novel. As early as the third chapter, we discover that the Schlegel 
siblings’ income is derived almost entirely from “Foreign Things,” indicating a range of 
foreign investments, which, in the opinion of Margaret’s Aunt Juley “always smash.” In 
deference to her elder relative, Margaret does invest “a few hundreds in the Nottingham 
and Derby railway, and though the Foreign Things did admirably the Nottingham and 
Derby declined with the steady dignity of which only Home Rails are capable” (HE 12).  
In this brief aside, Forster contrasts Aunt Juley’s improvident patriotism against 
Margaret’s sagacity—sagacity, it should be noted, that is at odds with Margaret’s fervent 
liberalism.  As suggested above, it is these “Foreign Things” that connects the Wilcoxes 
and the Schlegels. Initially, it would seem that Forster intends to pillory the ardent 
capitalism of the Wilcoxes and promote the liberal humanism of the Schlegels, who 
would seem to more closely resemble Forster’s own worldview.  As we learn however, 
the Wilcox family business is the Imperial and West African Rubber Company, which 
 125 
 
outright owns a “helping of West Africa” (HE 141).24 At the start of the novel, when it is 
thought that Helen and Paul had become engaged, we learn from his elder brother, 
Charles, that Paul is about to take up the reigns of the family enterprise himself: “‘He 
has to make his way out in Nigeria. He couldn’t think of marrying for years, and when 
he does it must be a woman who can stand the climate…” (HE 17).  The thought of a 
Wilcox being so impetuous and impractical seems shocking to Henry Wilcox, 
particularly when there is an empire to run, and when the time comes, the woman who 
would be the newest Mrs. Wilcox would have to meet certain immutable criteria.  In a 
certain sense, the view of Henry Wilcox presented in Howards End could very well be 
the domestic picture of the ivory-hunting Kurtz from Heart of Darkness; Forster 
provides a glimpse of this darker side in Chapter 34, when Henry, Margaret, Tibby, and 
Charles discuss what is to be done about Helen’s increasingly aberrant behavior: “The 
genial, tentative host disappeared, and they saw instead the man who had carved money 
out of Greece and Africa, and bought forests from the natives for a few bottles of gin” 
(HE 201). The Wilcoxes—Henry and Charles in particular—embody the materialistic 
pragmatism that made European imperialism so brutally effective. 
Although it would seem that Margaret would be particularly anti-imperialist, 
there are numerous indications throughout the novel that she is, at best, ambivalent 
towards Empire, or, at worst, passively supportive of it.  For instance, describing the 
Schlegels early in the novel, the narrator imparts that,  
in their own fashion they cared deeply about politics, though not as politicians 
would have us care; they desired that public life should mirror whatever is good 
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in the life within. Temperance, tolerance, and sexual equality were intelligible 
cries to them; whereas they did not follow our Forward Policy in Thibet with the 
keen attention that it merits, and would at times dismiss the whole British Empire 
with a puzzled, if reverent, sigh. 
(22) 
If the Schlegels are idealists, they are but drawing-room idealists, and their strong 
opinions tend to fade when asked to be pressed into action. In fact, although seeming 
philosophical opposites in nearly every way, the Schlegels are easily dazzled by the 
Wilcoxes’ vigor and vitality. During the initial complication of the novel, when Helen 
has supposedly fallen in with Paul, the narrator imparts that, “the energy of the Wilcoxes 
had fascinated her,” and that,  
[s]he had liked giving into Mr. Wilcox, or Evie, or Charles; she had liked being 
told that her notions of life were sheltered or academic; that Equality was 
nonsense, Votes for Women nonsense, Socialism nonsense, Art and Literature, 
except when conducive to strengthening the character, nonsense. One by one the 
Schlegel fetishes had been overthrown, and, though professing to defend them, 
she had rejoiced. When Mr. Wilcox said that one sound man of business did  
more good to the world than a dozen of your social reformers, she had swallowed 
the curious assertion without a gasp, and had leant back luxuriously among the 
cushions of his motor-car. 
(HE 19) 
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Even Margaret, the more sophisticated and resolute of the Schlegels, in incurious regard 
for the brusque Wilcoxes, notes that “An Empire bores me, so far, but I can appreciate 
the heroism that builds it up” (HE 82). This affection for Wilcoxian virility develops 
throughout the novel.  Margaret is perhaps not as idealistic as we are led to believe, and 
she becomes increasingly pragmatic over time. She is not ignorant, for instance, that her 
own station depends entirely on the economic pursuits of the Wilcoxes and their ilk, 
commenting that, despite their empathy for the less fortunate, “all our thoughts are the 
thoughts of six-hundred-pounders, and all our speeches; and because we don't want to 
steal umbrellas ourselves, we forget that below the sea people do want to steal them, and 
do steal them sometimes, and that what's a joke up here is down there reality” (46). 
Later, in defending to Helen her decision to marry Henry, Margaret opines, “if Wilcoxes 
hadn’t worked and died in England for thousands of years, you and I couldn’t sit here 
without having our throats cut. There would be no trains, no ships to carry us literary 
people about it, no fields even. Just savagery…. More and more do I refuse to draw my 
income and sneer at those who guarantee it” (HE 126-127).  The reader comes to realize, 
then, that with regard to imperialism, if the Wilcoxes and Schlegels are on opposite 
sides, it is of the same coin.  The sense is that, if the two families are presented as the 
possible stewards of the soul of England, neither is a desirable choice.25 
As the novel draws towards its close, however, Margaret begins to drift away 
from her newfound pragmatism as she becomes increasingly disillusioned with Henry, 
seeing him not as part of Britain’s “civilizing mission,” but rather as the indifferent, 
amoral cad that he is. On a personal level, for instance, Margaret notes that he shows no 
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remorse for having provided disastrous career advice to Leonard Bast, and when Helen’s 
tryst with Leonard is revealed, he demonstrates appalling hypocrisy by refusing to allow 
Helen to stay the night at Howards End. On a broader plane, rather than uplifting the 
poorer workers of England or the “subject races” abroad, Henry exploits both for profit.  
As Delany observes, Henry represents a destructive breed of social Darwinism that does 
not ensure the “survival of the fittest” but instead leads to “the destruction of the 
cherished past, the pollution of the countryside by the noise and stink of the motor car, 
and the loss to the English people of what they most need—a sense of being securely 
rooted in their own corner of the earth.” Initially impressed by the Wilcoxes’ 
assertiveness and strength in contrast to her own inactivity and intellection, she 
eventually comes to despise them as “hopelessly philistine, materialist, and brutal” 
(289).  
 
Melancholic Pastoralism 
Having discredited the Schlegel’s intellectual cosmopolitanism and the 
Wilcoxes’ rapacious imperialism, Foster obliges the reader to seek a new answer to the 
question of “who shall inherit England?” Common sense (and the conventions of the 
Victorian “marriage plot”) would suggest that the conclusion of Forster’s didactic novel 
should offer a compromise between rapacious, capitalistic imperialism and effete, liberal 
cosmopolitanism, at least metaphorically in the union between Henry Wilcox and 
Margaret Schlegel. As asserted above, however, Foster is notoriously evasive and rarely 
offer simple resolutions. 
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To be sure, Foster’s work is guided by a strong moral code, one that would best 
be categorized as “liberal humanist” for his emphasis on the virtues of individual 
freedom. As Trilling has observed, however, while Forster’s novels are “politically and 
morally tendentious and always in the liberal direction,” his work is actually “deeply at 
odds with the liberal mind, and while liberal readers can go a long way with Forster, 
they can seldom go all the way” (74). While on one hand Forster openly critiques the 
manners and opinions of Britain’s middle class and the British class system, public 
schools, capitalism, and imperialism, he never quite finishes the task. As Trilling 
suggests, for Forster, the main deficiency of liberalism is its lack of imagination, for, 
despite its affinity for reason, theory, and evidence, liberalism does not do well with 
anomaly or contradiction.  Liberalism depends on oppositional definitions, dyads such as 
“good and evil,” “rich and poor,” “right and wrong.”  These sorts of oppositional 
positions—the same sort that engender the basic complications of the plot—are 
perceived by the Schlegels at the outset of the novel, although they becoming 
increasingly muddled as the novel progresses.  As Trilling suggests, liberalism “is an 
attractive game because it gives us the sensation of thinking, and its first rule is that if 
one of two opposed principles is wrong, the other is necessarily right.”  The difficulty of 
reading Forster, according to Trilling is that he “will not play this game; or rather, he 
plays it only to mock it” (75).  Just as the reader begins to ascertain the lesson that Foster 
means to teach, “the outline of known things [grows] dim” (HE 59).  
This elusiveness is indicative of the melancholia interwoven in Foster’s work and 
is the marker of his Modernism. As indicated in the first chapter, the essential quality of 
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Freud’s initial conception of melancholia is grief is accompanied by self-recrimination 
and an expectation of punishment (“Mourning” 204).  The subject’s failure to internalize 
hostility or ambivalence towards the lost object is often directed inward, and as the 
grieving process progresses onward, this ambivalence is directed outward. On this point, 
Jesse Matz, in summarizing Foster’s oeuvre, offers that “Melancholia overdevelops the 
conscience, or that faculty through which we subject ourselves to critical scrutiny” 
(“Death” 309). The sort of contradictory position characteristically occupied by Forster 
is the aporia of melancholia—a state of being in which one refuses consolation for a lost 
object while simultaneously harboring animosity for it; or in which one resuscitates (or 
even creates) a lost object only to unendingly attend its death.   
Forster’s lost object is, quite plainly, the pastoral traditions of Britain.26 As 
Tambling observes, “Forster’s attachments are nostalgic, dwelling on a Britain which is 
agricultural, non-industrial, pre-motor-car” (2). Forster himself was not evasive about his 
attitude towards modernity, writing in Two Cheers for Democracy that the movement in 
Britain away from agriculturalism towards industrialism, “has meant the destruction of 
feudalism and relationship based on the land, it has meant the transference of power 
from the aristocrat to the bureaucrat and the manager and the technician. Perhaps it will 
mean democracy, but it has not meant it yet, and personally I hate it” (281).  It is this 
well-defined attitude that explains Forster’s incredibly cruelty towards some of his  
characters. For instance, consider the narrator’s observations of Leonard Bast:  
His mind and his body had been alike underfed, because he was poor, and 
because he was modern they were always craving better food. Had he lived some 
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centuries ago, in the brightly coloured civilizations of the past, he would have 
had a definite status, his rank and his income would have corresponded. But in 
his day the angel of Democracy had arisen, enshadowing the classes with 
leathern wings, and proclaiming, ‘All men are equal—all men, that is to say, who 
possess umbrellas,’ and so he was obliged to assert gentility, lest he slipped into 
the abyss where nothing counts, and the statements of Democracy are inaudible.  
(35-36) 
Less observation of Leonard’s characteristics than an editorial statement on the 
shortcomings of liberalism, this passage implies that he (and his lower-middle-class ilk) 
were perhaps “better off” under pre-industrial feudalism, where they could at least live a 
life of robust physical activity as agrarian laborers, never begrudging the art, culture, and 
leisure that they would never enjoy, for it never came to their mind.  
This hostility towards Leonard Bast (or at least the system that created him) 
seems a surprisingly conservative position for Forster, at least in the sense that it 
assumes an anti-progressive position.  For Forster, however, Leonard Bast, through no 
fault of his own, represents the complete and utter disintegration of England’s essential 
character. As Stuart Christie observes, “Bast is the literal embodiment of the smog 
clouding the horizon in Howards End. His is the ‘atmosphere’ of class encroachment 
that the text must accommodate and, where possible, purify” (23).  Forster makes it clear 
from the very start that Leonard’s attempts to acculturate himself to the intellectual class 
cannot overcome the insurmountable obstacles of “the inauthentic text of suburban 
privilege on one hand, and the impenetrable façade of genteel noblesse oblige on the 
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other” (Christie 24). His demise could be read as poignant critique of the lingering 
attitude, among certain circles, that such attempts at upward mobility is untoward or 
presumptuous. Still, Forster implies his own critique of liberalism by dictating that 
Leonard’s specific cause of death is a weak heart—a heart that, had he been a pastoral 
laborer, would have been sufficiently strong to survive both the attack by his economic 
and social better, Charles Wilcox, and the (rather symbolically heavy-handed) avalanche 
of books in the final confrontation between the two in the house at Howards End. 
 Forster’s preference of the rural “yeoman” is underscored just prior to this 
climatic scene, as Leonard walks from Hilton to Howards End.  Along the way, he 
observes that, “[h]ere men had been up since dawn. Their hours were ruled, not by a 
London office, but by the movements of the crops and the sun. That they were men of 
the finest type only the sentimentalist can declare. But they kept to the life of daylight. 
They are England’s hope” (HE 229). As Leonard makes this observation, he is passed by 
a motor car (one assumes Charles), and, 
in it was another type, whom Nature favours—the Imperial. Healthy, ever in 
motion, it hopes to inherit the earth. It breeds as quickly as the yeoman, and as 
soundly; strong is the temptation to acclaim it as a super-yeoman, who carries his 
country’s virtue overseas. But the Imperialist is not what he thinks or seems. He 
is a destroyer. He prepares the way for cosmopolitanism, and though his 
ambitions may be fulfilled, the earth that he inherits will be grey. 
(HE 229) 
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The comparison of the three “types” of Briton are offered quite plainly here: the Yeoman 
(the Basts, in a previous life); the Imperialist (the Wilcoxes); and the Cosmopolitan (the 
Schlegels). Of the three, the latter two are rejected, while the favored face of Britain, the 
Yeoman, is either extinct or on his way there (via railway to London, one would 
assume).  The Yeoman—that is, pastoral England—is the lost object that Forster seeks to 
recover in his melancholia.27 
 
Primitivism and Commodified Authenticity 
 Very little in Howards End could be said to be “exotic,” with the exception of 
the golliwog purchased by Margaret Schlegel as a Christmas present or Henry Wilcox’s 
Dutch Bible taken as a trophy of the Boer War.  Still, many of the same processes that 
create the Modernist fascination with the exotic and the primitive are to be found in the 
Forster’s fixation on the pastoral ideal.  This reluctance to abandon the past suggests the 
anxieties related to recovering “origins and pure states” discussed earlier, which as 
Torgovnik suggests, are representative of the “utopian desire to go back and recover 
irreducible features of the psyche, land, and community—to reinhabit core experiences” 
(5).  This desire is presented in the figure of Ruth Wilcox, who, after temporarily 
relocating to a flat opposite the Schlegel residence in London, is further revealed to be 
gracious and self-effacing in contrast to the witty, opinionated banter of Margaret’s 
highly intellectual circle. Tellingly, Ruth is horrified to learn that the lease of Wickham 
Place is nearing its end and that the Schlegels are to be turned out within the year. While 
the loss of their residence is distressing—or at least irritating—to the Schlegel siblings, 
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to Ruth Wilcox, the notion of losing one’s family home is “monstrous.” As she argues, 
“‘To be parted from your house, your father’s house—it oughtn’t to be allowed. It is 
worse than dying. […] Can what they call civilization be right, if people mayn’t die in 
the room where they were born?’” (HE 62). Whereas the cosmopolitan Schlegels’ 
patriotism is owed to lofty concepts and a community of ideals, Ruth Wilcox’s value 
system is quite plain: She believes in constancy, family, and generosity. Her sense of 
place is static, corporal, fixed.  She is the embodiment of the comforting sense of 
identity promised by the pastoral house at Howards End. 
The notion of houses and homes becomes the fundamental conflict of the novel. 
Just before her death, early in the novel, Ruth Wilcox revises her will to bequeath the 
house at Howards End to Margaret, a final act of selfless generosity to which the 
remaining Wilcoxes react, of course, with incredulity, collectively disregarding the 
request, a moment of disloyalty that they justify, in part, because, as Evie observes, 
Margaret “‘…really isn’t English,” to which Charles adds, “‘She’s a cosmopolitan…I 
admit that I’m rather down on cosmopolitans…. I cannot stand them, and a German 
cosmopolitan is the limit” (HE 75).  If Ruth is the embodiment of the English pastoral 
ideal, her attempt to bequeath the house at Howards End to Margaret would seemingly 
align with Forster’s liberalism in that the decision promotes individual humanistic needs 
and the valuation of individual choice and freedom. The Wilcox’s blockage represents 
the triumph of materialism, superficially masquerading as patriotism.  
From a certain point of view, however, the fetishization of the country home is 
itself a form of materialism, an increasingly common practice of commodifying 
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authenticity, a modern trend that Forster had likely observed. In the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, the rapid increase of economic prosperity not only led to increasing 
urbanization but also the expansion and solidification of the relatively new British 
“middle class.”  This new class was an advanced form of the bourgeoisie, neither 
aristocrat nor proletariat, and with ambitions for social advancement and the benefit of 
disposable income.  As Elizabeth Outka observes, the dawn of the twentieth century saw 
an “explosion of efforts” to market nostalgia in the form of relatively cheap, accessible 
“country homes” that conformed to conventional images of the idyllic English cottage.28 
Ironically, the desire to insulate the idealized notion of English rural life from “the 
contaminating forces of commerce and urban bustle” only made commercialization of it 
more profitable (68-69).  She goes on to argue that Howards End “reveals a surprisingly 
nuanced understanding of commodified authenticity” and “presents both a scathing 
critique and a more subtle investigation of its powers” (71).   
Howards End presents two types of real estate, the city home—such as Leonard’s 
flat or Wickham Place—which is temporary and transitory; and the “authentic” English 
country home—found in Oniton Grange or Howards End—which is timeless and far 
removed from the flux of the metropolis and its economic transactions.  We see this 
sentiment articulated after Margaret arrives at Howards End for the first time.  The 
reader learns that,   
“The sense of flux which had haunted her all the year disappeared for a time. She 
forgot the luggage and the motorcars, and the hurrying men who know so much 
and connect so little. She recaptured the sense of space, which is the basis of all 
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earthly beauty, and, starting from Howards End, she attempted to realize 
England. She failed—visions do not come when we try, though they may come 
through trying. But an unexpected love of the island awoke in her, connecting on 
this side with the joys of the flesh, on that with the inconceivable”  
(HE 147) 
In this passage, the house at Howards End becomes, for Margaret the entirety of Britain, 
and she discovers a new patriotism where there had before been mild ambivalence. This 
change within Margaret’s perception is an important development, as it signals her 
movement from her previous position as a cosmopolitan intellectual, in England but not 
of England, towards a more patriotic position.  As Tambling observes, the retreat from 
the urban and return to pastoral, “marks the Forster text as in retreat from otherness and 
clinging to an ideology of ‘Englishness’” (3). One must wonder, however, how deep this 
conversion actually is, for Margaret has not become any more sympathetic towards the 
“condition of England,” as represented by Leonard Bast, and she still enjoys the 
economic benefit of the investment returns on “foreign things.”  Her patriotic epiphany 
follows on the heels of newfound admiration for Henry in particular and the virtues of 
Wilcoxian pragmatism and efficiency in general. As Tambling argues, “this clinging to 
the local, which runs counter to the very internationalism of modernism, fitted the 
projections of England that were necessary for it to maintain an imperialist status, as at 
the center of the empire, and helped to preserve and England which paradoxically 
Forster could never be happy with…” (3). The juxtaposition of these “alterations” to 
Margaret’s character indicates Forster’s awareness of the necessary relationship of 
 137 
 
nationalism to imperialism—the latter both protects and is produced by the former. On 
this point, Ian Baucom suggests that the English “country house” depends entirely on 
“those distant, all but invisible spaces of empire to which it is connected through a 
perpetual passing of bodies, capital, and commodities and from which it derives its 
principles of order, stability, and rule” (261-262). So, with regard to the question, “Who 
shall inherit England?” it seems that the choice is not to be between landed gentry or the 
metropolitan imperialist, for they cannot survive without each other. 
 
Only Connect: Ethical Melancholia and Territorial Cosmopolitanism 
In the final chapter of Howards End, Helen and Margaret stand outside the 
eponymous home, looking out over the meadows as they are being cut for hay. Looking 
to the distance and observing the “red dust” of the encroaching suburbs, Helen says, 
“You see that in Surrey and even Hampshire now… I can see it from the Purbeck 
Downs. And London is only part of something else, I’m afraid. Life’s going to be melted 
down, all over the world” (HE 240).  This observation echoes sentiments offered 
numerous times throughout the novel.  For instance, earlier, in contemplating where she 
and Henry will reside as husband and wife, Margaret muses,  
Marriage had not saved her from the sense of flux. London was but a foretaste of 
this nomadic civilization which is altering human nature so profoundly, and 
throws upon personal relations a stress greater than they have ever borne before. 
Under cosmopolitanism, if it comes, we shall receive no help from the earth. 
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Trees and meadows and mountains will only be a spectacle, and the binding 
force that they once exercised on character must be entrusted to Love alone. 
(HE 186). 
This anxiety over the loss of the “known community” to come with cosmopolitanism 
(which Forster uses as a synonym for “modernity”) is eloquently expressed by the oft-
quoted epigraph to Howards End: “Only connect…,” indicating some grief for the loss 
of individual human connections, between one another and between their places.  The 
hope for the future, then, is that these connections can somehow be made. For instance, 
in Chapter 22, shortly after Henry kisses Margaret for the first time, we read of her 
thoughts, “Only connect! That was the whole of her sermon. Only connect the prose and 
the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will be seen at its height. Live in 
fragments no longer. Only connect, and the beast and the monk, robbed of the isolation 
that is life to either, will die” (HE 134).  The implication here is that dealing in absolutes 
and oppositions is futile, and the path to progress is through connecting one thing to the 
other.  Even Howards End, the epitome of idyllic English pastoralism, is doomed, for as 
Outka observes, “while Howards End offers a sense of continuity missing from the 
London flats, time here remains fixed, unable to accommodate the modern age and urban 
time” (75).29  
In observing the approach of the “red dust,” Margaret articulates an answer to the 
question “who shall inherit England?”:  
“Because a thing is going strong now, it need not go strong forever…. This craze 
for motion has only set in during the last hundred years. It may be followed by a 
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civilization that won’t be a movement, because it will rest on the earth. All the 
signs are against it now, but I can’t help hoping, and very early in the morning in 
the garden I feel that our house is the future as well as the past.” 
(HE 240)  
The house, now filled with the belongings of the Schlegels, takes a new form.  
Previously, the only connections offered by the novel were economic—Margaret 
capitulated to the necessary conditions of imperialism through her marriage to Henry, 
and Helen sought to assuage her guilt by donating her wealth to Leonard.  The solution 
offered in the figure of the revitalized Howards End is free of commercial 
entanglements—Henry and Leonard are both absent from the equation—and offers not a 
radical departure from the past, but a continuance of it into the future. This sentiment of 
connecting the future with the past is the best hope that England—or any society drawn 
into the flux of cosmopolitanism—has for preserving true human connections.  If 
Howards End is to symbolize England, we find, at the conclusion of a novel, hope for 
the future. Both are to be inherited by the progeny of the liberal intellectual and the 
yeoman, raised modestly and with a sense of history—a union of the global and the 
local, the past and the future, a form of the “territorial cosmopolitanism” proposed by 
Johansen. In this way, Forster’s refusal to relinquish the image of the pastoral, to admit 
its passing and release it, is read as “ethical” melancholia, per Derrida – he is preserving 
this past with the false hopes of recuperating it in a new version of ideal Englishness, to 
create a new community that exists self-consciously above the nation. 
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Notes
1 Wilde’s depiction of the dancing daughter, in particular, with his famous “dance of the seven veils,” 
engendered a wave of spin-off theatrical and artistic performances that amplified the alluring exoticism 
suggested in the play. For further discussion of the later performances of the “dance of the seven veils,” 
see Amy Koritz’s “Dancing the Orient for England: Maud Allan’s ‘The Vision of Salome’ and Judith 
Walkowitz’s “The ‘Vision of Salome’: Cosmopolitanism and Erotic Dancing in Central London, 1908-
1918.” 
 
2 Chris Bongie explains that exoticism as a literary and cultural practice, “creates another space (the space 
of the Other) outside the boundaries of a society that to some observers, in the aftermath of the political 
and technological revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century, seemed inalterably modern and deeply 
alienating” (270). 
 
3 In defining “imperialism,” I point to Edward Said, who uses the imperialism to mean the “practice, the 
theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory,” as distinguished 
from “colonialism,” which describes the “implanting of settlements on distant territory” (9). 
 
4 For an interesting overview of the United States’ imperialist ambitions in the Pacific, see Brody, 
Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and Imperialism in the Philippines. 
 
5 While colonial ambitions are roundly ridiculed in our own times, one has to wonder if our own efforts of 
“international development” are that much different.  As Craig Calhoun rightly observes, “the 
cosmopolitan ideals of global civil society can sound uncomfortably like those of the civilizing mission 
behind colonialism, especially when presented as a program from the outside borne by global NGOs rather 
than an opportunity for local development” (875). 
 
6 Coincidentally, Matisse, Durain, and many of the Fauvists had studied under the Salome-obsessed 
Symbolist Gustave Moreau at Paris’ École des Beaux-Arts in the 1890’s. 
 
7 In A Life of Picasso, art historians John Richardson and Marilyn McCully describe the profound effect 
that Gauguin’s retrospective exhibitions had upon Picasso: “Gauguin demonstrated the most disparate 
types of art—not to speak of elements from metaphysics, ethnology, symbolism, the Bible, classical 
myths, and much else besides—could be combined into a synthesis that was of its time yet timeless” 
(461). Richardson’s description of Gaugin’s oeuvre mirrors many of the same characteristics ascribed to 
Modernist literature. 
 
8 For further discussion, see Pericles Lewis’ Cambridge Introduction to Modernism (75-76). 
 
9 “For middle- and upper-class Victorians, dominant over a vast working-class majority at home and over 
increasing millions of ‘uncivilized’ peoples of ‘inferior’ races abroad, power was self-validating” 
(Brantlinger 166). 
 
10 I shall consider this figure later in this chapter when discussing Forster’s Leonard Bast. 
 
11 Williams asserts that any explanation of the “breaks in all arts” that signals the emergence of modernism 
“must start from the fact that the late nineteenth century was the occasion for the greatest changes ever 
seen in the media of cultural production. Photography, cinema, radio, television reproduction and 
recording all make their decisive advances during the period of identified as modernist.”  Williams asserts 
that it is in response to these technological advances that the “defensive cultural groupings” form (50). 
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12 This conception resembles Kwame Anthony Appiah’s notion of the “tribal fantasy,” which he describes 
as an idealized “small-scale, technologically uncomplicated, face-to-face society, where most interactions 
are with people whom you know.” Every member of this idealized society shares a common language, 
belief system, and understanding of cultural practices (626).  In contrast, the modern “imagined 
communities” of the nation-state are not and cannot be “centered on a common culture of this sort” (627). 
In “When Was Modernism?”, Williams suggests that this notion of the “tribal fantasy” explains the “the 
ideological victory” of Modernism, which is a result, in large part, of the “relations of production of the 
artists themselves in the centres of metropolitan dominance, living the experience of rapidly mobile 
emigres in the migrant quarters of their cities. They were exiles one of another, at a time when this was 
still not the more general experience of other artists…” (51). Modernists created their own communities, 
so to speak. 
 
13 I draw this notion of “territorialized” meanings and identities from Emily Johansen’s Cosmopolitanism 
and Place, which I discuss in later detail below. Johansen offers the term “territorialized 
cosmopolitanism” as a contradistinction to the phrase “rooted cosmopolitanism” frequently used by such 
theorists as Mitchell Cohen, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Bonnie Honig, to indicate shared super-national 
values—such as “democracy”—that also allow space for local loyalties and traditions.  Johansen’s 
“territorialized” cosmopolitanism then considers where and how cosmopolitan is practiced, in terms of 
quotidian experience. 
 
14 As Jessica Berman comments, “At the same time as we recognize national, communal, and 
cosmopolitan narratives as always already implicated in each other, we must also see them as particular 
discourses, spoken from a particular location at a specific moment in time” (17). 
 
15 This perception of incompatibility between the local and the global or between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism has a long history. For instance, as Craig Calhoun suggests, “while some nineteenth-
century thinkers embraced cosmopolitanism as an urban aesthetic ideal, others, like Thomas Carlyle, were 
ambivalent about cosmopolitanism.  They worried that it was somehow an ‘attenuated’ solidarity by 
comparison to those rooted I more specific local cultures and communities” (872). 
 
16 In his essay “Cosmopolitan Patriots,” Appiah offers a model that refuses the necessity of oppositional 
conditions, arguing that one can be simultaneously be “cosmopolitan—celebrating the variety of human 
cultures; rooted—loyal to one local society (or a few) that you count as home; liberal—convinced of the 
value of the individual; and patriotic—celebrating the institutions of the state (or states) within which [one 
lives]” (633). 
 
17 As Jeff Popke observes, “Practical, everyday cosmopolitanisms…are embedded within a complex 
politics of obligation and concern in which local demands must necessarily be weighed against, and at 
times may supersede, what might be seen as more ‘global’ claims.” The impression of global matters on 
local concerns is not always a mutually beneficial exchange, since many people are pressed into 
cosmopolitanism against their will (as in the case of imperialism and colonialism) and that a 
“cosmopolitan sense of responsibility may therefore end up being a “luxury of a gentrifying urban elite” 
(510).  
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18 Woolf and Forster are frequently compared and contrasted, as they were both members of the 
Bloomsbury Group.  As Elizabeth Langland observes, Forster was quite aware of “his somewhat 
anomalous position” in literary history, often finding himself at odds with Woolf, who advocated for a 
more experimental, “self-sufficient” aesthetic, while Forster argued that art should take a secondary 
position to the “claims of life.”  As Langland suggests, “he objected to her singleness of vision as a denial 
of life, she to his double vision as a failure of art” (93). 
 
19 For an interesting reading of Howards End against Gaskell’s North and South (1855), see Paul 
Delaney’s “‘Islands of money’: Rentier Culture in E.M. Forster’s Howards End.”  As in Gaskell’s work, 
Forster depends upon a series of dialectical oppositions – town and country, rich and poor, art and 
business – to structure his novel. 
 
20 As Jeremy Tambling notes in the introduction to his excellent casebook on Forster, the bulk of scholarly 
attention on Forster occurred in the 1940s and ‘50s, and little new critical work has been done, particularly 
work informed by various theoretical discourses, including narrative theory, post-structuralism, Marxism, 
or psychoanalysis (although significant recent work has been done by gender and queer theorists). 
Tambling’s suggestion—one with which I would agree—is that Forster’s novels often end ambiguously, 
seemingly incomplete in their arguments.  This quality is not, in my mind, a detraction. 
 
21 Lionel Trilling suggests that one reason for the difficulty in classifying Forster is that he writes in the 
comic manner: “Forster owes much to Fielding, Dickens, Meredith and James. And nowadays even the 
literate reader is likely to be unschooled in the comic tradition and unware of the comic-seriousness” (71-
72). 
 
22 Perhaps betraying his Victorian influences, Forster’s choice of character names borders on the edge of 
what Duckworth  terms “onomastic decorum,” with “Bast” to obviously close to “bastard,” and “Wilcox” 
being too obviously a phallic reference (30).  
 
23 Numerous critics have observed that Leonard Bast is representative of the wave of rural inhabitants that 
began swarming the city centers in the late nineteenth century, particularly after the repeal of the Corn 
Laws in 1852, which removed all tariffs from imported grain and essentially undercut the entire British 
agricultural economy.  As Duckworth observes, “Since the 1870s, when Americans extended their 
railroads to the Midwest and began shipping vast quantities of cheap grain across the Atlantic, Britain had 
suffered from a depression in agriculture,” resulting in “large scale movement of agricultural laborers to 
the cities” (5). 
 
24 The choice of rubber as the Wilcox’s imperialist commodity of choice is fitting, considering also their 
affinity for the motor-car, Forter’s preferred symbol of anti-pastoral modernity.  As David Bradshaw 
observes, within a few years of the Congress of Berlin (1884-1885), rubber had become “nothing less than 
the raw material of modernity, insulating the ever increasing range of electrical goods and enabling the 
burgeoning number of bicycles and cares to speed along ever more rapidly”  (164). As one of the “foreign 
things” into which a well-to-do Briton might invest, rubber plantations were an especially profitable 
option in the 1900’s. 
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25 The paradox offered by Forster is unsurprising, given his own ambivalence towards his own privileged 
position, which he could neither endorse nor refuse: “The education I received in those far-off and 
fantastic days made me soft, and I am very glad it did, for I have seen plenty of hardness since, and I know 
it does not even pay…. But though the education was humane it was imperfect, inasmuch as we none of us 
realized our economic position. In came the nice fat dividends, up rose the lofty thoughts, and we did not 
realize that all the time we were exploiting the poor of our own country and the backward races abroad, 
and getting bigger profits from our investments than we should. We refused to face the unpalatable truth” 
(Two Cheers 56). 
 
26 Or, to be more specific, the ideal of his own pastoral childhood in Britain. 
 
27 Forster is not alone in his beliefs; this sort of pastoralism—understood in this sense as a nostalgic view 
of British identity as rural and agricultural—had been gaining prominence in Britain from the 1850s 
onward.  This trend coincided with very real and dramatic demographic and economic shifts in Britain. 
The repeal of British Corn Laws in 1846, combined with the improvement of both transportation and 
agricultural technologies abroad, resulted in a dramatic drop in the price of grain in the Britain and an 
increased dependence on imports, thus gutting the domestic agricultural sector.  During the 1830’s, for 
instance, Britain imported only two percent of its grain, whereas by the 1880’s, it imported as much as 65 
percent (Ensor 116).  British census data shows a decline of 92,250 in agricultural laborers with a 
concurrent increase of 53,496 urban laborers between 1871 and 1881 (Ensor 117).  Of these nearly 54 
thousand emigres to the metropolis was certainly Leonard Bast’s father or grandfather. 
 
28 For additional discussion of the “fetishization” of the English country house, see Ian Baucom’s 
“Mournful Histories: Narratives of Postimperial Melancholy.” 
 
29 Related to this notion of pastoral timelessness vs. urban time, Baucom argues that the inextricable 
nostalgia that comprises English nationalism elevates the nation to “a principle of authority rather than as a 
space of inhabitation, as a deity rather than a home.” As a deity, then, the nation exists outside of history 
and dwells beyond “the lived experience of history, the messiness of the everyday, and designates 
belatedness and postponement as its sole temporalities” (272-273). 
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CHAPTER V 
ETHICAL MELANCHOLIA: THE DEATH OF HOSPITALITY AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF RECIPROCITY IN JAMES JOYCE’S “THE DEAD” AND THE 
“ITHACA” EPISDE OF ULYSSES 
  
 
Introduction 
Thus far, this dissertation has explored the means by which Modernist authors 
develop narratives that exhibit melancholic attachments to bygone ideals, notions and 
values assumed to be lost, victims to modernity. As demonstrated in the preceding 
chapters, the multiple technological, political, philosophical, and socio-political 
advances of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries irrevocably altered the 
modern conception of both historical time and geographic space. The modern subject 
(which is to say, the metropolitan subject) now stood at the center of a vast global 
economic network, connected by telecommunications networks and accessible by 
(relatively) rapid transportation, that stood almost entirely outside of her daily existence. 
The modern subject was not only daily aware that a larger world existed, she was aware 
that it operated far outside of her known community. With the loss of the former ways of 
“knowing” the world, the existing means of narration ceased to effectively communicate 
experience. The resulting grief for the loss of stability of meaning was performed as 
melancholia—a sustained longing for a lost object of desire and a refusal of consolation.  
The past two chapters explored Modernism’s melancholia with regard to aesthetics—
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that is, the loss of the unity of truth and beauty—and politics—seen as the loss of the 
“knowable community” in the face of a globalized economy.  The final chapter of this 
dissertation will explore melancholia with regard to ethics, particularly what I term the 
“ethics of alterity,” the practice of which is hospitality, or the cultural institution that 
dictates proper behavior towards strangers. Hospitality is the means of governing 
complicated social relations, the process by which one manages the difference presented 
by the other and comes to accept this difference into one’s own “home.”  
The fundamental ethical practice of hospitality was, of course, in crisis during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The prevailing Western models of the ethical 
relationship processes and rituals of behavior that exist between a guest and his or her 
host are based entirely on classical and Abrahamic models, models drawn from antiquity 
and therefore can only partially account for the radical alterity presented by Modernity. 
The pre-existing notions and models of hospitality did not and could not account for 
dramatic effects of rapid technological advances in transportation, telecommunication, 
and media that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As 
summarized in the introduction to this dissertation, advances such as the steam engine, 
the telegraph and telephone, and photography and the cinema not only forced a 
restructuring of commonplace notions of time, distance, and space, but also notions of 
“public” versus “private” space, notions that are fundamental to the deployment of 
hospitality.1  Furthermore, the rampant border-drawing (and re-drawing) resulting from 
the establishment and concretization of various European nation-states (particularly after 
the Revolutions of 1848) severely problematizes the application of the sort of “absolute” 
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hospitality practiced by the nomadic peoples of the Old Testament or the pre-polis 
figures from Homeric narratives.  
That there would be grief for a perceived loss of hospitality is not surprising, 
considering the basic structure of Western civilization was in a state of flux. Feudalism 
and mercantilism gave way to widespread capitalism, industrialism, and globalization. In 
the conclusion to 1913: The Cradle of Modernism, Jean-Michel Rabaté, in relating the 
observations of Italian journalist Guglielmo Ferrero, suggests that the late nineteenth-
century optimism resulting from the general death of absolutism at the hands of rising 
liberalism quickly degraded a generalized gloom of impending global war. “In the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the utopia of the bourgeois liberals had almost come 
true when power had shifted from the princes, kings, and courts to democratically 
elected parliaments” (209). The preceding assumption had been that large-scale wars 
were most commonly the result of long-standing feuds between royal families or 
individual ambitions of monarchic rules; the belief at the dawn of the twentieth century 
was that a new, liberal Europe in which democratically elected parliaments sought to 
craft a future in which each nation could live peacefully alongside its neighbors, would 
bring about the end of imperialist aggression. Rabaté suggests, however, that democracy 
may have come too quickly, not allowing sufficient time for public opinion to become 
calibrated with the increasingly powerful popular press. The result was a dramatic 
increase in rabid nationalism that spurred Europe to war faster than any dynastic caprice 
could have. Rabaté writes that the First World War was the inevitable consequence of 
“the paradoxical conflation of a modern evolution towards democracy in a period of 
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industrial revolution and scientific progress, and the spectral resurgence of an ancient 
heroic Romanticism, a compromise between the fruits of the French Revolution and the 
return of the nationalist myths” (1913 209). Never had there been a time period in which 
cosmopolitan hospitality was so desperately needed and so seriously in jeopardy. 
A secondary (and aggravating) effect of this ardent nationalism was that it 
promoted widespread immigration. As the old empires collapsed, new nation-states 
formed. While the emergence of the modern, liberal state promoted democratic ideals, 
the foundational elements of “the nation” (e.g. shared language and common religion) 
instantly generated new ethnic minorities that were often refused recognition, or even 
oppressed, by the states that had previously been their homes. As Panikos Panayi writes 
in the introduction to the anthology Refugees and the End of Empire, “the desire for 
ethnic purity, legitimized by nationalist ideology, meant, in some cases that the transition 
from empire to nation-state involved ethnic cleansing as part of the nation-building 
process” (22). The Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the wave of pogroms of Eastern 
Europe and Russia are the most dramatic example of mass forced exodus and relocation 
in pre-WWI Europe; the novelty of the concept is signaled by the newness of the term 
“refugee,” which was not codified, however, until the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951.  
Not all immigration and movement throughout Europe was forced exile. The 
increasing popularity (and decreasing cost) of rail travel throughout Europe from the 
middle of the nineteenth century onward resulted in dramatic growth of tourism that 
essentially rendered any existing passport and visa policies untenable. France abolished 
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passports in 1861, and by 1914, passport requirements were essentially non-existent in 
Europe (although the Russian and Ottoman Empires maintained both domestic and 
international travel paper requirements). Relatively few people even possessed passports. 
Many modernist writers responded to the increasing wave of trans-cultural exchange and 
immigration at the start of the twentieth century by eschewing national identity in favor 
of “world citizenship,” or cosmopolitanism. To point, notable Modernist authors such as 
James Joyce, Ernest Hemingway, E.M. Forster, Joseph Conrad, and Edith Wharton 
established the model for the expatriate author by living nomadic, cosmopolitan lives. 
On a larger scale, however, the increase in emigration and immigration between and 
within Europe and its colonies and the United States forced Modernist thinkers to 
address the challenge of the foreigner, to consider the ethics of alterity.  
A key premise to my larger argument, then, is that the commonly accepted 
penchant for experimentation and avant-gardism of Modernist literature is the result of 
the problematic dialogue between nostalgic notions of hospitality and “modern” 
perceptions of reality. As Mahaffey suggests, Modernist literature is “deeply engaged 
with questions of how we categorize, define, identify, and interpret the multiplicity of 
the world around us” (3). Approached in this way, we can begin to read the difficulty of 
Modernist literature, art, and culture as an ongoing (and ultimately undecidable) 
examination of the ethics of social relations, the demands of reciprocity, and concepts of 
“stranger,” “foreigner,” and “guest.” As suggested, the spread of liberalism, the rise of 
the cosmopolitan community, and the solidification of the modern nation-state near the 
turn of the twentieth century problematized not only the individual’s conception of 
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herself within the larger community, but also the terms by which one defines and 
interacts with a “stranger.” This anxiety over hospitality was not unique to the twentieth 
century, however, and as early as 1795, Immanuel Kant exposed a fundamental problem 
of international law in his essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”: Kant’s 
compact treatise is generally viewed as the originary text of modern discourses on 
contemporary liberal theory, cosmopolitanism, and hospitality. In it, he lays out a plan 
for the establishment of ongoing, sustainable world peace.2 
For, as far as my freedom goes, I am bound by no obligation even with regard to 
Divine Laws—which are apprehended by me only through my reason—except in 
so far as I could have given my assent to them; for it is through the law of 
freedom of my own reason that I first form for myself a concept of a Divine Will.  
(121n)  
This quote in particular, however, identifies the crux of the problem in regard to 
international law, peace between nations, and ethics: In the absence of immediate threat 
of punishment, laws only hold as much power as an individual decides that they do. In 
his essay, Kant establishes the fundamental premise of “universal hospitality,” the third 
essential article for the establishment of perpetual peace between states: “The rights of 
men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality” 
(137). This edict identifies hospitality as the right of a foreign stranger to be treated 
without hostility, provided that he or she is peaceful and abides the rules of the host. 
This right, Kant contends, exists by virtue of the fact that each human being enjoys a 
common right to possession of their individual portion of the globe. 
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As compelling as Kant’s arguments are, it is what he does not say about 
hospitality that conveys the impending tension of modernity: Whereas the preceding 
notions of hospitality were governed by religious texts or doctrine, Kant’s cosmopolitan 
hospitality reflects the Enlightenment shift away from the church as the seat of power 
and authority to the nation-state and, even, the individual. As Kant writes,  
The idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but 
a complement of the unwritten code of law…necessary for the public rights of 
mankind in general and thus for the realization of perpetual peace. For only by 
endeavouring to fulfill the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we 
flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal. 
(142) 
If we read Kant’s observations against the evolving tension between the Romanticism 
and Realism of the late nineteenth century and the high Modernism of the early 
twentieth century, we can begin to perceive a profound conflict between two world 
views: the Levinasian ethics of the twentieth century, which contends that the self is only 
created through an ethical encounter with an unknowable other; and the preceding ethics 
of Romanticism and Realism, which seeks an ideal, imperfectable relationship with the 
sublime through a personal connection with truth, as found in nature and the beautiful. In 
simpler terms, the intellectual preoccupation becomes the relocation of self from 
“inside” to “outside.” This conflict is read not only in the changing notions of hospitality 
in an increasingly cosmopolitan world, but also in the increasingly fragmented, 
melancholic texts offered by Modernist writers.  
 151 
 
Hospitality, like any idea worth discussing, is both universally known and 
recognized yet also entirely elusive and paradoxical. To paraphrase Martin Heidegger’s 
statement about the concept of “Being,” it could be said that hospitality is the “most 
universal and emptiest concept” in that little attempt is made to thoroughly define the 
concept, for everyone who uses it understands perfectly well what they mean by it (42). 
This disinterest in defining such a profoundly universal concept has, however, led to the 
sort of melancholic dissatisfaction expressed above, not to mention a good deal of 
consternation over attempts to apply an ethical code engendered in the ancient 
Hellenistic and Arabic worlds to a technologically advanced, globalized culture. This 
chapter will examine in depth the concept of “hospitality,” not only as a political act, but 
as an ethical practice problematized by modernity. Specifically, this chapter will draw 
comparisons between two works by James Joyce to demonstrate how the melancholic 
posture of Modernism problematizes this ethical practice and requires new methods of 
narration. 
 
The Death of Hospitality 
At the conclusion of the dinner party that is the central plot element of James 
Joyce’s oft-anthologized short story “The Dead,” the protagonist Gabriel Conroy stands 
and delivers an eloquent speech in praise of his hosts’ hospitality: 
Ladies and Gentlemen. It is not the first time that we have gathered together 
under this hospitable roof, around this hospitable board. It is not the first time 
that we have been the recipients—or perhaps, I had better say, the victims—of 
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the hospitality of certain good ladies…. I feel more strongly with every recurring 
year that our country has no tradition which does it so much honour and which it 
should guard so jealously as that of its hospitality. 
(202-03; emphasis mine) 
In the early years of the 20th century, “hospitality” loomed large in the public 
consciousness of England and Ireland. Gabriel Conroy’s after-dinner speech acquires 
additional meaning when read against its contemporary context—the subject of fading 
traditions had been a hot topic in the press throughout 1904 (Power 109). Numerous 
articles from the era lament the apparent death of hospitality, no more vehemently, 
perhaps, than Marie Corelli’s aptly named pamphlet, “The Death of Hospitality.”3 In this 
short but vigorous piece, Corelli eviscerates “new” concepts of hospitality and laments 
that traditional “hospitality, large-hearted, smiling gracious Hospitality, is dead and 
wrapped in its grave-clothes, waiting in stiff corpse-like state for its final burial” (89-90). 
The powerful rhetoric throughout the pamphlet bears such an uncanny resemblance to 
Gabriel’s remarks that it seems impossible that Joyce could not have been referencing 
Corelli. For instance, Gabriel remarks, “I sometimes fear that this new generation, 
educated or hypereducated as it is, will lack those qualities of humanity, of hospitality, 
of kindly humor which belonged to an older day” (D 203). In her pamphlet, Corelli 
muses, “What do we mean by Hospitality? Surely we mean friendship, kindness, 
personal interest, and warm-hearted openness of look and conduct…” (95). Further, 
Corelli invokes Grace, while Gabriel refers to the Three Graces; also, we see in both 
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Corelli and Gabriel’s statements a rhetorical mourning for a simpler era in which friends 
and relations were treated with high regard and with the utmost sincerity. 
These sentiments are, of course, not unique to the turn of the 20th century; it is 
very likely that social critics engaged in nostalgic yearning for “proper” hospitality have 
for centuries gazed backwards as far as Homer. The Modernist urge to re-contextualize a 
unified human history is well documented, however, and we know, for instance, that 
Joyce had the Odyssey on his mind while writing Dubliners and that Ulysses grew out of 
a story that was to have been included in the collection. Thus, reading Joyce’s narratives 
with such classical concepts as philoxenia—formal rituals of hospitality—at the fore is 
not untoward.  
If we accept the premise that the concept of hospitality transgresses historical 
eras and cultural contexts, then it would be fallacious to argue that the Modernists are 
notable at all for their attention to hospitality. My contention, however, is not that the 
Modernists were preoccupied with hospitality because it transgressed historical eras, but 
rather that the Modernists, consumed with grief for the losses of modernity, sought to 
resuscitate an idealized model of “historic” hospitality as a means of navigating the 
perceived chaos of modernity. In Literary Modernism and Beyond, Richard Lehan 
describes Modernism as a “state of mind” that involved a search for “an idealized 
reality—a quest for some kind of presence connected to the unfolding of time” (5). It is 
precisely the transhistorical, mythical quality of hospitality that makes it a lodestone for 
Modernist artists. In Lehan’s view, “The idea of the beautiful was reinforced by theories 
of myth and symbol, leading to the idea of spatial form, the universalizing of 
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modernism, the cyclicality of history, and the inevitability of historical decline” (x). To 
be in modernity is to be self-conscious of one’s existence in an historical moment that is 
defined primarily as having moved beyond those moments that preceded it; to be 
“modern” means to have lost some part of one’s past. This loss—or, rather, this 
perception of loss triggers melancholia, which itself requires creative production to 
“resuscitate” the lost object so that the mourning of its loss may be sustained. 
Lehan also describes the general approach of Modernists artists—visual and 
literary alike—as a “layering” of spatial and narrative meaning, a method conceptually 
analogous to the archaeological layering popularized by Heinrich Schliemann, who had, 
in the late 19th century, discovered the historical city of Troy. In Lehan’s words, “if 
Modernists turned to the past…it was to the historical past made mythic, to the layering 
of past and present events to suggest the simultaneity of historical event, the universality 
or mythic oneness of time (16). It is this same fundamental desire that promotes the 
desire for authentic, stable meanings, as discussed in the two previous chapters. Read 
from a distance, the narrative innovations of late nineteenth- and early twentieth- century 
authors suggests a deeper struggle to find effective means of representing the 
disorienting and irruptive experience of modernity. One of my fundamental assertions is 
that what we now consider modernist art and literature are the products of the productive 
tension between this urge to retain the solidity of the past while articulating the 
experience of living in a newly global world, one being re-shaped by speed, 
communication, and technology. T.S. Eliot famously referred to “contemporary history” 
as an “immense panorama of futility and anarchy” while praising the success of Joyce’s 
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Ulysses, because, as he argued, of its integrating myth as a means of “manipulating a 
continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity” (175). A resulting tension is 
thus created between the urge to look forward in anticipation of an idealized future while 
being compelled to preserve the past against the advancement of historical decline. This 
conflicted position is the dilemma of melancholia—the opposing urges to seek relief 
from the grief of loss and the desire to maintain an ethical fidelity to the lost object. 
 
The Question of Hospitality 
The beguilingly simple concept of hospitality—that is, the proscribed behaviors 
for dealing with a stranger crossing a boundary from “outside” to “inside”—has come to 
be examined from a kaleidoscope of perspectives, resulting in range of fecund questions 
being asked about some fundamental qualities of human civilization: What should be 
done with a stranger at the threshold? How do we distinguish between a potential guest 
and a possible enemy? To what protections is the guest entitled? What degree of comfort 
is the host obligated to provide? At what point is the guest no longer a guest but a 
resident? What questions may or may not be asked of the guest by the host? To what 
degree is the host responsible for (and to) the guest? What danger is posed to the host? 
The guest? Who (or what) may even be considered a “guest? What is the boundary 
between “stranger,” “guest,” and “friend?”  
Following the example of the Modernists, I will first look backward to move 
forward. The “history” of hospitality across world cultures is too vast to adequately 
summarize, but it may suffice to say that all world cultures have their own clear rules 
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governing the proper treatment of guests in one’s home. Furthermore, these laws are 
seemingly universal: A guest should be offered food and rest, a guest’s privacy should 
be respected, a guest should not be unduly interrogated, a guest should not overstay his 
or her welcome, a guest should reciprocate in some way the gesture of hospitality. These 
universal laws are so deeply ingrained that they are rarely critiqued or questioned.  In the 
introduction to the first issue of Hospitality & Society, the editors offer that, from the 
perspective of historical study of the Greek, Roman, or Enlightenment traditions, 
hospitality entailed “a sacred obligation not just to accommodate the guest, but to protect 
the stranger that arrived at the door” (Lynch 4). In fact, historically, hospitality has been 
generally viewed as a religious or moral duty, in the words of hospitality scholar 
Heidrun Friese, “a sacred commandment of charity and generosity to assign strangers a 
place in the community…” (52). This view has—as with most beliefs—considerably 
changed over time, thereby necessitating increasingly sophisticated theories of 
hospitality when originally there was only a mandate. These contemporary discourses on 
hospitality are generally informed by three textual traditions: 1) Homeric and Biblical 
depictions of hospitality; 3) Immanuel Kant’s treatise on cosmopolitanism and 
hospitality, “Perpetual Peace;” and 4) contemporary readings of these texts offered by 
Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, and their commentators.  
Hospitality, both in theory and practice, is the consideration of borders, 
thresholds, and limits, the cultural institution through which we decide what is to be 
done with individuals (or even texts and ideas) that seek to cross from a foreign place 
and become situated in close proximity with another individual in his or her “home.” We 
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as individuals engage in hospitality when we welcome another into our private 
residences; as members of a state, we participate in it when the immigrant crosses our 
political borders; as intellectuals, readers, and free-thinkers, we metaphorically engage in 
hospitality when we encounter ideas that are new and strange. In most basic terms, 
hospitality is the catch-all for any organized system that dictates what should be done 
with a stranger and how that stranger should treat his or her host.  
The study of hospitality—as a concept, practice, or ethics—has notably increased 
over the past two decades, not only in historical and literary studies, but also in 
philosophy, sociology, economics, political science, and even business management 
studies.4 The recent surge of scholarly interest in hospitality studies is perhaps 
unsurprising, considering the rise of globalization, migration, and telecommunications. 
Increasingly, we find ourselves called to respond to a stranger—in many cases, a literal 
foreigner—or find ourselves a guest of another, far away from our own homes. The 
impetus for this movement could range from voluntary—in the case of global tourism 
and business/trade—to involuntary—in the case of political exiles and refugees.  
As was discussed at length in the previous chapter, the march towards 
cosmopolitanism has created much anxiety about the porosity of national boundaries and 
stable means of identifying one’s “native” culture. The lingering effects of Western 
imperialism and colonialism, now compounded with commercial globalization, tourism, 
and travel, call into question proximity and the historical practice of hospitality. In their 
introduction to an entire issue of Paragraph devoted to the topic of hospitality, Mustafa 
Dikeç, Nigel Clark, and Clive Barnett observe that “Globalization, we might say, is the 
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predicament in which some of us enjoy the benefits of easy connection and extensive 
mobility, while others are locked in place or coerced into motion by dire economic and 
political pressures” (2). The economic benefits of trans-national commerce are not made 
available to all people, and free movement about the globe is not enjoyed (or at least 
experienced) by all peoples. The very powers that drive some from their homes may lock 
others in place, albeit without the authority of being “at home.” In our contemporary 
context, we may find tourists seeking hospitality from those who are in no economic or 
political position to do so; conversely, in such examples as the global relief industry, we 
may find “guests” travelling far from home to offer the benefits of hospitality to others 
in their own “home” environment.  
Given increased migration towards and within an expanded Europe, including 
both “economic migration” and asylum and refuge-seekers, the critical discourse on 
hospitality has taken on a new urgency. Large numbers of Africans, Arabs, and Eastern 
Europeans from former Soviet-bloc countries have flooded Southern and Western 
Europe in recent years, and this population of “strangers” has called into question many 
of the basic tenets of the cultural institution of hospitality, and several recent incidents 
have highlighted a growing inhospitality in Western Europe.5 United States citizens can 
undoubtedly draw a parallel to the issue of Latino migration in the US, which in the 
context of post-9/11 national security, the 2008 “Great Recession,” and the ongoing 
“war on drugs,” is one of the core political issues of our generation.6 Although the word 
is rarely invoked in the American political discourse, hospitality is at the fore of any 
discussion of border (in)security. In addition to this political demand, the lasting effects 
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of early twentieth-century colonialism and the aftereffects of the Second World War, 
particularly the Holocaust, have encouraged vigorous discussion of the ethical aspects of 
hospitality. This approach to hospitality would have us consider “difference” in less 
concrete terms than a Polish bricklayer in London or a Mexican day-laborer in Houston, 
but the radical alterity of the “Other” (i.e. the subject who is not the self) and the means 
by which we come to understand or are called to respond to the Other. This line of 
philosophical discourse also calls us to examine the potential for violence as an 
unavoidable (and perhaps necessary) aspect of hospitality, as well as matters of ethics, 
morals, justice, and laws that surround and govern hospitality.  
In offering his propositions for the establishment of an international order that 
can realistically bring and sustain lasting peace, Kant asserts that, “The rights of men, as 
citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality,” wherein 
he offers an operational definition of hospitality as “the claim of a stranger entering 
foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility” (137). Kant is clear to 
establish that hospitality is not a gift, not “philanthropy,” but rather a right.7 One 
important aspect of Kant’s “universal” hospitality, however, is that it is conditional. Kant 
argues that to be deserving of hospitality, the guest must conform to the standards of 
acceptable behavior as established by their host.8 We see, then, a form of reciprocity, an 
economy. In the Classical model, this economy could be quite literal – the exchange of 
goods and services for the promise of future return.9 From this perspective, we can 
imagine an “ethical economy,” through which obligations between individuals and states 
are exchanged as a form of currency. 
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Proceeding from Kant, we then conceive of hospitality as a means of managing 
this ethical economy, a process by which one manages the difference presented by the 
other and comes to accept strangeness. It is a process of translation through which a 
stranger becomes a guest and the other becomes a subject, and the two enter into an 
ethical relationship. This process is discussed at length by Levinas in his extended essay 
Totality and Infinity, which focuses on transcendence as found in the face-to-face 
relationship and raises questions of social existence and justice.10 The concept of 
hospitality is the cornerstone of Levinas’ discourse: “Metaphysics, or the relation with 
the other, is accomplished as service and as hospitality” (300).11 In extending Kant’s 
notion of hospitality, Levinas draws finer distinctions on the concept, offering that it 
operates in two distinct realms: the ethical and the political. As with Kant, proximity is 
an essential quality. For Levinas, however, one primary distinction between the realms 
of the ethical and the political is the distinction between private and public spaces. In 
terms of ethics, the self is morally obligated to welcome the stranger into the private 
space of the self—the home or dwelling. In regard to the political realm, Levinas holds 
that the self is obligated to welcome the entirety of humanity into the public space of the 
homeland. As with Kant, the complicating factor in both realms is the presence of our 
potential for violence, an inherent threat engendered by the proximity necessary to 
activate hospitality in the first place. When inviting a stranger into one’s home, one also 
allows accepts the possibility that the stranger will do violence to the host—steal his 
riches, murder his family, rape his daughters. (And conversely, to accept the offer of 
hospitality is to accept the possibility that one will become the hostage of the host.)  
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The distinction between public space (the political) and the private space 
(ethical) of the self is described in Totality and Infinity as the “home” or “dwelling,” a 
term that occupies a privileged position in Levinas’ thinking.12 Obviously, physical 
protection from the elements is an essential human need, a part of the “gear consisting of 
things necessary for the life of man” (152). The home, however, is more than a mere 
shelter; it is an essential implement in the process of intentional or subjective human 
action: “The privileged role of the home does not consist in being the end of human 
activity but in being its condition, and in this sense its commencement” (152). This 
space, which both initiates the possibility of violence towards another and is the font of 
the self’s ability to offer hospitality to another, is the space in which transcendence 
becomes possible. For Levinas, the seemingly unremarkable act of opening up one’s 
home to a stranger is a profound ethical exercise, for it demonstrates obedience to the 
fundamental Abrahamic moral imperative, “thou shalt not kill.” This negation of murder, 
this refusal to do violence is not only an essential quality of hospitality, but also 
demonstrates recognition of the presence of transcendence, as found in the face of the 
Other. For Levinas, this “calling in question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation 
of the Other in the face, we call language” (171).  In this way, by creating the necessary 
conditions for language, hospitality becomes the fundament of all ethics. 
Beyond the offering of recognition (as language), however, hospitality also 
presents some material, economic demands.  Beyond the gesture of opening one’s home, 
hospitality also requires that the host offer nourishment, comfort, and shelter from the 
elements (e.g. food and drink, rest, warm dry clothing, a bath, etc.).  The offering of 
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material comforts is also of benefit to the Host. As Levinas observes, “…in order that I 
be able to free myself from the very possession that the welcome of the Home 
establishes, in order that I be able see things in themselves, that is, represent them to 
myself, refuse both enjoyment and possession, I must know how to give what I possess” 
(170-171).  In this way, hospitality is not only of immediate material benefit to the guest, 
but also the host, who is separated from the demands of material possession. This 
newfound freedom, however, engendered by hospitality-through-language and 
separation from possession, produces an ethical problem in that the self now 
comprehends that the exercise of freedom is potentially unethical.  As D.J. Gauthier, in 
his reading of Levinas, suggests, “The self’s discovery of the ethically problematic 
consequences of its freedom constitutes the decisive stage in its transformation from an 
egoistical being to an altruistic servant of the other” (164).  
Derrida extends this discussion by suggesting that the very possibility of 
hospitality makes it impossible. In other words, I am only able to offer hospitality to 
another if I am “at home”—that is, if my authority springs from my autochthony, then I 
cannot completely and totally give to the stranger, as the Law of hospitality would have 
me do, nor can I completely and totally open my home, thereby exposing myself to 
potential violence, as the Law would have me do, for either would negate my ability to 
offer hospitality at all. This essential tension is what Derrida describes as the 
“undecidability” of the matter. The paradox of hospitality is that for an ethical 
relationship to exist (thereby making transcendence possible), we must dispossess 
ourselves of the very material objects that provide us the ability to offer hospitality at all; 
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we must open ourselves to the violence that would destroy our home, our dwelling. In 
Derrida’s line of thinking, limiting hospitality is what we both cannot and must do.13 The 
institutions to which Levinas refers threaten hospitality just as they make it possible. 
Derrida famously examines this paradox in Of Hospitality:  
It is as though hospitality were the impossible: as though the law of hospitality 
defined this very impossibility, as if it were only possible to transgress it, as 
though the law of absolute, unconditional, hyperbolical hospitality, as though the 
categorical imperative of hospitality commanded that we transgress all the laws 
(in the plural) of hospitality, namely, the conditions, the norms, the rights and the 
duties that are imposed on hosts and hostesses, on the men or women who give a 
welcome as well as the men or women who receive it . And vice versa, it is as 
though the laws (plural) of hospitality, in marking limits, powers, rights, and 
duties, consisted in challenging and transgressing the law of hospitality, the one 
that would command that the “new arrival” be offered unconditional welcome. 
(75-77) 
Derrida’s writings on hospitality have opened several new avenues of thought, as 
difficult and intricate as they might be; the seeming result of these avenues is a Mobius-
strip line of reasoning in which we come to understand that the very material conditions 
that make hospitality possible at all also make hospitality—in its truest, most essential 
sense—completely impossible. This impossibility of hospitality invites the melancholic  
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conversion of an absence into a loss. Modernism is prone to defining itself through an 
ethical commitment to its losses. If committed to an inauthentic idealization of loss, this 
melancholia becomes irresolvable. 
  
The Structure of Hospitality 
 If we desire to embark on this discussion from a point of consensus, however, the 
place from which to commence would be by examining the history of the word 
hospitality, which although not contested, does trace a puzzling trajectory. Hospitality as 
practiced in contemporary culture—that free fellowship so lauded by Gabriel Conroy—
is quite different than hospitality as practiced at the dawn of Western culture. The 
present-day concept of the giving of food, drink, and rest is rooted in ancient concepts of 
social control, economic exchange, power relations, obligation, and threat of violence.  
The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that “guest” is a cognate of “host,” with 
both words tracing their roots to the Latin hospes, which the OED defines as “possibly 
meaning host, guest, stranger, foreigner.” One could infer, then, that in the Greco-
Roman world, there was little use in distinguishing between host and guest; both parties 
are committed to the protocol of hospitality. The fine delineation between “stranger,” 
“guest,” and “enemy” becomes less clear when considering that the Latin hostis refers to 
“enemy” or “stranger” (thereby giving us hostile), and that a homonym for host—“host” 
as the Eucharistic bread—comes also from hostia, or “sacrifice, victim.” The etymology 
would indicate that the original conceptions of guest and host were not as clearly 
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oppositional as we currently conceive them; hostia, hostis, and hospes could all 
potentially be applied to a stranger. 
In Indo-European Language and Society, Émile Benveniste devotes significant 
attention to a number of terms that describe institutions of “welcoming and reciprocity” 
that allow members of a given culture the ability to find hospitality in one another, but 
also societies of different kinds to enter into alliances and formal exchanges (83). He 
observes that the term hospes is actually a compound of *hosti-pet-s; whereas the former 
component refers generally to “guest,” the latter component designates “master.”  The 
literal meaning of hospes, then, would be “the guest-master.”14 
The meaning of the former part of the compound, *hosti-, is, however, 
problematic. As Benveniste observes, “‘stranger, enemy, guest’ are global notions of a 
somewhat vague character, and they demand precision by interpretation in their 
historical and social contexts” (75). The Latin hostis, for example, originally meant 
“stranger” but came to acquire a more specific meaning as “enemy” over time.15 The key 
to unraveling this particular etymological knot, according to Benveniste, is the 
observation that most of the Latin terms related to our contemporary conception of 
hospitality conveyed in varying degrees a sense of compensation and equalization. For 
instance, in agriculture, the term hostus refers to the amount of olive oil obtained from a 
single pressing; hostorium is a stick used for a bushel measure, to ensure consistency and 
equality in basket loads. A lesser-known part of the Roman pantheon was Dea Hostilina, 
who was responsible for equalizing the size of ears of corn and ensuring that one’s hard 
work in the fields was fairly compensated at harvest. Previously mentioned is hostia, 
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which refers to a ritual victim offered to appease the anger of the gods (76). This latter 
notion exists in current use as host, referring to the consecrated wafer of the Eucharist. 
Benveniste’s research reveals that in its ancient form, hostis denotes only the 
stranger who is recognized as eligible for same rights as Roman citizens, as contrasted to 
peregrinus, which refers to a “foreigner” or “traveler;” in the early Roman empire, the 
term referred to a subject of the empire who was not a Roman citizen. Therefore, hostis 
refers only to a stranger of a certain sort—a foreigner who has entered into a pact of 
reciprocity with Rome (what could be considered a pact or treaty).16 This same sense 
exists in the Greek xénos, which defines a relationship of mutual reciprocity between 
two men of the similar standing. The literal exchange of gifts itself—xenía—is a 
mutually agreeable pact not only between the two parties, but their heirs as well. As 
noted classical scholar M.I. Finley writes in The World of Odysseus, the modern notion 
of a “gift” and its meaning in the ancient world differ considerably:  
It may be stated as a flat rule of both primitive and archaic society that no one 
ever gave anything, whether goods or services or honors, without proper 
recompense, real or wishful, immediate or years away, to himself of to his kin. 
The act of giving was, therefore, in an essential sense always the first half of a 
reciprocal action, the other half of which was a counter-gift. 
(64)  
As mercantile as this practice may seem to present-day Christmas and birthday 
enthusiasts, networks of reciprocity were the means by which civil order was 
maintained.  
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Over time, however, this sense of obligatory reciprocity eventually became 
obsolete.  Benveniste writes, “When an ancient society becomes a nation, the relations 
between man and man, clan and clan, are abolished.  All that persists is the distinction 
between what is inside and outside the civitas” (78).  As a result of the rise of the nation-
state, the sense of “ritual friend” faded from hostis, leaving only the sense of “stranger,” 
thus implying hostility, and resulting in the classical meaning of the word, “enemy.”  
The common notion of hospitality then resided solely in hospes, “the guest-master.”  
Likewise, the xénos (guest) of Homer eventually devolved into simply “stranger” (79).  
At first glance, that the word history of hospitality could involve such opposing 
meanings as “welcome” and “hostility” is entirely confounding.17 By considering 
evolving usages in their historical contexts, however, we can observe how the 
responsibility of kinship-making and treaty formation migrated from the individual 
“master” of the house/family/clan to the authority of the state.18  Establishing such 
boundaries was now a political action.19 In this way, we can conceive an “economy” of 
ethics that depends on the exchange of obligations between individuals and states; as 
shall be demonstrated in my discussion of Joyce below, pledging fidelity to hospitality 
means willingly entering this economy, and by refusing to participate, one refuses 
hospitality. Melancholic attachments to inauthentic ideals problematizes this exchange. 
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Hospitality in Homeric and Biblical Texts 
The melancholic attachment to hospitality is representative of the desire to 
sustain a commitment to the stability of historical authenticity, particularly because 
many notions of its practice originate from the ur-texts of Western culture. In the ancient 
world, hospitality was a fundamental moral practice that not only maintained a level of 
basic well-being and order, but also sustained communities and provided networks that 
created culture (Pohl 17). As indicated above, the lineage of hospitality in Western 
literature begins with the classical Greek concept of xenia, a proper code of ethics for 
dealing with xenos, which can be translated as either stranger or “ritual friend.”20 In 
Classical society, wayfarers occupied a special place, for they were thought to be 
completely helpless and therefore under the special protection of Zeus. The institution of 
hospitality, then, was a specific religio-moral practice that distinguished Greek culture as 
an advanced civilization in comparison to more hostile, and therefore “primitive,” 
cultures (Oden 18).  For instance, in the Odyssey it is notable that men are judged most 
severely not by their physical prowess or by their abilities as a warrior—they are judged 
by their hospitality, a peace-time virtue. Hospitality was not only an important means for 
an individual to display his wealth and generosity (and, therefore, status), but also in an 
era before the polis, hospitality was a means of forging alliances and maintaining 
peace—a cosmopolitan practice in the Kantian sense. As Finley writes, “Guest-friend 
and guest-friendship were far more than sentimental terms of human affection… they 
were technical names for very concrete relationships” (123). So although the specific 
meaning and practice of hospitality has certainly evolved over time, it has consistently 
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remained a means of ritualizing and defining the status of friendship. One can 
appreciate, then, why it becomes a focus of Modernist melancholia, which in the face of 
the utter uncertainty of modernity refuses to relinquish the past.  
Much of our understanding of Ancient Greek culture is derived from Homeric 
texts, which prominently feature hospitality scenes: in his extensive study of Homeric 
hospitality scenes, Steve Reece accounts for 18 such scenes in works attributed to 
Homer, twelve of which appear in the Odyssey (5).21  The events of these hospitality 
scenes are notable in that they are composed of overly formal diction and are arranged in 
a fixed order, thus implying ritualism inherent in the act of giving and receiving 
hospitality in the Ancient Greek world. Reece identifies 38 elements that occur 
repeatedly in the given hospitality scenes (he also notes that not all 38 elements appear 
in any single given scene, although the elements that do appear always appear in the 
same order) (6-7). In reviewing these elements, a clear-cut code of etiquette begins to 
emerge. First, the stranger waits at the threshold of the house until either invited inside 
by the master of the house or sent away. If the visitor is a social equal to the host, he 
stands at the threshold; if he is an inferior, come to beg or in supplication, he sits at the 
threshold in a posture of submission. When acknowledged, the host welcomes the 
visitor, takes him by the hand, relieves him of his spear, and leads him into the home. 
Once inside the home, the guest is offered a seat, usually in a position of honor. This 
offer to rest is typically followed by a feast of some sort, at which the guest is often 
showered with excessive hospitality.22 
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Only after the guest has rested, been fed, and offered drink does the host enquire 
as to the guest’s identity, place of origin, and reason for travel.23 As Reece writes, “The 
revelation of a guest’s identity is perhaps the most critical element in the development of 
a relationship of xenia, for it is the vital link that guarantees the host reciprocal 
hospitality in the future” (25). For this reason, the revelation of the guest’s identity is a 
formulaic, ritualistic affair. In Homeric hospitality scenes, the guests are frequently 
savvy enough to emphasize the host’s obligation of hospitality by also identifying 
kinship between the host and guest (whether as familial relations or as hospitality 
previously offered or accepted by an ancestor or relative). 
The guest reciprocates the offer of hospitality by providing news from abroad, 
entertainment or a story, or even a blessing upon the host and home. Zeus, as patron of 
strangers and travelers, is typically invoked. Once the exchanges have occurred, the 
guest is symbolically welcomed into the host’s community, so to speak. As Reece 
stresses, “perhaps the most symbolically powerful gesture of a host’s willingness to 
incorporate a stranger into the community, to transform an outsider into an insider, is an 
invitation to participate in the community’s religious rituals” (30). This offer can take 
the form of libations or even a sacrifice. 
In the case of extremely generous hosts, the guest must actually alert his host that 
the time has come to sleep. This element occurs in situations where the host’s efforts to 
be hospitable are well in excess of the guest’s expectations or needs. Frequently, the 
guest is offered a bath, ranging from a simple offer to bathe one’s feet to a ritualistic 
bath involving a tripod, anointing oils, and new clothes. Before he departs, the guest is 
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offered a gift by the host, which serves as material representation of the new bond that 
exists between them. Further, this gift also materially represents the reciprocity expected 
by the host, should the need arise in the future. Especially notable gifts are those that 
have been “re-gifted,” or received by the host as a guest-gift in a previous, historical 
instance of hospitality.24 
These essential elements of hospitality also feature prominently in Biblical texts. 
Several narratives in the Old Testament portray hospitality in practice, echoing the core 
themes and tensions present in Classical examples. The most prominent example occurs 
in Genesis 18, wherein three strangers appear at the tent of Abraham:  
He looked up and saw three men standing near him. When he saw them, he ran 
from the tent entrance to meet them, and bowed down to the ground. He said, 
“My lord, if I find favor with you, do not pass by your servant. Let a little water 
be brought, and wash your feet, and rest yourselves under the three. Let me bring 
a little bread, that you may refresh yourselves, and after that you may pass on—
since you have come to your servant.” 
(Genesis 18: 2-5)25 
Abraham then instructs his wife, Sarah, and his servant to prepare bread and a calf, 
respectively. Once the strangers have eaten, one remarks, “I will surely return to you in 
due season, and your wife Sarah will have a son,” an especially generous offer, 
considering that Sarah is well beyond the age of childbearing (Gen. 18: 10-11). 
Furthermore, the reader learns that not only will Abraham and Sarah be blessed with a 
son, but he shall also establish a “great and mighty nation” (Gen 18: 18). 
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Although brief, this narrative contains many elements similar to those found in 
Homeric hospitality scenes. First, we see that Abraham offers hospitality to the strangers 
immediately and without question; he does not interrogate them as to their purpose or 
place of origin. Secondly, as in the Greek epic form, Abraham provides the strangers 
with a place to rest, a means of bathing, and food and drink before any formal “business” 
is addressed. Lastly, Abraham receives a blessing in return for his hospitality (in this 
particular instance, Isaac). In particular, the Lord (one of the strangers, now identified) is 
keen to reward Abraham for his “righteousness and justice,” which will be passed on to 
his descendants (Gen. 18: 19). In this way, the social convention is perpetuated not only 
as a matter of etiquette or ethics, but a moral imperative. 
So as not to be overlooked this latter point is immediately driven home by means 
of contrast with the people of Sodom and Gamorrah, about whom the Lord has received 
reports of wickedness and whom he has come to cast judgment upon. In Genesis 19, two 
of the strangers (now identified as “angels”) arrive in Sodom and are greeted by Lot in 
an almost identical fashion to Abraham. The point of contrast in this episode, however, 
occurs when the men of Sodom surround Lot’s home and demand that the strangers be 
given up so that they may “know” them (Gen. 19: 4-5). This scene is frequently cited as 
an example of Biblical disapproval of homosexuality; however, the primary purpose is to 
underscore the sanctity of hospitality. So crucial is the safety and well-being of his 
guests that Lot offers up two virgin daughters in their place—he offers to make an 
ultimate sacrifice for the sake of hospitality. To modern eyes, this offer may seem 
repulsive or immoral, but it does underscore the importance of the law of hospitality.  
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His offer of extreme hospitality is denied, however, and the angels intervene to blind the 
madding crowd. In the end, Lot is rewarded with his life for his hospitality, and in 
punishment for their inhospitality, the people of Sodom and Gomorrah suffer “sulfur and 
fire from the Lord out of heaven” (Gen 19: 24).26 
We see in these examples of hospitality from Homer and the Bible many obvious 
similarities. Most interesting to consider, however, is the gulf that exists between our 
present-day practices of hospitality and those of the ancient world. A key component of 
ancient hospitality is that it is offered unconditionally and as an act of religious 
obedience. Over time, we see hospitality becoming increasingly “institutionalized,” 
becoming a realm of the church and the state. In the modern world, segregated as it is by 
its borders and mandated points of egress, rarely is an individual presented with an 
absolute stranger at the door of his or her dwelling. 
 
Modern/ist Melancholia and the Failure “Hospitality”  
Xenia—the Homeric notion of hospitality—was close at hand in Joyce’s various 
appropriations of Greek precedent. Approaching “The Dead” from this perspective, we 
can see that the “traditional Irish” hospitality featured in the central scene of the story is 
actually not hospitality in the original Homeric sense. In this way, Joyce offers a critique 
of the modern desperation to maintain fidelity to what it is perceived as lost.27 
As Mary Power points out, Gabriel Conroy’s hospitality toast acquires additional 
meaning when read against its contemporary context; the subject of fading traditions had 
been a hot topic in the press throughout 1904 (109). Numerous articles from the era 
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lament the apparent death of hospitality, no more vehemently, perhaps, than Marie 
Corelli’s aptly named pamphlet, “The Death of Hospitality.”28 In this short but vigorous 
piece, Corelli eviscerates “new” concepts of hospitality and laments that traditional 
“hospitality, large-hearted, smiling gracious Hospitality, is dead and wrapped in its 
grave-clothes, waiting in stiff corpse-like state for its final burial” (89-90). As Power 
argues, the powerful rhetoric throughout the pamphlet bears an uncanny resemblance to 
Gabriel’s remarks. For instance, Gabriel comments, “I sometimes fear that this new 
generation, educated or hypereducated as it is, will lack those qualities of humanity, of 
hospitality, of kindly humor which belonged to an older day” (D 203). In her pamphlet, 
Corelli muses, “What do we mean by Hospitality? Surely we mean friendship, kindness, 
personal interest, and warm-hearted openness of look and conduct…” (95). Eulogizing 
the past in this way—that is, by grieving a “more hospitable” (i.e. more Irish) past—is a 
melancholic act in that it treats a lack as loss. 
This expression of grief is also melancholic in that it creates the lost object, as in 
the sentiments of both Corelli and Gabriel Conroy, we find misappropriation of the term 
“hospitality.” I would agree with Mahaffey’s argument that “Joyce, in the wake of 
Homer, understood genuine hospitality as something very different than what is 
presented in ‘The Dead’” (27). As she writes, classical hospitality is “a perfect equipoise 
between opposite extremes, in this case foreigner and native, that grows out of humility” 
and that through rituals of hospitality, “the distinction between stranger and friend is 
eradicated” (28-29). In other words, the ritual of hospitality is meant to equalize stranger 
and host. The Feast of the Epiphany party of “The Dead” is not, then, an example of true 
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hospitality, for it is comprised only of friends and relatives (philos); there are no 
strangers, no xenos, to receive the hospitality, no power relationships to equalize. It is 
rather, as Gabriel suggests, an act of “camaraderie.”29 
I argue that this dissonance with Homeric hospitality is precisely what the story 
offers and that Joyce extends it as a critique of melancholic fidelity to idealized losses, 
particularly losses pressed into service to nationalism. In an oft-quoted letter written to 
his brother Stanislaus on September 25, 1906, James mentions his dissatisfaction with 
Dubliners before the addition of “The Dead:” “Sometimes thinking of Ireland it seems to 
me that I have been unnecessarily harsh…. I have not reproduced [Dublin’s] ingenuous 
insularity and its hospitality. The latter ‘virtue’ so long as I can see does not exist 
elsewhere in Europe” (166). The quotations (or “perverted commas,” as Joyce called 
them) around “virtue” indicate irony.30 Of the many Irish stereotypes in existence is the 
conception of Irish hospitality, an image that paints the Irish as a merry class of people, 
veritable Hobbits who are quick to share a song and a pint, who are eager to sit by the 
hearth and spin a yarn for a weary traveler and impart some golden nugget of folksy 
wisdom before sending the intrepid voyager back out into the cosmopole to confront the 
dreary realities of modern urbanity.31 Living as I do in a post-Riverdance, post-Angela's 
Ashes world, I may be overstating the case, but it is safe to say that Joyce was also 
cognizant of and perhaps burdened by nostalgia and sentimental clichés about Ireland, 
promoted in large part by the Irish nationalist movement. As Oona Frawley points out, at 
the time that Joyce was crafting “The Dead,” idealizations of pastoral Ireland were 
becoming commonplace among urban intellectual nationalists: “…to be in Ireland—and, 
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perhaps, particularly Dublin—of 1904 was to be pummeled with the idea of rural Ireland 
being real Ireland, the seat of some essentialist Irish spirit connected to land and nature 
in an intimate way” (110-111). In similar fashion to Howards End, we observe that 
nostalgia can quickly become melancholy, specifically Žižek’s articulation of 
melancholy, in that one’s sense of “Englishness” or “Irishness” becomes wed to 
idealized conceptions of the past. The melancholia depicted in Forster’s work—quite 
intentionally and with a strong sense of irony—glosses over the perils of modern 
industrial society and the evils of imperialism. In similar fashion, Joyce is well aware 
that the Irish idyll certainly never existed, especially when read against the history of the 
fairly recent famine and the centuries of brutal colonial rule (imperialism, for Kant, was 
a version of abusing hospitality, overstaying welcome). The melancholic performance of 
hospitality (if we read it as homage to “tradition”) thus produces fidelity to an 
inauthentic object of desire. 
This sort of attachment to an inauthentic image of the past is typically referred to 
as “nostalgia.” We find it performed most powerfully in “The Dead” by Miss Ivors, a 
member of the Dublin intelligentsia who speaks fluent Irish, is planning a month-long 
holiday to the (pastoral) Aran Islands, and refers to Gabriel as a “West Briton,” shaming 
him for writing for The Daily Express, a British publication (110). Gabriel’s lack of 
“Irishness” would not necessarily be problematic, however, if he did not so put on airs in 
extolling the “genuine warm-hearted courteous Irish hospitality” in his after-dinner 
speech (203). And while his rhetoric represents his commitment to the pastoral ideal, his 
actions—shrewdly critiqued by Miss Ivors—suggest that Gabriel entertains no such 
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nationalistic illusions; in fact, he seems to explicitly reject “Ireland,” the idealized 
conception that he honors in his speech, in favor of a more cosmopolitan existence, 
rejecting a trip to the west of Ireland in favor of a “cycling tour” to France and Belgium 
“partly to keep in touch with the language and partly for a change” (189). When Miss 
Ivors interrogates this position, Gabriel admits, “‘O, to tell you the truth…I’m sick of my 
own country’” (189). When she presses further, however, Gabriel cannot explain why he 
is so sick of Ireland, and his hospitality speech would suggest that he does suffer some 
anxiety of nostalgic impulse. I read Gabriel’s duplicity as a means by which Joyce is 
able to air conflicted thoughts on hospitality, especially the “traditional” (i.e. nostalgic) 
hospitality promoted in his native land in balance with the patterns of emigration and 
exile in post-Famine years.32   
The ultimate irony is that while Gabriel seeks to give homage to the tradition of 
Irish hospitality, he does so in the service of an emotional expulsion of the prime 
proponent of “Irishness,” Miss Ivors; thus, he occupies a conflicted position in which his 
original attempt to integrate the other into his nostalgic perception of hospitality actually 
rejects the other, who, in the case of Miss Ivors, did not comply to his version of 
“hospitality.”33 By situating a fabricated hospitality as the lost object, Gabriel eliminates 
the possibility of an ethical relationship with an Other. We will see this act continued, 
challenged, and upended in a later scene with his wife, Gretta, which I will shortly 
discuss. 
In reference to Žižek’s concept of “the remainder,” or that part of the lost object 
that cannot be integrated or worked through, we hear Gabriel note in his speech that, 
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“…there are always in gatherings such as this sadder thoughts that will recur to our 
minds: thoughts of the past, of youth, of changes, of absent faces that we miss here 
tonight” (204). His reference—especially at such a happy event—is the symptom of the 
pathologic self-reproach that Freud identified as a melancholic tendency. Knowing what 
we do about Joyce’s plan for the story (and, for that matter, Dubliners as a whole), we 
can justifiably infer that Gabriel’s melancholy is representative of a perceived cultural 
tendency in Dublin as a whole. As Karen R. Lawrence writes, Joyce’s Dublin is “a place 
where the dead brood over the living, haunting the homefront and estranging it from 
itself” (137). In Joyce’s Dublin, the past and the present, the living and the dead, are 
unresolved extremes—strangers not equalized through hospitality (which is impossible 
in nostalgic hospitality, as it cannot properly acknowledge strangers).  Knowing that one 
has experienced a loss does not necessarily promise that one is cognizant of what has 
been lost; this concept of an unidentified lack is often described as “gnomon,” a term 
that appears in “The Sisters,” the opening story of Dubliners.34 In Euclidian geometry, 
the gnomon is a missing portion of a geometric figure, discernable by the shape of what 
remains. As applied to human psychology, the conception is that one may determine 
meaning and describe what is lacking by considering what remains, a truly nostalgic 
thought. If we are to take Gabriel Conroy at his word, this missing part, this gnomon, is 
traditional Irish hospitality. Žižek, however, also argues that a refusal on the part of the 
melancholic subject to process a loss through mourning often “takes the form of its very 
opposite, a faked spectacle of the excessive, superfluous mourning for an object even 
before this object is lost” (661).35 While Gabriel, and, by inference, his contemporaries 
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are quick to mourn the loss of hospitality, their attempt to do so is essentially 
melancholic; they mourn an ideal that never existed, for the “Irish” form of hospitality 
that they practice is narcissistic, exclusionary, and, therefore, unethical.  
 
Ethical Hospitality and the Economics of Obligation 
By comparison, the ritual of hospitality performed by Leopold Bloom towards 
Stephen Dedalus in the “Ithaca” episode of Joyce’s later work, Ulysses, can be described 
as “true,” or Homeric hospitality. The relationship created between Bloom (as host) and 
Stephen (as stranger) requires activation of a hospitality ritual; the question is whether 
Bloom will activate “nostalgic” or Homeric hospitality. But as Constance V. Tagopoulos 
writes, “Ithaca” is “focused on the hero's homecoming, restarting, in Joycean terms, the 
Viconian argument that basic experiences and situations recur through history” (185). It 
would seem that the novel thus far has been preparing the way for a Homeric ritual, one 
that would seek to equalize Bloom as host and Stephen as guest.36  
Bloom faithfully follows many of the proscribed elements of xenia, as illustrated 
by the Odyssey and described by Reece. He offers Stephen refuge, refreshment, a bath, 
gifts, and, even, a bed. The catechistic narrator of “Ithaca” points to such acts directly. I 
quote from three successive questions: “What supererogatory marks of special 
hospitality did the host show his guest?” (17:359-60). Next, “Was the guest conscious of 
and did he acknowledge these marks of hospitality?” (17:366-67). And lastly, “Were 
there marks of hospitality which he contemplated but suppressed, reserving them for 
another and for himself of future occasions to complete the act begun”? (17:371-73). In 
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answer to the first question, we learn that Bloom has forgone his favorite cup in favor of 
“a cup identical with that of his guest” and, with the hot cocoa, he serves, 
“extraordinarily…and, in reduced measure, to himself the viscous cream ordinarily 
reserved for the breakfast of his wife Marion (Molly)” (17:363-65). The “exceptional” 
hospitality extended to Stephen could be compared to the example of “exceptional” 
hospitality shown by Telemachus to Athena (who is disguised as Mentes) in Book I of 
the Odyssey.37 Bloom’s actions are an attempt to equalize the relationship between 
himself—the host—and Stephen—the guest.  
 Stephen, however, flatly refuses much of Bloom’s hospitality. First, he declines 
the ritual bath (“What reason did Stephen give for declining Bloom’s offer?” That he 
was hydrophobe, hating partial contact by immersion or total by submersion in cold 
water…” (17:236-238)).  Later, when Bloom offers to Stephen that he “pass in repose 
the hours intervening between Thursday (proper) and Friday (normal) on an 
extemporized cubicle in the apartment immediately above the kitchen…,” Stephen 
“promptly, inexplicably, with amicability, gratefully” declines this ritual offer of a bed 
(17:931-933 and 955). Bloom is exemplary in his performance of Classical hospitality, 
having not only equalized himself with his guest, but offered refreshment, rest, and even 
a bath—yet Stephen refuses to participate in the ritual. Perhaps it is this refused union 
that prompts Rabaté cryptically to offer the following: “One can therefore claim that 
Ulysses is a great novel of hospitality because it demonstrates the impossibility of 
hospitality” (160). “Ithaca” creates a possibility, but it ends in disunion. The most 
nagging question, here, one that Ulysses leaves unanswered (despite the promise that the 
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“Ithaca” chapter is the “key” to the novel, the episode that answers all questions posed 
by the book) is why, exactly, Stephen refuses Bloom’s hospitality, why he refuses to 
participate in xenia. It would seem that Stephen, as a (notoriously) classically educated 
person would recognize and appreciate the virtue and ethics of a hospitality ritual. Yet, 
he “inexplicably” declines Bloom’s offer. 
Insight on this conundrum can be found by placing “The Dead” in dialogue with 
the “Ithaca” episode. In his after-dinner speech, Gabriel Conroy attempts a joke when he 
remarks, “…we have been the recipients—or perhaps, I had better say, the victims—of 
the hospitality of certain good ladies…” (202, emphasis mine).  This comment touches 
on a remarkable truth and also perhaps suggests why Stephen would refuse Bloom’s 
hospitality. As mentioned earlier, a fine distinction exists between hospes, hostis, and 
hostia.  
One way to understand the differences is to examine reciprocity, and one way 
better to understand reciprocity, oddly enough, is to examine the word “parasite,” which 
comes from the Greek parasitos, which literally translates as “next to” (para-) “grain” or 
“food” (sitos). As J. Hillis Miller observes, in its original usage, “parasite” had positive 
connotations, for to be a parasite was to be a dinner guest, one with whom the host is 
sharing food. Over time, however, the word acquired a negative meaning, used to 
describe a perpetual dinner guest, one who never extends an invitation to dinner in return 
(442).38 The host, then, not only dines alongside the parasite, but is also its source of 
sustenance, to the point that the host is being drained of resources without compensation. 
In other words, if a guest does not reciprocate the hospitality—as directed under xenia—
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then he or she becomes a parasite, or the victim of an act of hospitality that they do not 
intend to reciprocate. Edward Brandabur observes that, “spiritual parasitism is a central 
experience of Joyce's Dubliners.” He goes on to suggest that Joyce's characters are 
unable to craft satisfactory lives of their own and therefore feed on “the real or imagined 
strength of those they envy and despise” (109).  It is this quality, very likely, that Joyce 
had recognized and sought to exploit in Dubliners. Brandabur continues: “The living 
feed on the dead, the dead on the living. The lives of others keep Dublin alive, even in its 
supposedly most gratifying aspect, the hospitality which Joyce felt obliged to honor, 
however ambiguously” (110).  The melancholic hospitality practiced by those at the 
dinner party of “The Dead” (and, by extension, all Dubliners) is not reciprocal, but 
parasitic.  
Both etymologically and conceptually, hospitality has a double meaning. As 
Miller suggests, “The relation of household master offering hospitality to a guest and the 
guest receiving it, of host and parasite in the original sense of ‘fellow guest,’ is inclosed 
within the word ‘host' itself’” (442). In other words, because there can be no host 
without a parasite or vice versa, to be involved in an act of hospitality (melancholic or 
not) is to become duplicitous—that is, in the sense of being twofold in meaning, to the 
point of internal contradiction. Whether or not one recognizes this duality is another 
matter: Gabriel Conroy generally disregards his duplicity, and his epiphany occurs when, 
at the conclusion of “The Dead,” he comes to recognize the stranger within himself.  
Doubleness of meaning, or perhaps, more accurately, doubleness of 
understanding, is an essential concern of both “The Dead” and “Ithaca,” for it explains 
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the reactions that their respective protagonists have to the model of hospitality deployed 
in their texts. Mahaffey argues that the “emotional intensity of Joyce’s lyrical ending 
depends on this doubleness of signification” (29).  As the central symbol of “The Dead, 
the falling snow represents the duplicity of hospitality. Throughout the story the snow 
functions to draw a contrast between “inside” and “outside.”39 For instance, as Gabriel 
rehearses his upcoming hospitality speech, he observes the snow through the window: 
Gabriel’s warm trembling fingers tapped the cold pane of the window. How cool 
it must be outside! How pleasant it would be to walk out alone, first along the 
river and then through the park! [...] How much more pleasant it would be there 
than at the supper table!” (192). 
Gabriel occupies a duplicitous position with respect to nostalgic hospitality; although he 
sings its praises in his after-dinner speech, he also comments that he is “sick” of Ireland. 
He is an avowed cosmopolite, yet he sides with tradition against the Modernism 
represented by Molly Ivors, with her ostentatious “Irish device,” a symbol of her 
nostalgic strain of nationalism.40 In the latter portions of the story, however, we begin to 
understand that his preference for tradition is not a commitment to the idea of it, but 
rather a sort of paralysis that is committed to the past in general. As he and his wife 
depart from the party, Gabriel melancholically ruminates on his past: 
A wave of yet more tender joy escaped from his heart and went coursing in warm 
flood along his arteries. Like the tender fires of stars moments of their lives 
together, that no one knew of or would ever know of, broke upon and illuminated  
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his memory. He longed to recall to her those moments, to make her forget the 
years of their dull existence together and remember only their moments of 
ecstasy. 
(214) 
From here, Gabriel begins to imagine the upcoming intimacy that they will share in their 
hotel room, his lust fueled by—of all things—melancholia. When he attempts to extend 
his desire to Gretta in a distorted act of hospitality, he is frustrated by her lack of 
acknowledgement of his “gift.” Instead, Gretta is herself engaged in her own grieving, 
recalling the death of Michael Furey, her first love. Gabriel’s love, his desire for his 
wife, read as melancholic hospitality, eliminates the possibility of an ethical relationship 
with his wife. As Marian Eide argues, in Ethical Joyce, “the first ethical consideration” 
in Joyce’s work is the “preservation of difference within a context of response or 
responsibility” (7).  Gabriel does not see Gretta as an Other, for in his melancholy, 
Gabriel has grafted his phantasmal concept of her and their past together to his ego. If 
they cannot stand apart as Self and Other, then they cannot enter xenia, or a hospitable 
relationship that creates the possibility for reciprocity. Melancholic attachment would 
seek to integrate the other into the ego, conflating self and other and thereby eliminating 
the possibility of hospitality and, thereby, an ethical relationship. 
As stated, however, Gabriel’s epiphanic moment is a recognition of true 
hospitality, and it occurs when he embraces his own duality, thereby recognizing in 
himself both guest and host.41 Furthermore, his realization of “how poor a part” he had 
played in his wife’s romantic history actually opens the possibility for hospitality, as it 
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disengages him from the melancholic incorporation of Gretta’s other into his nostalgic 
self and re-establishes Gabriel and Gretta as strangers: “He watched her while she slept 
as though he and she had never lived together as man and wife” (222). By recognizing 
that his own nostalgia, his dependence on inauthentic creations of the past, Gabriel 
begins to reconcile himself with a deeper past of which he had previously no notion 
(Rabaté, Egoism 156).  In the final two paragraphs of “The Dead,” Gabriel experiences 
his epiphany and realizes his love for his wife. Through the window, he spies “the form 
of young man standing under a tree,” a form that could be a ghost.42 His identity (i.e. 
ego) fades, “out into a grey impalpable world,” and he watches as the snow falls faintly 
(D 42). He recalls an earlier comment that the snow is “general all over Ireland,” thereby 
equalizing the Modern and the pastoral, the strange and the familiar, the living and the 
dead.  The concluding image of the story draws a contrast between the nostalgic, 
exclusionary hospitality practiced earlier and the true hospitality that Gabriel has come 
to understand as a process of recognizing alterity, in oneself as well as others.43 To see 
oneself as a potential guest or stranger allows for true hospitality, which depends also on 
understanding of reciprocity, the ability to imagine one’s self also as the host.44 
Therefore, one can simultaneously be both “inside” and “outside.” 
This matter of “inside” versus “outside” is a prevalent theme in Ulysses, as well. 
Whereas in “The Dead,” Gabriel Conroy’s epiphany moves from “inside” to “outside,” 
in “Ithaca,” Bloom’s ritual of hospitality offers Stephen the reverse of the same 
opportunity, to move from “outside” to “inside.” Read in this way, however, Stephen’s 
refusal becomes all the more perplexing. J. Hillis Miller writes that, “Gift-giving is the 
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binding or sealing of that relation of reciprocal obligation expressed in the word ‘host,’ 
but it is also apotropaic, the warding off of the evil the parasite may do you or the evil 
your host may somehow do you if you do not recompense him for feeding you” (446). 
Stephen understands the classical world well enough to know what true hospitality 
requires; he does not wish to enter the economy of reciprocity. To point, our narrator 
offers, “What various advantages would or might have resulted from a prolongation of 
such an extemporization?” Among the possible “advantages” are, for Leopold Bloom, “a 
rejuvenation of intelligence, vicarious satisfaction” and for Molly Bloom, “disintegration 
of obsession, acquisition of correct Italian pronunciation” (17:935-939). These 
“advantages” are the obligations faced by Stephen, should he accept the hospitality 
offered him.  
But this point begs the question. Still, we must ask, why does Stephen refuse to 
accept the possibility of obligation? Stephen’s refusal can be interpreted in many ways, 
and because the reader is not granted access to Stephen’s consciousness before he 
departs the novel, we cannot know his conscious motivation for certain.  A simple 
explanation is that Stephen is simply immature and petulant, and lacks the common 
courtesy to graciously accept what he has been offered.  But Joyce takes great pains to 
follow the proscriptions of Classical hospitality, and it is therefore logical to assume that 
Stephen’s refusal would parallel a similar act in Homer’s narrative. I therefore argue that 
Stephen’s rejection of hospitality is analogous to Athena’s refusal of Telemachus’ 
hospitality at the end of the Odyssey. When Telemachus implores her to extend her stay: 
“Although your voyage presses, bathe—/refresh your spirit; then, find gift in hand,/you 
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can with satisfaction sail away,/That gift will be precious, handsome thing,/a keepsake 
such as dear friends give to friends” (1.400-404). Athena replies that she must be on her 
way, but will accept Telemachus’ gift on her return voyage when she will bring with her 
“a gift of equal merit” (1.412). As Reece suggests, as divinity, Athena cannot fully 
participate in xenia, for it would result in “an unacceptable obligation to her host” (56). 
The relationship between gods and mortals cannot be equalized—they offer reciprocity 
in return for sacrifices and offerings. I am not prepared at this point to offer an argument 
that Stephen Daedalus is divine (although he is customarily read as a parallel to 
Telemachus), but I do recognize that in both cases, the strangers recognize that they 
cannot meet their obligation to the host and therefore decline the hospitality offered to 
them.45 True hospitality, “Homeric” hospitality, is ethical for it follows a code under 
which both host and stranger, Self and Other, are treated justly. So, by this same logic, it 
would also be ethical to refuse an obligation that one cannot (or will not) meet.  
By juxtaposing Joyce’s two most obvious treatments of the concept of 
hospitality, we can begin to discern a complicated and nuanced examination of 
hospitality in the context of early twentieth-century modernity.  Although Joyce’s design 
is never as graspable as the reader would perhaps like, an implicit argument does begin 
to take form. The immediate urge is to contrast the critiques of hospitality offered by the 
“The Dead” and in “Ithaca,” with the assumption being that the two are offered in 
opposition to each other. In “The Dead,” we see melancholia performed as nostalgia, an 
allegiance to a misremembered or misunderstood vision of the past. The grief expressed 
over the “death” of hospitality is predicated on a fictive memory of an idyllic Ireland and 
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pressed into service to present desires. Through Gabriel Conroy’s epiphanic recognition 
that his memories of his own relationship with his wife, Gretta, have become 
sentimentalized, the reader begins to perceive the potential for narcissism in 
melancholia. In attempting to maintain fidelity to an object of desire, one grafts it to 
one’s own ego; ethical melancholia, as demonstrated in “true” hospitality, maintains a 
separation of Self and Other.  
And while Stephen’s refusal of Bloom’s hospitality might initially be read as a 
rejection of an ethical mandate, it presents two arguments.  First, Stephen’s refusal 
demonstrates his awareness of the conditions of hospitality—by accepting Bloom’s 
offer, he would then be implicated in the economy of reciprocity formed by the practice 
of hospitality.46 This economy of mutual obligation is the basis of modern society—we 
form communities to not only protect one another but to share resources and 
information. Stephen’s refusal demonstrates his admission that he is neither capable of 
this reciprocity, nor does he wish to become a member of this society. By refusing 
hospitality, Stephen opts for a society formed not from mutual obligations to family, 
religion, community, or country—each of which are determined by birth and are 
conditions of pure chance—but rather a society of his own choosing, a community of 
affinity that is self-consciously above the nation. Stephen is a Modernist subject, one 
who is eager to leave the past behind in favor of a cosmopolitan economy, one that does 
not implicate one in an interlocking chain of pre-determined obligations. 
Secondly, Stephen’s refusal presents an alternative to the “ethical mourning” I 
previously discussed, in which fidelity to the lost object is maintained in order to sustain 
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awareness of the loss.  In many cases, the loss of an important ideal or an instance of 
great trauma should not be grieved, resolved, and forgotten. One can find in Bloom’s 
exemplary hospitality fidelity to “true” Abrahamic hospitality—which, for its 
authenticity, we assume to be the superior mode of being. Furthermore, however, 
Bloom’s urgency to have Stephen stay in his home also indicates Bloom’s own 
unresolved grief for the loss of his son—his desire to have Stephen reside in his home is 
a means of resuscitating his lost child. This offer of hospitality, then, becomes an act of 
fidelity to his own losses. Stephen’s refusal—which is essentially a refusal to be 
detained on his journey—also suggests Joyce’s refusal of a false dilemma that one must 
either choose sustained fidelity to the past or accept consolation for its passing. Instead, 
Stephen’s refusal to participate in the economy of reciprocity that hospitality mandates 
posits an alternative pathway, one that rejects the closed loop of this economy. Eide has 
observed that, for Joyce, Dublin is suffused by a tyranny in which “subjects are not 
precisely citizens, in which the individual has no voice in the polity” (319).  Complying 
with the edicts of hospitality would signal Stephen’s submission to this tyranny, and the 
warning is clear: if we are to hold dear to (what we believe to be) the past, then we must 
also endure the negative repercussions of what the past brings with it. This desire for 
resolution signals an alternative to melancholia, in that it seeks not consolation and 
release of the lost object, nor does it insist upon on the sustainment of grief. Stephen’s 
departure signals a break entirely with the obligations of the past. 
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Notes
1 Recall Kern’s assertion that the “assault on a universal, unchanging, and irreversible public time was the 
metaphysical foundation of a broad cultural challenge to traditional notions about the nature of the world 
and man’s place in it” (314).  
 
2 The first part lays out six “preliminary articles” for the establishment of “perpetual peace between 
states,” which essentially mandates that treaties that would allow for future hostilities be invalid, abolishes 
standing armies, disallows exorbitant national debt, forbids covert operations (e.g. assassins or poisoners), 
and generally advocates for the complete sovereignty of individual states. From the perspective of history, 
Kant’s proposals seem eerily prescient. 
 
3 Which, according to Mary Power, appeared first as “The Decay of Hospitality” in The Bystander, 29 
June, 1904. I quote from Free Opinions Freely Expressed on Certain Phases of Modern Social Life and 
Conduct, a collection of Corelli’s editorials, which appeared in 1905. 
 
4 2011 saw the launch of Hospitality & Society, an international multidisciplinary social sciences journal 
focusing upon hospitality’s connections to wider social and cultural processes and structures.  
 
5 Consider, for instance, France’s 2010 ban of face coverings, aka “the burqa ban,” Germany’s notoriously 
difficult citizenship test (introduced in 2008), and the rise of far right-wing, anti-immigration political 
parties, such as Spain’s Movimeinto Social Español, Norway’s Progress Party, or the UK’s British 
National Party, among numerous others.  
 
6 Latino/Hispanic immigration to the U.S. garners the most attention, the data actually reveal that Asian-
born immigrants have recently overtaken Hispanics as the largest proportion of immigrants to the U.S. 
Yet, Asian immigrants are rarely considered a threat to the U.S.’s economy, security, or identity. (Pew 
Research Center). 
 
7 He also predicts the oncoming wave of cross-cultural interaction in modernism, arguing that it is 
“…possible for men to come into touch with tone another across these unappropriated regions and to take 
advantage of our common claim to the face of the earth with a view to a possible intercommunication” 
(138). 
 
8 Kant’s view on hospitality as a “right” is admittedly problematic, in that it does open the door for an 
assimiliationist model, one we find demonstrated throughout U.S. and, now E.U., immigration policy. In 
the U.S. and, now, throughout the E.U., both of which enjoy their position of “host” on the basis of their 
imperialist (i.e. “forced hospitality” projects. Contra to Kant, Derrida argues that for hospitality to exist at 
all, it must be unconditional: “Let us say yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before 
any anticipation, before any identification, whether or not it has to do with a foreigner, an immigrant, an 
invited guest, or an unexpected visitor...” (Of Hospitality 77) 
 
9 Lynch, et al., offer that “one could in fact posit hospitality as operating on a continuum with commercial 
hospitality at one end, ulterior-motives hospitality a bit further along, reciprocal hospitality somewhere in 
the middle, and genuine altruistic hospitality at the other end” (11). 
 
10 The concept of hospitality is the cornerstone of Levinas’ discourse: “Metaphysics, or the relation with 
the other, is accomplished as service and as hospitality” (300). In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida 
states, “Although the word is neither frequently used nor emphasized within it, Totality and Infinity 
bequeaths to us an immense treatise of hospitality” (21). 
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11 His meaning is that the encounter of the I with the Other, thus resulting in the We, is the fundament of 
“a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality” (300). 
 
12 As Gauthier observes, “…Levinas’s discussion of the home posits nothing less than a normative 
standard by which the adequacy of the human relationship to place can be ethically judged” (165). 
 
13 For instance, hospitality scholar Judith Still argues that hospitality “inevitably touches on that 
fundamental ethical question…of the borders of the human, and how we set those up” 4 
14 In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida refers to this guest-master binary as a “chain that would link, 
like two sovereign powers, hospitality and ipseity” (18). 
 
15 Lambros Kamperidis observes, “According to the Burgundian Laws, a hospes is a barbarian warrior 
settled on Roman soil, based on the hospitalitas principle governing the settlement of barbarians on 
Roman estates” (12). 
 
16 Benveniste draws a comparison to the notion of potlatch common among Native Americans of the 
Northwest, which denotes a gift-giving ceremony and economic system in which each gift ceremoniously 
given to a guest produces an obligation of reciprocity and generates prestige for the host. 
 
17 Sigmund Freud explores this phenomenon in his short essay, “The Antithetical Meaning of Primal 
Words.”  In exploring an observation made in The Interpretation of Dreams that “[dreams] show a 
particular preference for combining contraries into a unity or for representing them as one and the same 
thing” (94).  Relaying the work of philologist Karl Abel, who studied at length the penchant for duality in 
ancient Egyptian, Freud concludes, “our concepts owe their existence to comparisons” (97). 
 
18 Along these same lines, Benveniste draws an interesting relation between the evolution of hostis and 
another series of words coming from the root *mei-, specifically the Latin munus, which connotes a sort of 
official gift but also an office or public duty.  From this root, stem the cognates muneral, municipal, and 
remunerate.  Benveniste suggests that the relationship between the sense of “exchange” and the sense of 
“public responsibility” “In nominating somebody as a magistrate one confers on him honour and certain 
advantages.  This obliges him in return to counter-service in the form of expenditure…” (79). 
 
19 Kamperidis observes that this migration in meaning is also reflected in contemporary religious 
ceremony: “Under the influence of the militaristic mentality of the West, even the sacrament of 
communion with God assumed the form of the Hostia, the sacrificial victim, the scapegoat slain as a 
hostage for the redemption, the atonement of our sins.”  The failure, then, is that the ceremony that began 
as a means of equalizing guest and host has devolved into a belief system that “reduces free men and 
women into inferior beings in need, worthy to receive institutionalized care, since they cannot of their own 
free will exercise their freedom of entering into relationships with one another, of offering hospitality to 
one another, of showing compassion to each other, as long as they perceive the other, the stranger, as 
enemy” (12) 
 
20 Although xenos has multiple possible meanings, the essential connotation is “foreigner,” although the 
degree of “foreignness” is ambiguous, and xenos can describe an individual who is not of one’s own 
family, state, or race, or, more abstractly, to someone who is merely a traveler to whom xenia is 
obligatorily extended. The latter conception, which could be thought of as “friend-guest” can be contrasted 
with philos (translated as “friend” or “relative”), which indicates a friendship relationship not beholden to 
the rituals of xenia. 
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21 In his accounting, Reece includes “everything that occurs from the moment a visitor approaches 
someone’s house until the moment he departs.” These “scenes” then are actually composites of a number 
of type-scenes, including arrival, reception, seating, feasting, identification, bedding down, bathing, gift 
giving, and departure (5). 
 
22 Reece notes that “a truly generous host may ‘bestow great honor’…on his guest by relinquishing his 
own ‘designated portion’…” (23). Cf. this scene to the “Ithaca” chapter of Joyce’s Ulysses, where Bloom 
extends ‘excessive’ hospitality to Stephen, giving him use of Bloom’s mustache cup and pouring the 
remainder of Molly’s cream. 
 
23 For example, in Book 3 of the Odyssey, Telemachus is welcomed by Nestor: “But when they saw / the 
strangers, all the men of Pylos rushed / to welcome them with hands outstretched; they asked / the visitors 
to join the celebrants” (3:45-48). Nestor proclaims that, “It surely is more proper to inquire—to ask our 
guest to tell us who they are—after and not before we’ve shared this feast” (3:93).   
 
24 The protocols of hospitality were especially important in an era when the common belief was that the 
gods (or their representatives) walked among men. Reece notes that theoxeny “appears in folktales 
universally, and is well attested in Greek and Roman myth generally,” citing the examples of Odysseus 
and the Phaecians (7.199-206), Telemachus meeting his father (16.178-79), and the suitors observing 
Odysseus disguised as a beggar (17.485-87) as examples where people suspect a disguised Odysseus as 
being a god come to judge the conduct of mortals (47). A review of the Odyssey will show that harm is 
immanent for any character who fails his or her obligation to xenia, either as a host or a guest. Consider, 
for instance, the devastation that befalls Odysseus’ men after slaughtering Helios’ oxen or the fate of the 
suitors to Penelope, who are egregiously poor guests. In terms of poor hosts, both Polyphemus and the 
Laestrygonians are punished for not obeying xenia. 
 
25 All quotes taken from Suggs, M. Jack, et al. The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible, with the 
Apocrypha. 
 
26 Two other notable examples from the Old Testament reiterate this theme of theoxenia: 1 Kings 17-18, in 
which the prophet Elijah seeks hospitality from a widow in Zarephath, and 2 Kings 4:9, in which the 
prophet Elisha repays the hospitality offered him by the Shunammite woman with a son (as with Sarah). 
27 Jean-Michel Rabaté writes that “The Dead,” “deals directly with the two related issues of hospitality and 
betrayal, which appears indeed as the perversion of hospitality” (155). 
 
28 Which, according to Powers, appeared first as “The Decay of Hospitality” in The Bystander, 29 June, 
1904. I quote from Free Opinions Freely Expressed on Certain Phases of Modern Social Life and 
Conduct, a collection of Corelli’s editorials, which appeared in 1905. 
 
29 It worth noting that the Feast of the Epiphany is celebrated on the twelfth day of Christmas, the day that 
the Magi brought their gifts to the infant Jesus.  Joyce’s careful selection of the setting calls to mind 
August Strindberg’s selection of the Feast of Saint John as the setting for Miss Julie – both holidays 
clearly connect to the core themes of the narratives. 
 
30 Jean-Michel Rabaté writes, “Quite early in his career, [Joyce] became aware of a tension between the 
cosmopolitan pattern he wanted to write down as a symptom of culture and a national or provincial reality 
that tenaciously resisted the virtuoso deployment of the most varied technical skills” (153). 
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31 Of interesting note, leading academic study on “Irish hospitality” seems concentrated on the provision 
of hospitality (particularly food, drink, and tobacco) at wakes and funerals. For an extended discussion, 
see Lysaght. Lysaght’s conception of hospitality is also at odds with Homeric hospitality, as I define it 
above. 
 
32 As Whelan argues, “Modernity’s nostalgia for its past became a political placebo, sweetening the bitter 
pill of history and establishing the comfort of distance between past and present…. “tradition” was a 
defence against a deliberately torn culture, fully exposed to, and unprotected against, the modernist blast” 
(60). We can find this conflict being examined elsewhere in Dubliners: “A Little Cloud” and “Evaline.” 
 
33 As Rabaté suggests, “Gabriel both wishes to exclude her from the gathering and to take her as an 
example of the rudeness, of the brash new spirit he condemns. ‘Hospitality’ begins fissuring itself, and 
needs an alien, a xenos, as a butt to satirize and criticize in order to rejoice in its fake universality” (157). 
 
34 As suggested earlier, Žižek distinguishes between loss and lack, wherein in the former, the subject 
actually loses the object, while the latter is an “already always” condition, in that the subject never 
possessed the object. 
 
35 Rabaté would agree: “Gabriel is thus portrayed as the liberal intellectual who is caught up between the 
values of the past he cannot completely make his—there is a forced and histrionic quality in his praise of 
tradition…. Gabriel’s beautiful soul swoons too quickly, betraying his own alienation, his ganwing sense 
of failure, his restless uneasiness” (Egoism 157). 
 
36 In many ways, the two are already equals; as Tagopoulos writes, “Stephen's presence in Bloom's house 
as a guest validates Bloom as a host—the latter can be a host only as long as there is a guest present.... 
Stephen, whom Bloom gets to know only that same day, is a 'stranger,' in the Joycean idiom, an Irishman 
who is an exile in his own fatherland, like Stephen, like Bloom, like the author himself” (191). 
 
37 Reece comments that “Telemachus’ hospitality is not merely conventional and adequate. He lavishes 
special attention on his guest, placing her spear against a pillar, in a stand among Odysseus’ own spears 
(1.127-29)” (49).  
 
38 And from this meaning comes our current conception, as a way to describe an organism that feeds off of 
a host. 
 
39 Joyce emphasizes this separation: “People, perhaps, were standing in the snow on the quay outside, 
gazing up at the lighted windows and listening to the waltz music”  
 
40 The most common reading is that Gabriel rejects Miss Ivors because she threatens his intelligence, 
thereby suggesting that the condition of modernity—the movement towards an uncertain and unstable 
future—is the cause of Gabriel’s anxiety. 
 
41 Mahaffey argues that hospitality “depends upon acceptance of the strangeness within the self” (31). 
 
42 Etymological evidence suggests that ghost and guest are cognates, as well.   
 
43 This attempt at emphasis by contrast can also be found in Book I of the Odyssey, where Telemachus 
displays extraordinary hospitality, as opposed to the inhospitable suitors, who make no attempt to either 
offer hospitality to their guest (Athena in disguise as Mentes) nor reciprocate the hospitality that they have 
been offered ad nauseum. 
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44 With regard to the reconsideration of the self in relation to others, Marian Eide suggests that, “Joyce’s 
fiction frames Levinas’s ethics as a system of compassion and generosity, and also of a goodness that 
displaces the self, that decenters the primacy of self as transitive in a way that, while it is morally good, is 
also deeply pleasurable” (“Otherness” 315). 
 
 
45 We may look elsewhere in Ulysses for instances of Stephen’s avoidance of obligation; the most obvious 
incident occurs in “The Wandering Rocks,” where Stephen experiences the agenbite of inwit—the remorse 
of conscience—in the form of his sister, Dilly: “She is drowning. Agenbite. Save her. Agenbite. All 
against us. She will drown me with her, eyes and hair. Lank coils of seaweed hair around me, my heart, 
my soul. Salt green death” (U 10:875-877). 
 
46 Marian Eide reads Bloom’s hospitality and strong sense of responsibility to others as masochism, in that 
he derives pleasure from subordinating himself to others.  Eide suggests that “Bloom’s masochistic 
pleasure does not reduce his altruism to mere self-interest but opens the possibility for an asymmetrical 
ethical reciprocity” (“Otherness” 315).  I would disagree slightly with Eide on this point, for although 
Bloom does give more than he receives elsewhere in the novel, in this particular scene – what might 
arguably be considered the climax of Ulysses—he acts with clear self-interest. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
What has happened will happen again, and what has been done will be done again; 
there is nothing new under the sun. 
--Ecclesiastes 1:9 
 
 
As Michael Levenson writes, in his excellent survey, Modernism, “no book on 
Modernism can ever be ambitious enough; there will always be much more to say and to 
write” (11). Modernist literature, in its ambitiousness and evasiveness, never seems 
definitively understood, and its meanings evolve as they are viewed through the 
kaleidoscope of contemporary culture. As Mahaffey writes, despite the common view 
that “Modernist writing is characterized by willful obscurity and shot through with 
nostalgia for a rapidly waning elite culture,” increased familiarity, such as I have 
attempted to limn in this dissertation, reveals a body of works that are “deeply engaged 
with questions of how we categorize, define, identify, and interpret the multiplicity of 
the world around us…” (3). In this way, Modernism remains current and serves as a 
bridge between “then” and “now.” 
Modernism asserts itself as a response to an era of rapid and overwhelming 
social, political, technological, philosophical, and scientific advances that rendered the 
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existing means of understanding and representing the world essentially useless, and 
Modernism suggested that notions borne by the Enlightenment and by Romanticism 
could not explain, and the narrative conventions that preceded this era could not 
adequately express, the sense of loss produced by these revolutions.  A distinction 
between varying practices of grief has been essential to my argument, as one form—
mourning—is accepted as a normal, healthy reaction to loss, while the other—
melancholia—is, in Freud’s original terms, “pathological.” While I do not dismiss 
melancholia as an unhealthy or inappropriate reaction to loss, I do admit that it is a 
problematic state of being, particularly because melancholia is by its nature an aporia. I 
identify two essential, interlocking, paradoxes that define melancholia.  First, the 
melancholic subject, while well aware of his own grief, does not fully comprehend what 
it is that he is mourning; he constructs a lack as a loss.  Secondly, the melancholic 
subject resists any means of resolving the grief, of successfully completing the act of 
mourning.  This apparent absence can either be the result of external—most commonly, 
cultural—factors that inhibit successful mourning, or internal constructs that prevent one 
from accommodating the loss and accepting consolation.1 
 I have suggested in this dissertation some possibilities for objects both created 
and lost to the Modernist subject: how one interpreted representative artistic production, 
how one conceived one’s own “community;” and how one behaved towards strangers.  
During the time period that I have considered in this dissertation—the late 1800’s 
through the 1920’s—these ideals, formerly stable concepts rooted in the prehistory of 
human society, were, being supplanted by new concepts, new means of knowing one’s 
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world and articulating one’s experience in it. With regard to aesthetics, the Modernist 
penchant for experimentalism engendered stylistic and formal innovations that presented 
themselves as rejections of preceding literary techniques. Politically, Modernism ranged 
from socialism to fascism, but in all cases demonstrated a commitment to individual 
freedom and to communities formed upon ideals as opposed to economic, geographic, 
linguistic, or religious affinities. The ethical concerns of Modernism focused chiefly on 
alterity, or the moral responsibilities owed to and by individual “others.”  These values 
thus established a movement in cultural production distinguished by its avowed self-
consciousness, penchant for appropriation of historical or exotic themes, concern for the 
function of essential forms, and social commitment.  As discussed at length in Chapter 
IV, one of the most influential modern concepts was the idea of the “nation,” which, 
beginning with the Enlightenment, supplanted local communities in favor of larger-scale 
societies conceptually organized around such abstract concepts as language, history, or 
politics. As Benedict Anderson suggests, the end of the eighteenth century brought not 
only the “dawn of the age of nationalism” but the “dusk of religious modes of thought.”  
As he offers, 
The century of Enlightenment, of rationalist secularism, brought with it its own 
modern darkness. With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief 
in part composed did not disappear. Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes  
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fatality more arbitrary. Absurdity of salvation: nothing makes another style of 
continuity more necessary. What then was required was a secular transformation 
of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning.  
(11) 
In this context, where the irrefutable and immutable truth of religious doctrine is 
replaced by ideological communities, that a widespread sense of grief should be present 
is perhaps unsurprising. Given that melancholia is a form of grief for an ideal not fully 
comprehended, it is a logical state of being for the modern subject. Melancholia is also 
sustained by its ability to fabricate a sense of identity. The melancholic-modern subject 
is identified by his status as one who has suffered a loss.  As Jahan Ramazani suggests, 
identifying oneself through loss can even be the foundation of a national ideal: “Because 
death is nothing but sheer construct, it is in its imagined forms inextricable from our 
local, national, and subnational frames of reference and custom, thinking, and feeling. 
As such, it lends itself to being…the absent center around which the nation weaves 
itself” (Ramazani Transnational 92).  
This attachment to an idealized past can be problematic, as the conversion of 
absence into loss can have serious political implications. Mourning could be seen not 
only as what LaCapra terms, “individual or quasi-transcendental grieving” but as a 
“homeopathic socialization or ritualization of the repetition-compulsion that attempts to 
turn it against the ‘death drive’ and counteract compulsiveness by re-petitioning in ways 
that allow for a measure of critical distance, change, resumption of social life, ethical 
responsibility, and renewal.”  In contrast, melancholy produces an “impossibly mournful 
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response to the closure of metaphysics, a generalized ‘hauntology,’” that problematizes 
our interpretation and critical evaluation of historical trauma (LaCapra 189-190).  We 
understand that Freud’s framework identifies self-loathing as an aspect of melancholia. 
Self-reproach is also a characteristic of Modernism, often understood as a bifurcated 
process of criticizing the process of modernization while also demanding a radical 
rupture with the past. One objective of my discussion, however, has been to suggest that 
melancholia may threaten not only our individual psychic well-being, but also our 
understanding of history and politics. 
Few Americans who were alive and aware at the time will ever forget where they 
were or what they were doing at or around 8:46 AM, EST, September 11, 2001.  I was 
brushing my teeth, preparing for a day of teaching at the University of New Orleans 
when I was called up to the living room of my Irish Channel shotgun by my roommate. I 
arrived at 8:02 AM, CST, just in time to see the second airliner strike the South Tower of 
the World Trade Center, live on television.  I immediately knew that I had just witnessed 
something tragic and horrible, although I could not imagine at the time what a profound 
effect it would soon have on our culture, our history, and our collective psyche.  After 
showering, dressing, eating, and driving to campus, just as I would any other Tuesday, I 
found myself in front of 25 freshmen writing students.  Nobody had stayed home.  They 
wanted to talk.  Their reactions ranged from utter grief—some were weeping—to 
stunned and silent disbelief, to outright rage.  What I remember most is that they were 
looking to me, a first-year college instructor who at the ripe age of 25 had yet to even 
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buy a car on my own, to explain what had just happened, what it meant, and what we 
should do next.  We had lost something vital—we didn’t know anything. 
What is notable about the tragic events of September 11, 2001, is the widespread 
and universal grief experienced by every American, and millions of others worldwide. 
This grief was not solely felt by the friends and relations of the 2,977 victims of these 
atrocities—it was deeply felt by everyone. For my part, after the full details of the events 
came to light, I had been shaken to my core, and many friends commented to me that I 
seemed to be “taking it pretty hard.” I, like everyone who is reading these words, live in 
a world of ideas, of abstract concepts and philosophical notions, and it profoundly 
frightened me to witness the destruction that could be wrought by others who also lived 
in a world of ideas.  Powerful ideas.   
This profound sense of loss will forever mark our generation to future scholars, 
although it remains to be seen how this trauma defines the formal means by which we 
relate our experiences to one another, how we narrate our experience to the future.  That 
much may not be fully understood until the last witness of 9/11 is gone from this earth.  
The losses endured were, for the vast majority of us, not corporeal losses; we did not 
grieve the loss of a brother or sister, wife or husband, mother or father.  What we began 
to mourn was something more abstract – an ideal that we perhaps had not fully 
comprehended prior to the attacks. Naming this ideal is difficult, and agreement on the 
terms is unlikely.  Perhaps we would call it “safety,” “certainty,” “distance,” or 
“superiority,” while others prefer to simply say “freedom.”  I would argue that what we 
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lost was our innocence, the lovely naiveté enjoyed by the privileged minority of humans 
who never experience threat of sudden violence and instantaneous death from afar. 
Sadly, the traumatic reverberations of 9/11 are not a unique occurrence. The 
survivors and witnesses of the Rwandan Genocide, the Cambodian Killing Fields, the 
Holocaust, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Rape of Nanking, the Russian 
Pogroms, the Armenian Genocide, the Herero and Namaqua Genocide, and innumerable 
other atrocities from the past century can surely lay claim to equal if not greater losses.  
Death and violence were not invented in the twentieth century, but they were certainly 
improved upon. That our societies, however one cares to define them, are forever 
changed after these tragedies is inarguable. What is less certain is if we have 
appropriately mourned these losses, memorialized the victims, and “worked through” the 
grief.  I cannot imagine that we have or even could do so, and for a great many 
survivors, there is a steadfast refusal to do so.  As LaCapra observes,  
Those traumatized by extreme events, as well as those empathizing with them, 
may resist working through because of what might almost be termed a fidelity to 
trauma, a feeling that one must somehow keep faith with it. Part of this feeling 
may be the melancholic sentiment that, in working through the past in a manner 
that enables survival or a reengagement in life, one is betraying those who were 
overwhelmed and consumed by that traumatic past.  
(Writing History 22) 
As suggested earlier in this dissertation, an ethical code may oblige one not to complete 
the mourning process, not to release the lost object. There is, as Žižek argues, a 
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“conceptual and ethical primacy of melancholy,” for no loss is every fully worked 
through, and there is always a remainder.  For Žižek, “the ultimate fidelity is the fidelity 
to this remainder,” and “mourning is a kind of betrayal, the second killing of the (lost) 
object” (658). Therefore, if we seek an ethical relationship with the past, melancholia is 
essential. 
As previously discussed, Derrida has argued that the only way to appropriately 
honor the dead is to sustain a relationship that combines intimacy with the certain 
finality of their passing—which he describes in terms of “aporia,” or an impossibility.  
In the practice of mourning, we keep the other alive “in memory,” which re-creates the 
other within ourselves.  We bring the lost object into ourselves through the practice of 
memory, practiced as a “faithful interiorization” that “makes the other a part of us” 
(Memoires 35).  Ultimately, just as Freud came to argue in Ego and the Id, Derrida 
posits that we are who we are only as a product of our interiorized losses. In Derrida’s 
view, however, melancholia forces us to choose between two infidelities: do we fail to 
memorialize the past, or do we internalize the loss, thus maintaining a conversation with 
the dead through a sort of ventriloquism? The work of mourning remains simultaneously 
compulsory and impossible.  We maintain our losses inside of ourselves through 
memory, we speak of them and to them, but the dead remain apart in their ultimate 
alterity, gazing back upon us. 
It is perhaps because of its ultimate irresolvabilty that melancholia retains its 
negative connotation, despite the ethical and creative vantage it provides. Another source 
of the negative disposition towards melancholia is its tendency to diminish our ability to 
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remember. The primary purpose of what scholars in the humanities do is to look 
backward at what has already happened, what we have made, done, or said, and create a 
sensible narrative out of it.  We call this narrative history. Our ability to accurately craft 
this narrative greatly depends on proximity and distance—that is, our temporal and 
geographic relationship with the events in question.2  When these two delimiters are 
violated—that is, when an event is impossibly close or overwhelmingly rapid—we 
experience trauma. It is trauma, I would argue, not melancholia, that is what 
problematizes memory and, thereby, history. For instance, as Cathy Caruth has 
observed, “the possibility of knowing history…is raised as a deeply ethical dilemma: the 
unremitting problem of how not to betray the past” (27).  Caruth also suggests that this 
problematic relationship with history can, in the view of some, “lead to political and 
ethical paralysis,” as “the possibility that reference is indirect, and that consequently we 
may not have direct access to others’, or even our own, histories, seems to imply the 
impossibility of access to other cultures and hence of any means of making political and 
ethical judgements” (10). The impossibility of history is therefore assigned to 
melancholia, with its fixation on the past. 
But as previously suggested, however, melancholia is an essentially creative state 
of being, not in that it requires one to re-construct (or, in the case of absence, completely 
construct) the lost object, but to create the narrative of our present relation to that lost 
object.  As Caruth suggests, that by reconsidering our response to traumatic loss, “we 
can begin to recognize the possibility of a history that is no longer straightforwardly 
referential” and that we can understand that “a rethinking of reference is aimed not at 
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eliminating history but at resituating it in our understanding, that is, precisely permitting 
history to arise where immediate understanding may not” (11). This inability to make 
sense of what has happened, this sense of being separated from history, to not participate 
in it, explains much of what we now recognize as Modernist literature.3 What 
modernism presents as an historic loss, might also be understood as a creative absence. 
Any artistic attempt to make visible the greatness that we can conceive is insufficient—
therefore, the affectation of the melancholic mode is painful, dejected, inconsolable. The 
object of loss in these cases typically inhabits some sort of “cultural archive”—that is, it 
is typically a lost ideal or abstraction, a value promoted by a cultural “metanarrative” 
that is perceived as having passed.  Whether or not the ideal (and its metanarrative) is 
actually lost or is simply absent is one of the primary questions of this dissertation.  
The objective of this dissertation was not to provide a sweeping summary or 
survey of melancholia exhibited in Modernist narratives, but rather to establish the 
framework for continued discussion of Modernism’s fundamentally melancholic nature.  
This claim proceeds from the premise that the thematic, formal, and stylistic 
characteristics that conventionally define Modernism are a response to the pervasive 
sense of loss that resulted from upheavals in science, politics, and cultural production in 
the West at or near the turn of the twentieth century.  Those attendant to the crisis of 
modernism grieved the loss of stability of meaning they claimed had once been enjoyed 
by their predecessors.  Thus, Modernist narratives exhibit melancholic attachments to 
perceived objects of loss—ideals such as truth in beauty, a knowable community, or 
authentic hospitality. This claim would initially seem at odds with the characteristic 
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avant-gardism and experimentalism of Modernist literature, qualities that one would 
typically associate with progressivism, not nostalgic conservativism.  
I cannot help but feel, however, that by suggesting that Modernist literature is 
simultaneously progressive and nostalgic, I have somehow suggested that Modernism is 
either inauthentic or hypocritical. The argument could be made that efforts to “make it 
new” fall short of the mark, and that Modernism simply puts old wine in new wineskins, 
to invert the old phrase. While this argument could be made, however, I don’t believe it 
to be worthwhile to do so, as being dismissive of any work of art as “inauthentic” 
demonstrates a narrow view of history.  It is for this reason I began the dissertation with 
an epigraph from Bakhtin’s essay “Discourse and the Novel,” which asserts that, “Every 
age reaccentuates in its own way the works of its most immediate past.”  As Bakhtin 
continues: 
The historical life of classic works is in fact the uninterrupted process of their 
social and ideological re-accentuation. Thanks to the intentional potential 
embedded in them, such works have proved capable of uncovering each era and 
against ever new dialogizing backgrounds ever newer aspects of meaning; their 
semantic content literally continues to grow, to further create out of itself. 
Likewise their influence on subsequent creative works inevitably includes re-
accentuation. New images in literature are very often created through a re-
accentuation of old images, by translating them from one accentual register to 
another…. 
(421). 
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T.S. Eliot offers a similar argument in his defense of Joyce’s Ulysses against criticisms 
that Joyce’s strategy to structure the novel as a parallel to Homer’s The Odyssey is 
nothing more than, “an amusing dodge, or scaffolding erected by the author for the 
purpose of disposing his realistic tale, of no interest in the completed structure.”  In 
response, Eliot praised Joyce’s work as a watershed moment, the founding of a new art 
form, based on a “mythic method” that represented “a step toward making the modern 
world possible for art, toward that order and form” that the offended critics so desired. 
By “re-accentuating” the narrative, Joyce had translated one human experience from eras 
long past into the Modern idiom, which, like Einstein’s theories, is but a “simply a way 
of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense 
panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history.” In this way, we 
respond to the crisis of modernity by seeking our place in the flow of human history.   
In conclusion, I offer three questions in summation that will, one hopes, inspire 
continued investigation and discussion.  First: is grief experienced as the result of the 
physical death of a loved one substantively different than the grief experienced as the 
result of a lost ideal?  Do we assume that the former is more powerful or more 
“authentic” than the latter?  Is mourning a lost ideal substantively different than 
mourning a literal loss? And what degree are these differences discernable in literary 
representations of loss?  And can mourning be a way of killing off an ideal one wishes to 
alter, while melancholia is an aporatic method for both creating that revolution and 
maintaining connection with history? 
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Secondly, must grief—either corporeal or abstract—be resolved, worked 
through, or otherwise completed in order to be considered “successful?”  As discussed in 
the first two chapters of this dissertation, Freud’s original conception of mourning vs. 
melancholia classified the former as a “healthy” reaction to loss, a normal psychological 
process that must be allowed to run its course; whereas melancholia is to be considered 
“pathological” in that, by refusing consolation for his grief or to release the lost object, 
the melancholic subject is subject to irresolvable self-loathing.  As we know, Freud later 
revisited the idea that melancholia was merely an “unsuccessful” attempt to mourn, 
arguing instead that the behaviors considered as melancholic are but a step in completing 
the “work” of mourning.  By recreating the lost object within the ego, the melancholic 
subject maintains fidelity to the lost other through acts of imitation. The hostility and 
self-loathing that Freud initially identified is not necessarily a symptom of melancholia, 
but rather an indication that the subject holds unresolved ambivalence or hostility 
towards the lost object, feelings that, through the process of introjection, are grafted onto 
the ego.  Therefore, if these feelings are worked through, melancholia may be the only 
means by which the ego can endure the emotional pain of loss.  Melancholia is, in this 
framework, a necessary phase of mourning, one through which the character of the ego 
is constructed (Ego 19). We become, in essence, who we are because we mourn. 
The third and final question for further discussion regards the relationship 
between grief, memory, and history.  In our attempts to memorialize what has been lost, 
to what degree do we misremember the past, creating an inaccurate or inauthentic 
history? As discussed in Chapter II, when experiencing abstract grief—that is, grief for a 
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lost ideal, rather than a literal loss—there exists the risk of confusing absence for loss.  
We may mourn the loss of an ideal that, in our nostalgic imaginations, once existed but 
has since, in the face of modernity, ceased to exist.  In this attempt to articulate the 
process of being a human being—to create a narrative—we thus proceed from a faulty 
premise. We refuse to accept that the conditions or ideals that we so desperately seek 
never existed at all; it is somehow preferable to believe that they have been lost. 
LaCapra suggests that “the conversion of absence into loss gives anxiety an identifiable 
object…and generates the hope that anxiety may be eliminated or overcome.”  Whether 
consciously or not, the anxiety related to absence is less preferable to the anxiety of loss, 
as it has little possibility of being overcome or resolved (and this impossibility is a likely 
source of the blame and hostility that the melancholic directs at others).  In contrast, by 
converting absence into loss, “one assumes that there was (or at least could be) some 
original unity, wholeness, security, or identity that others have ruined, polluted, or 
contaminated and thus made ‘us’ lose” (183).  This process of converting absence to loss 
is often termed “nostalgia,” indicating a sentimental longing for an idealized past. 
To read Modernism is to assent to paradox. As Morag Shiach asserts, in her 
contributing chapter of The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms, “Modernism is 
constructed through its own contradictions: it is rooted in tradition and classicism but 
fascinated by the impulse towards the ‘new’; it aspires to aesthetic integrity but finds 
increasingly ingenious ways to capture fragmentation; it presses towards the intensity of 
the moment but also reaches towards the infinite” (17-18).  This dissertation has argued 
that the paradoxical nature of Modernist narrative, which concurrently maintains hope 
 209 
 
and grief, optimism and despair, is an aesthetic reaction to the widespread conflicts and 
upheavals occurring at or near the turn of the twentieth century. The challenging 
thematic, formal, and stylistic innovations of Modernist literature proceed from 
melancholia—understood as a form of inconsolable grief, an impossible mourning. As it 
is not a static canon, but an unending attempt to find and make meaning in our perceived 
losses, Modernism becomes not a period, but a “process.” This perceived sense of loss, a 
pervasive feeling that the nature of individual existence has irrevocably changed, is the 
defining characteristic of literary Modernism.  Modernist narrative literature can, 
therefore, be simultaneously read as both melancholic and progressive.  
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Notes
1 It is worth considering the socio-historical context of Modernist melancholia. That Sigmund Freud 
should compose the definitive pathology of grief in 1917 in the midst of the Great War is unsurprising, 
considering that the codification of death was undergoing significant revision In Britain, specifically, 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, funerary practices significantly changed, due in 
large part to Queen Victoria herself.  Ever the trendsetter, Victoria had had much influence on British 
attitudes towards mourning, particularly with regard to her conspicuous and long-running grief over the 
death of her husband Albert, who preceded her in death by forty years. Following Victoria’s lead, 
mourning in England became a protracted performance.  For instance, following the death of a loved one, 
it was expected that the bereaved wear black clothing for a period of at least one year (deep mourning), 
after which her or she would dress in other dark colors (half mourning), typically purple or dark green.  
After a suitable period of time, the bereaved would “come out of mourning” and resume wearing brightly 
colored clothing.  Funerary practices were taken out of the home and given over to professionals, and most 
of the rituals associated with state funerals (e.g. backwards-facing boots, the conveyance of the body by 
gun carriage). I am planning future work exploring the connection between the publicization (and 
professionalization) of grief during this time period and portrayals of grief in Modernist narratives. 
 
2 One of Kern’s most interesting premises is that the strong reaction to the establishment of a World 
Standard Time in the artistic and philosophical communities can help to explain the avant-gardism of 
Modernist narrative and spatial arts: 
 
The assault on a universal, unchanging, and irreversible public time was the metaphysical 
foundation of a broad cultural challenge to traditional notions about the nature of the world and 
man’s place in it.  The affirmation of private time radically interiorized the locus of experience.  
It eroded conventional views about the stability and objectivity of the material world and of the 
mind’s ability to comprehend it.  Man cannot know the world “as it really is” if he cannot know 
what time it really is.  If there are as many private times as there are individuals, then every 
person is responsible for creating his own world from one moment to the next, and creating it 
alone. 
(314) 
 
3 As Esther Sanchez-Pardo suggests, “[Modernist] writers used a number of strategies to draw attention 
away from the intrinsic temporality of language and human action,” including the use of “mythic 
structures as organizing principles, the movement from perspective to perspective, rather than from event 
to event, and the use of metaphoric images as leitmotivs to draw together separate moments and thereby 
efface the time that has elapsed between them” (211).  New and dramatic forms of loss mandated new and 
dramatic means of expression.  
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